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I. Introduction
A true story: Two infertile couples, Donna and Richard Fasano of
Staten Island, N.Y.,1 and Deborah Perry-Rogers and Robert Rogers of
Teaneck, NJ.,2 went to the In Vitro Fertility Center of New York, an IVF
clinic in Manhattan, for treatment on the same day in April 1998. Both
couples were engaged in in vitro fertilization procedures that created preembryos 3 ("test tube babies") with hopes of giving birth to their own
babies. Due to a clinical error that caused a pre-embryo mix-up that day,4
Donna Fasano was mistakenly impregnated with at least one and possibly
between 3 and 6 of the Rogerses' pre-embryos along with at least one of
her and her husband's pre-embryos.5 Deborah Perry-Rogers was also
implanted with pre-embryos on April 24, 1998, but all those pre-embryos
were her and her husband's.6 Unfortunately, the Perry-Rogers' pregnancy
did not “take.”7 A few weeks later on May 28, 1998, after Donna Fasano

1

Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 276 A.D.2d 67, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept.
2000). Although the opinion mentions Donna's first name, it never identifies Mr. Fasano's
first name. I gathered this other information first from newspaper articles and then from the
record in the case. Michael Grunwald, In Vitro, in Error, and Now, in Court; White Mother
Given Black Couple's Embryo Will Give One 'Twin' Back, WASH . POST, March 31, 1999, at
A01, available in 1999 WL 2208496.
2
I first discovered their hometown in Samuel Maull, Teaneck Parents Opposing 'Twin'
Visits, REC. N. N.J., February 4, 2000, at A06, available in 2000 WL 14796459.
3
These fertilized few cells can also be referred to as zygotes, pre-zygotes, or -embryos, but
for conceptual clarity in this paper (rather than scientific accuracy), I will call them
embryos and pre-embryos interchangeably.
4
Both couples have filed malpractice claims against the clinic operator, Dr. Lillian Nash,
and the embryologist, Dr. Michael Obasaju. Bob Groves, Lawyers Argue Over Visitation in
Case of Misplaced Embryo, REC. N. N.J., June 10, 2000, at A03, available in 2000 WL
15818246. The Appellate Division ruled that the Rogerses’ malpractice lawsuit for
emotional harm damages may continue despite the absence of physical injury. PerryRogers v. Obasaju, 282 A.D.2d 231, 723 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y.A.D., 1st Dep’t., 2001); Fasano
v. Nash, 282 A.D.2d 277, 723 N.Y.S.2d 181 (N.Y.A.D., 1st Dep’t 2001). The original
action in Perry-Rogers v. Fasano was filed under the index number for the malpractice claim,
Perry-Rogers v. Nash, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No. 601212/99).
5
Complaint at ¶¶¶ 47, 66, and 81, Perry-Rogers v. Fasano (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (No.
601212/99).
6
Id. at ¶ 65.
7
The Rogerses’ complaint against the clinic alleges that once the clinic realized the mistake
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knew she was pregnant with twins, the clinic notified both couples of the
mistake. The Rogerses attempted to learn who had their pre-embryos, but
they were unable to find out at that time. The Fasanos, on the other hand,
did not take any affirmative steps to identify either of their fetus' genetic
parents during Mrs. Fasano’s pregnancy or for several months after the
children's birth. 8
On December 29, 1998, Mrs. Fasano gave birth to two male
infants, one of whom is European-American like the Fasano couple and the
other who is African-American, like the Rogerses. The Fasanos were
content to raise both sons, whom they named Vincent and Joseph.
However, when the Rogerses learned about the birth "by luck,"9 they
insisted on having genetic tests done. Those tests revealed that the
African-American boy was their genetic child. 10
The Rogerses
immediately sued for a declaration of parentage and custody. They also
renamed the boy Akeil Richard Rogers. When genetic tests revealed that
Joseph/Akeil11 was the genetic child of the Rogerses, the Fasanos agreed
to relinquish custody to the Rogerses, if the Rogerses would execute a
written agreement granting them liberal visitation. The agreement, signed
on April 29, 1999, gave the Rogerses custody, but contained a carefully
delineated visitation schedule and provided for $200,000 liquidated
damages, if the Rogerses violated the visitation agreement. Pursuant to
that agreement, on May 5, 1999, the Fasanos signed affidavits
acknowledging that the Rogerses were Joseph/Akeil’s genetic parents,

of implanting Donna Fasano with their embryos, the clinic personnel quickly got a second
batch of pre-embryos together to implant in Deborah Perry-Rogers, but those pre-embryos
were of lesser quality. Complaint at ¶ 48, supra note 5.
8
Brief for Appellant-Rogers at 3, Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 276 A.D.2d 67 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000) (No. 601218/99) (citing Record on Appeal, at 50-51 and 107).
9
I assume this “luck” was either a breach of confidentiality by someone at the IVF clinic or
their following up on media reports about a mother who gave birth to twins of different
races. I have found no reports that explain how the Rogerses actually came to learn who
gave birth to their genetic child.
10
Genetic tests revealed that Joseph/Akeil was 99.97 percent certain the genetic child of
Deborah Perry-Rogers and 99.96 per cent certain the genetic child of Robert Rogers.
Complaint at ¶ 60, supra note 5.
11
Throughout this article, I call the baby, Joseph/Akeil or Akeil/Joseph, so as not to
privilege one set of parents by using solely their name for the boy.
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consenting to the entry of a final order of custody in the Rogerses' favor,
and agreeing to change Joseph/Akeil’s birth certificate. On May 10, 1999,
when the baby was four and a half months old, the Fasanos turned the
infant over to the Rogerses. The next day the Rogerses complied with the
agreement by discontinuing with prejudice the action against the Fasanos
(although they retained their action against the IVF clinic).
Had the story ended here, we probably could have agreed that the
best was made of a bad situation. But two weeks later the Rogerses were
back in court seeking a resolution that was different from the one to which
the parties had agreed. On May 25, 1999, the Rogerses sued the Fasanos
by petitioning the court for a declaratory judgment about Akeil/Joseph's
parentage, seeking sole and exclusive custody, and making no mention of
the visitation agreement that was signed. After several stages of legal
wrangling and a full evidentia ry hearing, the court issued a January 14,
2000 order allowing the Fasanos substantial visitation. It is from this order
that the Rogerses appealed, seeking to void the visitation agreement
entirely. The appeals court rendered the startling decision that the Fasanos
had no standing to claim visitation rights to Joseph/Akeil; they had no
parental right to even ask the court to enforce the visitation agreement.
The troubling resolution of this case by an intermediate appellate court of
New York prompted my reflections in this essay.
This essay explores some of the legal policy questions that arise
when strangers' lives become inextricably linked because of assisted
reproductive technologies (ARTs)12 gone awry. At the intersection of law,

12

ARTs include artificial insemination by donor (AID or DI), in vitro fertilization (IVF),
embryo transfer, cryopreserved (frozen) embryos and gametes, GIFT (gamete intrafallopian
transfer), ZIFT (zygote intrafallopian transfer), PGD (preimplantation genetic diagnosis),
ICSI (intracytoplasmic sperm injection), gestational and traditional surrogacy, genetic
enhancement or engineering, cloning, and more. These technologies, as a group, go by
several other nomenclatures, including new reproductive technologies and collaborative
reproduction. For an excellent early bibliography on these technologies, see ABA Task
Force on the Law of Reproduction and Genetic Technology (H. Joseph Gitlin, Lori B.
Andrews, Phyllis G. Bossin, Lawrence H. Stotter, Stuart B. Walzer & Bruce Lord Wilder),
Section of Family Law, A GUIDE TO REPRODUCTIVE AND GENETIC T ECHNOLOGIES: A
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF M EDICAL AND LEGAL WRITING (American Bar Association
1990). The expanded use of these reproductive technologies is phenomenal. A study
published in June 2000 noted that one in 80 births in Britain are "test-tube" babies. One in
80 Born in Britain is a Test-Tube Baby, DAILY T ELEGRAPH (LONDON ), June 28, 2000,
available in 2000 WL 23256967.
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medicine, technology, and ethics, cases arising out of mistakes with ARTs
reveal more than just the frights of failed technologies and human error.
Cases like that of the Rogerses against the Fasanos unveil race-biased and
sex-biased assumptions that skew our legal analyses. At the heart of the
problem are the revealed assumptions about the role that genetics and
genetic relationships should play in defining legal parenthood. The
tendency of courts to default to a “genetic essentialism” 13 when trying to
unravel the complicated messes of maternity created by mistakes in ARTs
is alarming.
Genetic essentialism asserts that our genes and our DNA are the
essence, the core, the most important constituent part of who we are as
human beings; therefore genetics should overpower any other factor when
defining things like biological parenthood. Genetic essentialism reduces
human beings to the contents of our cells. It ignores the ways our cells and
environments interrelate, the ways our physiological system functions as a
whole organism, and the ways our minds and hearts affect our being.
Additionally, genetic essentialism renders all our ways of nurturing and
being nurtured by one another for naught.
My aim in writing this essay is to challenge courts, lawyers,
bioethicists and legal theorists to reject genetics as the ultimate tie -breaker
in contests over legal maternity and legal parenthood. I argue that a
genetics-based or genetic essentialist approach is sex-biased, because it
discounts entirely the relational, nurturing, biological contributions to
reproduction that only women make--gestation and birth. I also argue that
a genetics-based approach can be race-biased because it relies only on
physical/biological signifiers of race, rather than understandings of the
compound socio-political, historical, legal, cultural and economic meanings
of race.
When an ART mistake involves racial differences as the PerryRogers v. Fasano case does, a genetic essentialist approach or a simplistic
race-matching approach to parenthood dangerously reduces the complexity
of the race issues to seemingly unadorned biological facts. If it was not
genetic essentialism that led the court to biological notions of race, then the
court employed other hidden race-biased assumptions that ought to be

13

DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE , T HE DNA M YSTIQUE: T HE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON 38-49 (W.H. Freeman & Co., 1995).
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exposed to light and challenged. None of this bodes well for an appropriate
legal analysis of parenthood for victims of ART mistakes, and yet an
appropriate legal analysis is more ominously needed every day.
Desperation for children of their own led the Fasanos and the
Rogerses to use assisted reproductive technologies to achieve their desired
ends. ARTs, when successful, have enormous power to help couples
create new life, but ARTs can exaggerate the pains of infertility when they
are not successful. 14
As with any other humanly designed and
implemented technological fix, ARTs may have a third consequence: the
problems associated with negligent or reckless errors, or even with
intentional abuses. The magnitude of harm from this third consequence
cannot be overstated. 15

14

“In 1995, approximately 7.1 percent of the nation’s married couples with wives of
childbearing age were currently infertile, meaning that they had not conceived after at least
twelve months of unprotected intercourse. Approximately 12.9 percent of married couples
reported some form of impaired fecundity, i.e., problems in conceiving or carrying a
pregnancy to term.” NEW YORK STATE T ASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW , ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE T ECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY ,
Executive Summary, http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/taskfce/execsum.htm. The
written report suggests that "the incidence of infertility is 10.5[%] among married couples
with non-Hispanic black women, roughly 1.5 times greater than among Hispanic or nonHispanic white women.” See also American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM),
Fact Sheet: Infertility, at http://www.asrm.org/ Patients/faqs.html (reporting that over 6.1
million Americans suffer from infertility). Lisa C. Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, the Too Fertile,
and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1007 (1996)(examining the discursive use of the
language of fertility and infertility and procreative technologies and their consequences for
our understandings and laws about motherhood, race, gender, class, and sexuality).
Linda Lacey and Barbara Berg make powerful pleas for understanding the perspectives
of infertile women and couples, and urge feminist scholars and writers on this subject not to
discount their pain, needs and good faith. Linda J. Lacey, "O Wind, Remind Him That I
Have No Child": Infertility and Feminist Jurisprudence, 5 M ICH . J. GENDER & L. 163
(1998); Barbara J. Berg, Listening to the Voices of the Infertile, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS &
THE LAW 80 (J. Callahan, ed., Indiana U. Press 1995). Berg additionally critiques the
repeated media, scientific, and scholarly descriptions of infertile couples as "desperate."
Though I hear and value her critique, the concept of desperation still seems apt in this case
to me.
15
In addition to any physical harms that arise from ART mistakes, the emotional distress is
unimaginable. Because the genuineness of emotional distress claims arising in these
circumstances is not in doubt, in the two medical malpractice cases brought by both couples
against the IVF clinic physicians, the New York Appellate Division, First Department, was
willing to permit an action for emotional distress even without proof of physical injury, a
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The Fasano and the Rogers families are victims of inexcusable
negligence by an ART provider. Were this essay about the medical
malpractice lawsuit against the IVF clinic, proof of negligence would be
easy and the only challenging issue would be how to assess the appropriate
damages. But, this essay is about the child, who his family is, and the
assumptions that courts should or should not use when resolving these
complicated messes. Who should have custody of Joseph/Akeil and why?
Should visitation be granted to the other couple? Lower and intermediate
appellate New York courts were asked and already answered these
questions in Perry-Rogers v. Fasano.16 Leave for appeal to New York's
highest court, the Court of Appeals, was filed in December 2000 and
denied in May 2001. 17 The New York Court of Appeals' failure to take up
this important case and to right the terrible wrong done by the lower courts
does not silence the issues presented.
This essay begins by situating the problem of ART mistakes within
the problems that law faces in the bioethics arena, and then specifically
critiques the reasoning and approach in the October 2000 decision by the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department in the
Perry-Rogers v. Fasano case. My critique illustrates that in order to
judge this kind of dispute appropriately, courts must tackle deeper issues
about the flawed assumptions underlying their analyses. Similar kinds of
cases raising questions about genes, parenthood and assisted reproductive
technologies will inevitably reach other state highest courts, even if the
New York Court of Appeals avoided the issue this time around. My hope
is to provide some insights that will enable courts and lawyers involved in
cases of ART mistakes to understand the unintended biases that distort this
decision-making process when they fail to examine their assumptions.

II.

Bioethical Dilemmas, ARTs, and Law

highly unusual move for New York courts. Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju, 282 A.D.2d 231; 723
N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Fasano v. Nash, 282 A.D.2d 277; 723 N.Y.S.2d 181
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
16
276 A.D.2d 67, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2000).
17
Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 96 N.Y.2d 712, 754 N.E.2d 199 (N.Y. 2001).
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For the last two decades, our judicial system has trailed woefully
behind (often being dragged kicking and screaming) the complex bioethical
dilemmas that accompany the rapid advances in biotechnology,
biomedicine, and assisted reproductive technologies. For a bioethics and
law professor, the weekly news is an embarrassment of riches: conjoined
twins for whom separation surgery necessarily will result in the death of
one twin;18 "designer babies" whose embryos were genetically tested and

18

See, e.g., In re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation), [2001] Fam. 147 CA,
[2001] 2 W.L.R. 480 (C.A. September 22, 2000), available in 2000 WL 1274054. This
British case involves Michaelangelo and Rina Attarc, a strict Roman Catholic Maltese
couple originally from Gozo, who went to Manchester, England to give birth to their
conjoined twins on August 8, 2000. Twins, Jodie and Mary, were joined at the abdomen
with fused spines, two sets of legs and arms at right angles to their bodies, but one heart and
one lung. Doctors said both would soon die if kept together because the heart and the other
organs were not strong enough to support two bodies. Doctors said Mary had "primitive
brain functions" and was "draining [the] lifeblood" out of Jodie. Id. at 204. The girls'
parents refused separation surgery. Doctors went to court to get permission to operate. A
British Court of Appeals ordered surgery after five days of hearings, in an order dated
September 22, 2000, written by Lord Justice Alan Ward, himself the father of twin girls.
Id. The judge said that Mary lived "on borrowed time, all of it borrowed from her sister.
She is incapable of independent existence." Id. at 162. The court also said, "Jodie has a
right to protest that Mary is killing her," describing the killing of Mary in this case as
"legitimate self-defense" and "the lesser of the two evils—the death of one twin instead of
the death of both." Id. at 204. See also Majorie Miller, British Judges OK Surgery to
Separate Twins, L.A. TIMES, September 23, 2000, at A1; Warren Hoge, Siamese Twin is
Separated; ‘sadly dies’ to save sister, N.Y. TIMES, November 8, 2000, at A9; and Editorial,
A Cruel Solomonic Dilemma, S.F. CHRON ., September 6, 2000, at A20, available in 2000
WL 6490740. Surgery was performed when the girls were three months old on November
7, 2000. After the twenty-hour procedure in November, Mary died. At an inquest in
December 2000, the Coroner, Leonard Gorodkin, did not find that the doctors or the
hospital had committed a lawful act of homicide. Russell Jenkins, Siamese Twin Jodie is
Bright and Flourishing, T IMES (London), December 16, 2000. Jodie has made remarkable
progress in her recovery. Doc: Separating Twins a Tough Choice, NEWSDAY , December
30, 2000, at A20. Dr. Adrian Bianchi, one of the surgeons who operated on the twins,
testified at the inquest that Jodie is "a bright, alert, and interested child whose neurological
functions are in advance of her age." Life After Mary, STRAITS T IMES (Singapore), December
8, 2000.
For a happier story of conjoined twins, Alaina and Xela Bryce, who were separated on
October 31, 2000, see Steven Carter, Separated Twins Further Divided, T HE OREGONIAN ,
November 28, 2000, at D01. Both children lived and are making good recoveries. Ken
Olsen, Separated Twin Joins Her Sister at Home, T HE COLUMBIAN, December 29, 2000, at
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implanted to be tissue matches for living siblings;19 infertility clinic directors
stealing or misplacing frozen embryos;20 custody battles between divorcing

C1.
19
This process, called preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), was most recently in the
news for its use by a Colorado couple, Jack & Lisa Nash. Their six-year old daughter
Molly has Fanconi anemia, causing massive failure of bone marrow production, which, in
turn, causes anemia, bleeding disorders, severe immune system problems and generally
death from leukemia or other complications by age 7. Their newborn Adam was born in
Denver on August 29, 2000 through PGD; he was selected to be disease free and a tissue
match with his sister for bone marrow transplant from the umbilical cord. Rick Weiss, TestTube Baby Born to Save Ill Sister, WASH . POST, Oct. 3, 2000, at A01. The bone marrow
transplant was performed on Sept. 26, 2000 and seems to have worked quite well. Molly
has an 85-90 percent chance of being largely free of the marrow disease now. Peter Gorner,
A Child is Born, and So Is a Genetic Dilemma, CHICAGO T RIB., October, 8, 2000, at C1. It
took five rounds of PGD and IVF before Lisa became pregnant with Adam. Now three
couples in Australia are "designing" babies to help their children with Fanconi anemia. Kelly
Andrew, 'Designer' lifesavers last hope, mum says, T HE CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Dec. 26,
2001. See also, Annette Mccann, Designer baby bid to save boy’s life; British couple say
treatment offered in America could offer hope for son with leukemia, T HE HERALD
(Glasgow), October 16, 2001, at 12. Leah Wild, It took 10 people to make my babies, T HE
GUARDIAN (London), April 18, 2001, at 10.
20
The most infamous case of misappropriated eggs and embryos is the 1994-1995 scandal
at the University of California at Irvine Center for Reproductive Health. Whistleblowers
exposed infertility doctors for taking eggs and selling them without the donors' consent
and/or appropriating the eggs for research without the donors' consent. See Judith D.
Fischer, Misappropriation of Human Eggs and Embryos and the Tort of Conversion: A
Relational View, 32 LOY . L.A. L. REV. 381 (1999) (discussing the Irvine fertility cases);
Rebecca S. Snyder, Reproductive Technology and Stolen Ova: Who is the Mother?, 16 LAW
& INEQ . J. 289 (1998) (discussing the case of Loretta and Bacilli Jorge whose eggs were
stolen at this clinic). Doctors Asch & Balmaceda fled to Mexico and Chile respectively to
avoid charges of theft and fertility-drug smuggling. Their colleague, Dr. Sergio Stone, served
time for insurance fraud, and sued the University for failing to represent him in the
litigation. Stone v. Regents of University of California, 77 Cal. App. 4th 736, 1999 Cal.
App. LEXIS 1138, (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1999). Charges were brought by many of the
couples affected by the egg misappropriation. Approximately 120 cases were settled for
over $21m. When U.C. Irvine closed this clinic, the 1,900 frozen embryos then stored at
the lab were moved to California Cryobank, and approximately 300 couples were notified.
At that time, another whistleblower leaked information about two dozen notebooks full of
lab records that showed that embryos were stolen from as many as 500 patients and often
sold on a black market to couples who implanted them in Brazil and South America. New
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or separated ex-partners over stored frozen embryos;21 posthumous
reproduction;22 infertility treatment induced multiple births;23 defective,

suits have been filed based on the theft of those embryos, as opposed to the settled actions
for the theft of the eggs. Kelly Felts-Gora filed suit in Santa Ana, California in 2000. See
Aimee Welch, Special Report: When Scientists Kidnap Embryos, 16 INSIGHT M AG ., July 31,
2001, at 20.
In another recent debacle, Paul Fielding, an embryologist at North Hampshire
Hospital and Infertility Clinic, disappeared after it was discovered that almost forty
patients (39 couples) at two fertility clinics where he worked in Hampshire had their frozen
embryos turn up missing. See Jenny Booth, et al., Baby mix-up scare after blunders at IVF
Clinics, SUNDAY T ELEGRAPH (LONDON ), Sept. 24, 2000. Ironically, when his home was
checked, there were still fresh floral tributes commemorating the recent birth of Benjamin, a
second child to Fielding and his wife Alison, who also have a three-year old, Jonathan.
With his rapid disappearance, suspicions have been raised about the genetic parentage of his
new son. In August 2001, Fielding and another man were brought up on charges for this
embryo loss. Jeevan Vasagar, Two appear before magistrates over disappearance of frozen
embryos, T HE GUARDIAN, August 3, 2001; Thomas Penny, Two face court over embryos
scandal, DAILY T ELEGRAPH (London), P15, August 3, 2001.
See also Rick Weiss, Babies in Limbo: Law Outpaced by Fertility Advances,
WASH . POST, Feb. 8, 1998, at A1 (mentioning some cases of missing embryos against
doctors and a fertility clinic in Rhode Island).
21
See e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 431 Mass. 150 (Mass. 2000); Kass v. Kass, 696
N.E.2d 174, 91 N.Y.2d 554 (N.Y. 1998); J.B. v. M.B., 170 N.J. 9, 783 A.2d 707 (N.J.
2001); Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So.2d 465 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000); In re Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000), reversed,146 Wash.2d 514, 48 P.3d 261 (WA 2002), amended,
2002 WL 31015235 (Wash. Sep 10, 2002)(No. 70413-9); and Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d
588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
22
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2002 WL 4289 (MA 2002); In the
Matter of the Estate of William J. Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 332 N.J. Super. 593, (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); Hecht v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App.4th 1289, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d
222 (Cal. App. 1996), rev. denied; Hall v. Fertility Institute of New Orleans, 647 So.2d
1348 (La. Ct. App. 1994). See also Michelle L. Brenwald & Kay Redeker, A Primer on
Posthumous Conception and Related Issues of Assisted Reproduction, 38 WASHBURN L.J.
599 (1999); Susan Kerr, Post-Mortem Sperm Procurement: Is it Legal?, 3 DE PAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 39 (1999); Carson Strong, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Sperm Retrieval
After Death or Persistent Vegetative State, 27 J. L. MED . & ETHICS 347 (1999) and Gladys
White, Commentary: Legal and Ethical Aspects of Sperm Retrieval, 27 J. L. M ED . & ETHICS
359 (1999); Jane Warren, Now I've Got My Son's Sperm, Nothing Will Stop Me Becoming a
Gran, DAILY EXPRESS, September 20, 2000, available in 2000 WL 24216707; Rick Weiss,
Babies in Limbo, supra note 10 (discussing Julie Garber); Helen Bruce, Baby-Battle: Parents
Find Surrogate Mother, BIRMINGHAM POST (U.K.), December 27, 1999; Evelyn Shuster,
The Posthumous Gift of Life: The World According to Kane, 15 J. CONTEMP . HEALTH L. &
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POL 'Y 401 (1999); Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising From the Dead: Challenges of
Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901 (1997); John A. Robertson, Posthumous
Reproduction, 69 IND . L.J. 1027 (1994). Britain struggled with the issue of posthumous
reproduction in the case of Diane Blood. Mrs. Diane Blood sought to have a child using her
dead husband's sperm. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority in England had
refused to allow her to use her dead husband's sperm, so she went to court to get
permission, and then to Belgium for the IVF procedure. R v. Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, [1999] Fam. 151 [1997] 2 WLR 806 (C.A. 1997).
She gave birth to a son, Liam, in 1998. In August 2000, the Government in England
accepted a proposal that children conceived using fertility treatments and sperm from a
dead man will be allowed to have their father's name recorded on their birth certificate, but
there will be no extension of inheritance or succession rights to such children, and the
father's name must be followed by the word "deceased." See Cherry Norton, At Last, Diane
Blood can put the Name of her Husband on Son’s Birth Certificate, T HE INDEPENDENT
(London), August 25, 2000. Another woman, Marian Jordan will also be able to register her
son Daniel as the child of her husband who died of cancer, but gave written consent to the
posthumous reproduction. See id.
23
Multiple births result both from infertility drug treatments and from the practice of
transferring multiple embryos into a womb during each IVF cycle. See generally Ronald
Chester, Double Trouble: Legal Solutions to the Medical Problems of Unconsented Sperm
Harvesting and Drug-Induced Multiple Pregnancies, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 451 (2000);
Mary Ann Davis Moriarity, Addressing In Vitro Fertilization and the Problem of Multiple
Gestations, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 503 (1999); Higher Order Multiple Births Drop
for the First Time in a Decade, M2 P RESSWIRE (U.K.), April 18, 2001; and Doctors Warn
of Boom in Multiple Births: Spurred by Technology, NATIONAL POST (Canada), June 28,
2000, at A4, available in 2000 WL 22982601. The United States is the leader in multiple
births from assisted reproductive technologies. Europe Is a Leader in Aiding Fertility by InVitro Means – Treatments in the U.S. Yield More Multiple Births, 28 WALL ST. J. EUR., June
29, 2000, available in 2000 WL-WSJE 21065156. In August 2001, the Human Embryology
and Fertilization Authority in Britain issued new rules limiting the number of embryos that
can be transferred to a womb during an IVF cycle with the goal of reducing the incidents of
multiple births. David Derbyshire, Fertility clinics ordered to cut down on IVF multiple
births, DAILY T ELEGRAPH (London), August 8, 2001.
Recently, in a case of triplets from in vitro fertilization, a mother prevailed against
the fertility experts based on the problems caused by the multiple births. Parents: Three’s
a Crowd, T HE GUARDIAN (London), November 22, 2000. Fertility specialists are still
developing drug treatment protocols that result in multiple births. It was reported in the
fall of 2000 that two women were pregnant with twins and that another woman was
pregnant with triplets after taking Viagra during IVF treatments. Danielle Demetriou,
Childless Women Expecting Twins after Viagra Treatment, DAILY T ELEGRAPH (London),
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contaminated or mistakenly donated gametes;24 the expanding commercial
market in gametes (ova, sperm and pre-embryos);25 gestational and

October 23, 2000. They were among 10 women who have become pregnant using Viagra at
the Assisted Reproduction and Gynaecology Centre in London. The drug was given to
women who were told they were unable to conceive due to an extra-thin lining of the uterine
wall. Viagra caused the wall to thicken and enabled the women to conceive.
24
Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr.2d 864, 80 Cal. App.4th 1050 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000), rev. denied, Supreme Court Minute 08-23-2000, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 6741 (Cal. 2000)
(Parents and their minor daughter, who was conceived from donated sperm, sued sperm
bank and its employees claiming that Ds failed to disclose that the sperm they sold came
from a donor with a family history of autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease
(ADPKD). Parents sought an order compelling the donor's deposition and the production
of records. The court of appeals held that the parents and child could compel the donor's
deposition and production of documents to discover information relevant to their action.),
pet. for writ of mandate denied, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 4580 (Cal.App.2d Dist., 2002);
Harnicher v. University of Utah Medical Center, 962 P.2d 67, 1998 Utah LEXIS 57, 349
Utah Adv. 3 (1998, as corrected, March 19, 1999) (A couple went to fertility clinic
exclusively seeking to find a way to have wife artificially inseminated by husband's sperm.
To raise the likelihood of success the couple agreed to combine the husband's sperm with
the sperm of an anonymous donor whom they selected because of his similar features to the
husband. When their triplets were born, one of the triplet's coloring was extremely different
from any one else in the family. Genetic tests revealed that the clinic had made a mistake
and used the wrong donor sperm); Doe v. Irvine Scientific, 7 F. Supp.2d 737 (E.D.Va.
1998) (Frozen embryos stored in potentially contaminated albumin); Stiver v. Parker, 975
F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992) (Contaminated gametes led to birth of disabled child). Another
famous case of mistaken gametes is Michael and Elizabeth Higgins in Florida where Betty
Higgins' eggs were fertilized with the wrong sperm (a European-American man), rather than
her husband's (an African-American man.). This destroyed their marriage and Michael sued
to make sure he was not liable for child support. Michael Lasalandra, Woman, Ex and
Hospital Settle over Sperm Mix-up, BOSTON HERALD , August 27, 1998. See also, Wilma
and Willem Stuart, a Dutch couple who gave birth to one blond and one darker skinned child
in 1995 due to a mix-up with some of the gametes used in IVF. Kenneth J. Ryan, M.D.,
National and International Responses to Ethical Issues in Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, ASSISTED REPROD . REV. 181, 184 (1996). Marlise Simons, Uproar Over
Twins, and A Dutch Couple’s Anguish, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1995, at A3. In a separate,
infamous case, Dr. Cecil Jacobson, a fertility doctor, used his own sperm instead of the
sperm of anonymous donors to inseminate approximately 120 patients.
He was
prosecuted by the government and eventually imprisoned. United States v. Jacobson, 785
F.Supp. 563 (E.D.Va. 1992) (Government action for protective order to close proceedings
so parents of children allegedly fathered by Jacobson could testify without publicity). The
most recently reported case of an IVF mix-up occurred in Britain in July, 2002, when a
white couple gave birth to black twins. Sarah Lyall, Whites Have Black Twins in In-Vitro
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traditional surrogacy or contractual motherhood arrangements gone awry;26
intergenerational reproduction (e.g., grandmothers giving birth to their

Mix-Up, N.Y. Times, July 9, 2002, at A12.See also Judith D. Fischer, Misappropriation of
Human Eggs and Embryos and the Tort of Conversion: A Relational View, 32 LOY . L.A. L.
REV. 381 (1999) (citing Teri Sforza, Who Rules How Babies are Made?, ORANGE COUNTY
REG ., May 28, 1995, at A1); Fred Norton, Assisted Reproduction and the Frustration of
Genetic Affinity: Interest, Injury and Damages, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1999) and Raizel
Liebler, Are You My Parent? Are You My Child? The Role of Genetics and Race in Defining
Relationships after Reproductive Technological Mistakes, 5 DE PAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 15
(2002).
25
Infertile Couple Offering $100,000 to “Very Special Donor” with “Athletic Ability” to
Donate Eggs, 4(10) T RANSPLANT NEWS, February 29, 2000; Martha Frase-Blunt, OvaCompensating?, WASHINGTON POST F01, Dec. 4, 2001; Rebecca Mead, Eggs for Sale, 75
(22) T HE NEW YORKER, August 9, 1999; Rick Weiss, Limited Pay for Eggs Advised, WASH .
POST, August 4, 2000, at A05.
See also Ruth Macklin, What is Wrong with
Commodification?, in NEW WAYS OF M AKING BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG DONATION 106
(Cynthia B. Cohen, ed., Indiana U. Press, 1996); and Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic
Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA
L.REV. 265 (1995).
26
Decker v. Decker, 2001 WL 1167475 (Ohio App. 3 Dist. 2001), appeal denied, Decker v.
Decker, 94 Ohio St.3d 1411, 759 N.E.2d 787 (Ohio Dec 19, 2001) (TABLE, NO. 01-1850);
In re Marriage of Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 280, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 77
A.L.R.5th 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (when father and mother split up in a gestational
surrogacy case, father disclaimed all paternity); In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 893, 25
Cal. App. 4th 1218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 851 P.2d 776, 19
Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874, 114 S.Ct. 206 (1993) (gestational
surrogate mother decided that she did not want to turn child over to contracting genetic
parents); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J.. 1988) (traditional, genetic surrogate mother
refused to give up child to genetic father and his wife); R.R. v. M.H., 426 Mass. 501, 689
N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998) (in dispute between father and surrogate mother, Massachusetts
Supreme Court refused to enforce surrogacy agreement); Huddleston v. Infertility Center of
America, Inc., 700 A.2d 453 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1997) (surrogate mother sued when contracting
father killed child); Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992) (contracting father refused
to take child after child contracted contagious infection that caused him to be seriously
disabled); and Al Pessin, High Court Rules Separated Couple’s Frozen Embryo May be
Implanted, ISR. FAXX, September 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8153475 (Story of Danny
and Ruti Nachmani, discussed more fully in Dalia Dorner, Human Reproduction: Reflections
on the Nachmani Case, 35 T EXAS INT'L L. J. 1 (2000), where the Israeli Supreme Court, en
banc, awarded the frozen embryos to the ex-wife, so she could have more children using a
gestational surrogate). See also Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998) (child

14

COLUMBIA J. of GENDER & LAW

[Vol.

grandchildren or daughters giving birth to their siblings);27 post-menopausal
pregnancies;28 implications of the Human Genome Project;29 genetic

born of surrogate mother and husband was not considered a "child of the marriage" when
husband and wife divorced, although court had jurisdiction to decide the custody of child
born through traditional surrogacy in divorce action between biological father and social
mother.); Soos v. Superior Ct., 182 Ariz. 470, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (court
found that genetic mother should be granted legal maternity instead of gestational mother).
Problems in surrogacy cases continue to dominate the news. In 2001, we read about the
story of Helen Beasley, who as a single mother in Britain became the paid surrogate for a
California couple, but when it was determined that she would have twins, the couple
ordered selective reduction and Beasley refused. The twins then became the subject of
lawsuits. Another couple finally agreed to take the twins. Maria Belen-Moran, Another
couple to take surrogate twins, 8/14/01 ASSOCPR On-line (No Page).
27
Gordon Rayner, The Woman Who Gave Birth to Her Own Grandchild, DAILY M AIL
(London), February 5, 2001; Charis Cussins, "Quit Sniveling, Cryobaby. We'll Work Out
Which One is Your Mama!" in CYBORG BABIES 44-66 (Davis-Floyd & Dumit, eds.,
Routledge, 1998) (stories of sisters giving birth to their sister's children, i.e., their own
nieces; mothers giving birth to their daughter's children, i.e., their own grandchildren;
daughters giving birth to their mother's children, who are their genetic sisters); LEE M.
SILVER, REMAKING EDEN : HOW GENETIC ENGINEERING AND CLONING WILL T RANSFORM
THE A MERICAN F AMILY 166-7 (Avon Books, 1998) (story of Karen Ferreira-Jorge and her
mother Patricia Anthony in Johannesburg, where grandmother gave birth to her own
granddaughter as "gift of love" to her daughter); and Simon Mowbray, Grandchild
Surrogacy Set to Split Couple, SUNDAY M ERCURY (U.K.), June 11, 2000, available in 2000
WL 7303349.
28
Seema Kamdar, Sixty-year-old woman gives birth to baby, T HE T IMES OF INDIA , December
9, 2001; Rebecca Fowler, Baby's Bathtime Amid Rising Anger for IVF's Most Bizarre
Family, DAILY M AIL (London), June 23, 2001, at 16 (62 year old woman in France is
surrogate mother to her brother's child with donor egg in order to inherit her mother's
estate); John Phillips, Woman, 62, Gives Birth as ‘Oldest Mother in World,’ T HE T IMES
(London), July 19, 1994 (Rosanna Della Corte, an Italian woman who is the oldest recorded
mother to give birth, bore her son when she was 62); 51-Year-Old Chinese Woman Gives
Birth to Test Tube Baby, XINHUA GEN . NEWS SERVICE , November 30, 2000. See also Mark
V. Sauer, Richard J. Paulson and Rogerio A. Lobo, Reversing the Natural Decline in Human
Fertility: An Extended Clinical Trial of Oocyte Donation in Women of Advanced
Reproductive Age, 268 J.A.M.A. 1275 (1992); Guido de Wert, The Post-Menopause:
Playground for Reproductive Technology? Some Ethical Reflections in T HE FUTURE OF
HUMAN REPRODUCTION (John Harris and Søren Holm, eds., Clarendon Press 1998); and
William E. Schmidt, Birth to a 59-Year-Old Generates an Ethical Controversy in Britain,
N.Y. T IMES, December 29, 1993, at A1.
29
The Human Genome Project (HGP) is an international effort to map all the genes on the
human genome. For overview of project, see National Human Genome Research Institute
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therapies30 or genetic engineering of embryos;31 sex-selection of children;32
chimera; stem cell research; and the cloning of animals and humans.33

(NHGRI), National Institutes of Health (NIH), The Human Genome Project,
http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/HGP. See generally Symposium, Law and Human Genetics on
the Threshold of the New Millennium, 49 EMORY L.J. 745 (2000); Symposium, The Human
Genome Project, 26 J.L. MED . & ETHICS 181-224 (1998); Francis S. Collins, Ari Patrinos,
Elke Jordan and Aravinda Chakravarti, et. al., New goals for the U.S. human genome
project: 1998-2003, 282 SCIENCE 682-689 (1998). One of the original researchers on that
project, Craig Venter, broke away and started his own company, Celera Genomics, to
complete the mapping sooner than anticipated by the HGP. See Dick Thomson, Craig
Venter is a Man in a Hurry, T IME , January 11, 1999, at 49. A hot race pursued and in June
2000, President Clinton announced that both HGP and Celera had completed the project.
Peter Gorner, DNA’s Map Completed; How Genes Interact Still a Puzzle, CHICAGO T RIB.,
June 27, 2000. In fact, they were then only near completion. Since that announcement,
Celera has claimed that it has the entire genome mapped. Justin Gillis, Celera has Mouse
Map Monopoly, WASH . POST, April 27, 2001, at E01. Part of the funds (about 3%)
allocated for the Human Genome Project go to studying the Ethical, Legal and Social
Implications (ELSI), because there are so many and they are so complex. See e.g., JUSTICE
AND THE H UMAN G ENOME P ROJECT (Timothy F. Murphy and Marc A. Lappe, eds., U. Cal.
Press 1994); Symposium, Genetics and the Law: The Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications
of Genetic Technology and Biomedical Ethics, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH . ROUNDTABLE 417 (1996).
See generally, T HE CODE OF CODES (Daniel J. Kevles and Leroy Hood, eds., Harvard U.
Press 1992); T HE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE (Thomas H.
Murray et al. eds., Indiana U. Press 1996); ROBERT COOK -DEEGAN , THE GENE WARS:
SCIENCE , POLITICS AND THE HUMAN GENOME , Part 5, at 231 (Norton & Co. 1994). See
also, Joan Stephenson, Ethics group drafts guidelines for control of genetic material and
information, 279 J.A.M.A. 184 (1998) (discussing work of the Ethical, Legal and Social
Issue Committee of the Human Genome Organization (HUGO)).
30
The most prominent case of harm from gene therapy occurred when 18 year-old Jesse
Gelsinger died four days after the therapy started. See Gene Therapy: Reports Disclose 691
Deaths and Illnesses, AM. HEALTH LINE, February 1, 2000; and Rick Weiss and Deborah
Nelson, Penn Settles Gene Therapy Suit; University Pays Undisclosed Sum to Family of
Teen who Died, WASH . POST, November 3, 2000, at A04. See also Joshua Runyun, FDA
Seeks to Disqualify Top U. Pennsylvania Gene Therapy Researcher, DAILY
PENNSYLVANIAN, December 13, 2000.
31
Alternatively called ‘genetic enhancement,’ genetic engineering to improve the
characteristics of an individual is more than mere science fiction. See e.g., Alex Salkever,
Building a Better Brain?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE M ONITOR, September 2, 1999, at 1 (scientists
alter mice genetics to increase intelligence). See also Symposium, Genetic Technology:
Social Values and Personal Autonomy in the 21st Century, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 561
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It is no wonder that the courts are befuddled by the conflicts that
arise when these new technologies succeed and fail, whether of their own
accord or because of human error. Legislatures, frequently unable or

(1999) (particularly articles by Michael Shapiro, Peter H. Huang, Maxwell J. Mehlman and
Roberta M. Berry).
32
Using pre-implantation genetic diagnosis for sex-selection, a Spanish couple has decided
to bear only sons. James Meeks, Sons created to beat blood disease, GUARDIAN (London),
October 17, 2000, at 6. The father of the children, who were born in May, suffers from
hemophilia, which prevents blood clotting. Males do not pass the disease on to their
children, but if they have a daughter, the daughter becomes a carrier. Doctors from the
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona made sure the embryos implanted in the mother's
womb would grow only into boys. But, had the mother given birth to girls, they would
have been perfectly healthy, just carriers for their further (hypothetical) grandchildren. If
the mother is a hemophilia carrier undergoing IVF, she can have embryos tested before they
are implanted and pick out any with hemophilia, something permitted in Britain, although
sex selection to prevent a healthy daughter who may be a carrier is not permissible in
Britain. This is the first case to be publicly written up in the Journal of Prenatal Diagnosis.
Researcher, Josep Santalo, emphasized that they wouldn't genetically test a fetus once it
was growing in the womb, but that this pre-implantation genetic diagnosis to prevent the
transmission of abnormalities to descendants was not a problem. See also the case of
Monique and Scott Collins, who used PGD at a Fairfax, Virginia IVF clinic to select a
daughter embryo, giving rise to baby Jessica. Michael D. Lemonick, Designer Babies, 153
T IME , January 11, 1999, at 64. See generally, Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Sex
Selection through Prenatal Diagnosis: A Feminist Critique, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN
M EDICAL ETHICS (Helen Bequaert Holmes and Laura M. Purdy, eds., Indiana U. Press
1992), at 240.
33
James Chapman, Human clone trial hits ethical nerve, COURIER M AIL, November 27,
2001. An American couple is paying to clone their dead 10-month old child. See Jill Stark,
Couple’s Bid to recreate girl causes public outcry, SCOTTISH DAILY RECORD , January 3,
2001, available in 2001 WL 2779590; Philip Delves Broughton, We will clone dead baby
girl, DAILY T ELEGRAPH (London), January 3, 2001, available in 2001 WL 2905022. That
quest, by Mark Hunt, a West Virginia lawyer, has ended, but a new candidate, a 59 year old
single man with a terminal illness, is attempting to have the same group of scientists and
fanatics, the Raelians, clone him. International Raelian Movement: Rael announces a new
candidate for human cloning, 4/3/02 BIOTECHWK 23, 2002 WL 9227896. See also Lori
Valigra, Human Cloning Within Reach, Experts Say, UNITED PRESS INT’L , January 5, 2001;
and CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF TH E NATIONAL
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION (Executive Office of the President 1997) (Volumes 1 &
2). The Executive Summary to that Report can also be found at 14 ISSUES L. & M ED . 217
(1998). See generally LORI B. ANDREWS, T HE CLONE AGE (Holt & Co. 1999); GREGORY E.
PENCE , WHO 'S AFRAID OF HUMAN CLONING ? (Rowman & Littlefield 1998); CLONES AND
CLONES (Martha Nussbaum and Cass Sunstein, eds., Norton & Co. 1998).
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unwilling to articulate governing public policies,34 leave the courts holding
these "hot potatoes." Usually after a crisis involving assisted reproductive
technologies or biotechnologies, commissions and task forces are formed to
articulate guidelines for thinking about the issues and to develop proposals
for legislative responses.35 Legislation that does get enacted often fails to
anticipate the newest assisted reproductive technologies and their unique
twists.36 The "victims" of this technology have no choice but to resort to
the courts, and the courts have no choice but to find appropriate legal and
factual analogies on which to base their decisions. When analogies fail, the
courts must forge ahead, consistent with whatever policies can be
discerned from prior legislative, judicial, and executive actions.37 But

34

As Larry Palmer argues about legislation and assisted reproductive technologies,
"[L]egislation is difficult to pass in our process, and what emerges is not necessarily
comprehensive. It usually takes some change in the political equilibrium for legislation to
pass." Larry I. Palmer, Private Commissions, Assisted Reproduction, and Lawyering, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 223, 231 (1998) (book review).
35
NY STATE T ASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW , ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE T ECHNOLOGIES:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (1998); National Advisory Board on
Ethics in Reproduction (NABER), Report and Recommendations on Oocyte Donation, in
NEW WAYS OF M AKING BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG DONATION, at 233-302 (Cynthia B.
Cohen ed., Indiana U. Press 1996); Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Genetic
Committee of the ABA; Institute for Science, Law and Technology's Working Group on
Reproductive Technologies (ISLAT), Art into Science: Regulation of Fertility Techniques,
281 SCIENCE , July 31, 1998, at 651-52; Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies, PROCEED WITH CARE (Canada Communications Group 1993); President's
National Bioethics Advisory Commission, (last visited October 1, 2001)
<http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac>.
36
See e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987 & Supp. 1999); UNIF. STATUS OF
CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, 9B U.L.A. 135 (Supp. 1999).
37
Recently, Judge Stanton of the N.J. Superior Court concluded that the general intent of
N.J. law should override a literal interpretation as applied to new assisted reproductive
technologies (in that case, posthumous reproduction), "when the legislature …was not
giving any thought whatever to the kind of problem we have in this case." In re Estate of
Kolacy, 332 N.J. Super. 593, 753 A.2d 1257, 2000 N.J. Super LEXIS 275,* at *12. Judge
Stanton notes, "We judges cannot simply put those problems on hold in the hope that some
day (which may never come) the Legislature will deal with the problem in question. Simple
justice requires us to do the best we can with the statutory law which is presently
available." Id. Likewise, the Massachusetts Supreme Court permitted inheritance by
posthumously conceived children in limited circumstances by looking at the general intent
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looking to policies and analogies is insufficient. Courts must proceed with
sensitivity to justice concerns about gender, race, and class-based equality.
Lawmaking in novel situations is a difficult task for courts, but certainly
within their role. When heart-rending disputes such as that of the Fasanos
and Rogerses appear in their courtrooms, judges cannot disregard their
professional commitments to justice and equality just because the
legislature has failed to act.

Courts fail us miserably when they use the language and
procedures of technology-dated statutes to bar deep analysis of the
substantive issues and justice concerns that arise in cases of ART
mistakes.38 But decisionmaking outside of a clear legislative context is
also fraught with dangers. Judicial resolutions of disputes arising from the
use of assisted reproductive technologies have often defaulted to a
genetics-based approach to defining parenthood, which I argue,
reproduces an unacceptable sex-bias in the law. In addition, in the
interracial ART mistake cases like Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, courts may
inadvertently utilize a race-matching approach that ultimately harkens

of the intestacy laws, but urged the Legislature to act. Woodward v. Commissioner of
Social Security, 2002 WL 4289 (MA 2002)(“ As these technologies advance, the number of
children they produce will continue to multiply. So, too, will the complex moral, legal,
social, and ethical questions that surround their birth. The questions present in this case cry
out for lengthy, careful examination outside the adversary process, which can only address
the specific circumstances of each controversy that presents itself. They demand a
comprehensive response reflecting the considered will of the people. In the absence of
statutory directives, we have answered the certified question by identifying and
harmonizing the important State interests implicated therein in a manner that advances the
Legislature's over-all purposes.”)
38
Contra Palmer, supra note 34, at 231 ("The real question is whether a court should
abandon the legislative framework for resolving custody disputes in the context of divorce
because assisted reproductive technology was used to produce the children. Whether the
use of in vitro fertilization should make a difference in how the custody dispute is framed is
a legislative rather than judicial decision," but when the legislature fails to act, the courts
must intervene, at least to "provide an incentive for the parties and their lawyers to resolve
the dispute themselves prior to a full litigated trial"). Palmer argues that courts are correct
in reaching a result on a narrow ground and leaving the issue to the legislature, even
recognizing that getting legislation on the subject is slow, plodding and difficult to achieve.
"The best response from courts to cases that come before them is to resolve them narrowly,
and on non-constitutional grounds, since legislatures rather than courts are the least
detrimental legal means of changing the nature of family." Id. at 234.
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back to a kind of discredited biological racism. The Perry-Rogers v.
Fasano case provides a concrete example for my more general
arguments about the kinds of analyses that need to be explored in
answering the bioethical and legal dilemmas that arise from ART
mistakes. I use the case to illustrate both the horrors of ART mistakes
and the ways in which courts unconsciously or subconsciously rely on
deeply flawed and biased assumptions in determining parenthood. Part
III critiques the Perry-Rogers v. Fasano decision to give a context to
Part IV, which contains my deeper substantive critique of the issues about
parenthood that arise from ART mistakes.
III. The Perry-Rogers v. Fasano decision: A Critique of Flawed
Reasoning
The challenges of the Fasanos and Rogerses' story surpass any
hypothetical problem that the most creative bioethics and law, family law,
or torts professors could invent. One can not help but imagine the multiple
ways in which thoughtful and creative answers could be formulated. The
reasoning in the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department decision was terribly disappointing. The Perry-Rogers v.
Fasano decision39 turns on a standing issue, elevating process over
analysis of the substantive issues. The court attempts to avoid all the sticky
substantive issues by denying the Fasanos standing to seek visitation. This
approach not only intentionally evades the issues that underlie the dispute,
but deeply damages our emerging jurisprudence surrounding assisted
reproductive technologies and impugns the court's perceived legitimacy.
No decisions seem more illegitimate than ones that deal with thorny
and deep substantive issues, but are nevertheless resolved on subordinate,
technical, procedural matters or literal readings of statutes that were never
intended to cover such a situation. The Perry-Rogers v. Fasano decision
of the New York Appellate Division fails for those reasons, in addition to
its undeveloped theories of the case. Truthfully, I am not a process-phobe
nor an advocate for rampant judicial activism. As much as the next person,

39

Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 276 A.D.2d 67, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
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I respect that courts are supposed to "apply statutes" rather than "legislate."
But when process concerns or crabbed readings of statutes prevail over
reasoned resolutions of heart-wrenching conflicts, the judicial system
becomes a mockery of justice. Form over substance deprives judicial
opinions of legitimacy.
In Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, when the mother who bore the twins
(Donna Fasano) sought to enforce a visitation agreement regarding the
child who turned out to be genetically unrelated to her, but genetically
related to the other couple (the Rogerses), she was told she did not have
"standing" to dispute custody or visitation of the child. This resolution by
the Appellate Division is worse than a substantive decision with a negative
outcome. The court resolves the substantive issues by default, rather than
by dealing with them directly, and it resolves the procedural issue in such a
way as to block entirely one party’s access to the judicial system for
resolution of its dispute. Where one party is deprived of fair process and
an opportunity to be heard, respect for and obedience to the law wanes.40
The Fasanos had no opportunity to present their claims about the best
interests of the child and the quality of their relationship to him. Vincent,
the twin who grew in the womb with Joseph/Akeil, was denied standing to
seek visitation as a sibling. Where standing and courthouse "door-closing"
is used as a flimsy excuse to avoid a reasoned explanation of the court's
preferred substantive result, even more damage is done to public
perceptions about the legitimacy of the judicial system. 41 If, as an effect of
the court’s ruling, the Rogerses end up with exclusive custody of
Joseph/Akeil and the Fasanos have no visitation rights at all, then the court
has an obligation to tell us why that ought to be so and to explain the role of
the ART mistake in the result.
A. The Subject Matter Jurisdiction Arguments

40

See generally Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking
Public Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When
Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. Rev. 707 (2000); T OM R. TYLER, ET AL.,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (Westview Press 1997); T OM R. T YLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW (Yale U. Press 1990).
41
For an analogous argument about the ways federal courts have used courthouse "door
closing" mechanisms to avoid explaining their decisions on pressing substantive issues, see
DAAN BRAVEMAN, PROTECTING CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS: A ROLE FOR FEDERAL
COURTS (Greenwood Press, 1989).

Bender –10/10/02

GENES, PARENTS & ART MISTAKES

21

In fairness to the court, the parties did not help the court reach the
substantive issues in the case, because of the way they framed their
arguments. They relied heavily on procedural arguments to make their
cases for whether visitation should be allowed in this case. The appellate
court could arguably claim that it was restricted—by the briefs and issues
on appeal—to the approach it took in this difficult case. The Fasanos
questioned the subject matter jurisdiction of the court based on the manner
in which the Rogerses dismissed and then refiled their custody action under
the same index number. The appeals court, in a unanimous opinion
authored by David B. Saxe,42 dismisses this argument and issues a nunc
pro tunc order to the Rogerses to get a new index number and to transfer
the documents to that file. The court wisely rejects the Fasanos' argument
that this procedural defect deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Fasanos are not alone in trying to get the case dismissed on
procedural grounds. The Rogerses also make procedural arguments about
subject matter jurisdiction and standing. The court sensibly casts-off their
subject matter jurisdiction argument as well. The Rogerses assert that the
court has no subject matter jurisdiction and the Fasanos have no standing,
because the Fasanos are "genetic strangers." The court denies this
challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction stating that it has subject matter
jurisdiction over all petitions for custody and visitation without regard to
who the parties are.43 As the court sees it, the procedural problem in this
case, if any, is not subject matter jurisdiction, but whether the Fasanos have
standing to claim visitation rights.
B. The Standing Arguments
The court ultimately accepts the Rogerses' argument that the
Fasano parents lack standing to claim visitation and that their son Vincent
lacks standing, too. In finding no standing in the gestational parents or
gestational womb-mate, the court insists that it does not reach its decision
based "solely" on privileging genetics over other biological or social factors.
The opinion specifically notes that, "it is simply inappropriate to render any

42

Other members of this court included Milton L. Williams, J.P., Peter Tom, Betty
Weinberg Ellerin, and Richard T. Andrias.
43
Perry-Rogers, 276 A.D.2d at 71.
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determination solely as a consequence of genetics."44 The court overtly
rejects the idea that being a 'genetic stranger' deprives one of standing to
sue for visitation. In an important move the court also hypothesizes that "a
'gestational mother' may possess enforceable rights under the law, despite
her being a 'genetic stranger' to the child."45
In Part IV of this essay I argue that the court did make this
decision about standing “solely as a consequence of genetics”, that is, on
the basis of "genetic essentialism,"46 despite its protestations to the
contrary, or else it made a decision “solely as a consequence of race.”
Furthermore, I suggest that genetic essentialism or genetic determinism
serves as a cover for continued unconscious sexism in law and race-based
decisions perpetuate biological racism in our society. Before I make those
arguments however, I will finish reporting on and critiquing the court's other
arguments leading to the denial of standing for the Fasanos.
The standing arguments are where the court seriously falters. The
Rogerses make two major standing arguments, one of which the court aptly
rejects, but the other of which the court adopts, despite its inconsistency
with other reasoning within the opinion. First, the Rogerses claim that the
Fasanos and their son Vincent do not have standing to argue for visitation,
because they do not meet the statutory definition of parties who may seek
visitation under New York law.47 Since the Fasanos gave up their rights as
parents in the voluntarily signed agreement, and turned the baby over to the
Rogerses, the Rogerses argue that the Fasanos no longer qualify as parents
who have a statutory right to sue for visitation. The court discards this
argument, noting in footnote 1 that it could conceivably treat both the
genetic mother and the gestational mother as parents.48 Acknowledging

44

Id. at 73.
Id.
46
DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE , T HE DNA MYSTIQUE: T HE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON, supra n. 13 at 38-49.
47
N.Y. DOM. REL . LAW , §70.
45

48

Perry-Rogers, supra, at n. 1 states:
Despite the longstanding tradition that a child cannot have more than
one mother and one father at a time, some exceptions to that firm rule
have recently begun to develop. For instance, it is now possible for
both parties in a lesbian couple to be a child's mother (see, Matter of
Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716, 660 N.E.2d 397). It is also
possible for a parent to assert rights to continuing visitation despite
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another couple's genetic contribution to a child does not remove the birth
parent's standing. 49 So far, so good. It looks like now we can get to the
substance of the dispute, right? Wrong.
The court unanimously decides that the Fasano parents and
Vincent do not have standing to seek visitation after all, in response to the
Rogerses' second standing argument. The Rogerses' denial-of-standing
argument is based on the unique circumstances of this case. The court
concludes that the Fasanos acted badly by not giving the child to the
Rogerses at birth, since they were made aware of the embryo mix-up
early in the pregnancy. The court reasons that because the Fasanos knew
about the embryo mistake/mix-up early in the pregnancy, they could have
"corrected" the problem as soon as the baby was born, rather than creating
a situation where a parent-child bond has formed. The court is persuaded
that the Fasanos behaved badly by allowing this bond to develop and
therefore should be denied standing to raise visitation issues. In other
words, they should be "punished" for their wrongdoing by barring their
ability to maintain a relationship with their baby.
Within this parental standing argument are three separate,
subordinate analyses, all of which are deeply flawed: an equitable "dirty
hands"-like analysis, the application of faulty analogies, and inconsistent
rhetoric surrounding maternal bonding. After denying the Fasanos standing
as parents under any of its proposed analogies and muddying its argument
by its rhetoric about intrauterine bonding, the court also summarily
dismisses the womb-mate's "sibling" argument for standing. I will critique
these arguments seriatim.

1. Dirty Hands

having given a child up for adoption (see, Social Services Law § 383-c;
Matter of Gregory B., 74 N.Y.2d 77, 91, 544 N.Y.S.2d 535, 542 N.E.2d
1052). It is certainly conceivable that under some other circumstances,
we would have to treat both genetic and gestational mother as parents,
at least for certain purposes.
49

Perry-Rogers, 276 A.D.2d at 74.
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At the end of the day, the court denies the Fasanos standing because
of their "bad" conduct. Although the court does not use these words, this is
arguably an equitable "dirty hands"-type argument.
The Fasanos
wrongfully permitted a bond to form when they kept the baby for over four
months after its birth, so declares the court, therefore they now have the
equivalent of "dirty hands." As Judge Saxe states:
[A]ny bonding on the part of Akeil to his
gestational mother and her family was the direct result of
the Fasanos' failure to take timely action upon being
informed of the clinic's admitted error. Defendants cannot
be permitted to purposefully act in such a[] way as to
create a bond, and then rely upon it for their assertion of
rights to which they would not otherwise be entitled. 50
A party with "dirty hands" cannot expect a court to hear its claims.51
Denial of the Fasanos' right to argue for visitation seems an
inappropriately strong punishment for forming a bond with Joseph/Akeil.
The court assumes that the Fasanos do not have any rights to the child
("rights to which they would not otherwise be entitled"), and, based on that
assumption, concludes they acted purposefully and wrongfully by bonding
with the Rogerses' baby. Yet, I argue infra, that the assumption of the
Fasanos' non-parentage 52 is contradicted by the court's own assertions in
this opinion and by fair understandings of maternal parenthood. To my
mind, it is indisputable that Donna Fasano is the child’s gestational and
biological mother, a relationship that does entitle her to rights to the child, or
at a minimum, rights to make claims to the child. The court acknowledged
as much in its first footnote, stating “It is also possible for a parent to assert
rights to continuing visitation despite having given a child up for adoption. It

50

Id. at 76.
As a principle of equity, the "clean hands doctrine" states that a litigant can be proscribed
relief if s/he comes to court with "dirty hands" regarding issues to the dispute. 27A
AM.JUR.2D EQUITY § 126 (1996). Conduct constituting dirty hands includes unfair,
dishonest, fraudulent, inequitable, or deceitful behavior.
52
The court calls it Fasano’s “nominal parenthood.” Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 276 A.D.2d
at 74-5.
51
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is certainly conceivable that under some circumstances, we would have to
treat both genetic and gestational mother as parents[.]”53
However, even if we were to agree, for the purposes of argument,
with the court's assumption that the Fasanos acted badly by not delivering
the child to the Rogerses upon his birth, the Rogerses are not in a position
to claim "dirty hands." Both sides to this dispute can be accused of "dirty
hands," if we are to follow that logic. The Rogerses signed an agreement
with the Fasanos that allowed visitation and promised to drop their lawsuit
in exchange for physical custody of the child. Then after receiving physical
custody of the child, they immediately violated the terms of the agreement.
The law states that when both sides act with "dirty hands," neither may
advance that equitable argument against the other.54 Nevertheless, the
court excuses the Rogerses' "bad" conduct,55 and applies a "dirty hands"like rationale to bar the Fasanos from seeking visitation.
If the court were fairly utilizing equitable considerations, a more
appropriate concept would be in pari delicto: "where the wrong of the one
party equals that of the other, the defendant is in the stronger position."56
Since the Rogerses commenced this declaratory action for a declaration of
their sole parentage and exclusive custody, the Fasanos are the defendants
who benefit from this maxim. The court's failure to apply the more
appropriate equitable approach confirms my conclusion that the court
intended all along to find any way it could to give the child exclusively to
the genetic parents. The power of the subterranean genetic essentialist
ideology overrode traditional equitable considerations. And if it was not
genetic essentialism that motivated this result, then the court was
persuaded by a race-matching rationale that is equally, or even more,
troublesome.

53
54

Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, note 48, supra. (citations omitted)

27A AM.JUR.2D EQUITY § 126 (1996).
Without explanation, the court apparently accepts the Rogerses' assertion that they were
coerced into entering into the agreement for custody by the duress of not having another
way to get physical custody of Akeil/Joseph.
56
27A AM. JUR.2D EQUITY §132 (1996). Both the clean hands doctrine and in pari delicto
have been applied to custody, visitation and family law matters, although the court is
supposed to yield to the dictates of justice and public policy if they conflict with
application of the maxims.
55

26

COLUMBIA J. of GENDER & LAW

[Vol.

2. Faulty Analogies
The court's second logical error occurs in its use of faulty
analogies. Judge Saxe recognizes the close analogy of this case's facts to
gestational surrogacy cases, but he also tries to make (form?)analogies to
cases where babies are switched at birth and to non-biological parent cases
involving failed same-sex or step-parenting partnerships. None of these
analogies is appropriate. More importantly, the analogy to gestational
surrogacy upon which the court relies is most pernicious because there was
no commercial or altruistic surrogacy agreement leading to the relationship
between Donna Fasano and Joseph/Akeil. I shall address each analogy in
the order that the court does.
a. Switched babies
For cases in which a switch or mix-up occurs at the hospital and
new parents are given the wrong baby to take home, the court claims the
law is clear. If the mix-up is discovered right away, there is no question in
law that the matter should be corrected "at once."57 Like mix-up cases
where the babies should be returned to their genetic parents immediately
upon discovery of the mix-up, the court finds in this case that the Fasanos
should have given the baby to the Rogerses immediately, thus preventing
bond formation. The Fasanos may not argue for visitation based on a
parent-child bond here, the court explains, when that bond was wrongly
formed after learning of the mix-up. The court seems persuaded by the
switched babies analogy.
[W]here the Rogerses’ embryo was implanted in Donna
Fasano by mistake, and where the Fasanos knew of the
error not long after it occurred, the happenstance of the
Fasanos’ nominal parenthood over Akeil should have been
treated as a mistake to be corrected as soon as possible,
before the development of a parental relationship. It
bears more similarity to a mix-up at the time of a hospital’s
discharge of two newborn infants, which should simply be
corrected at once, than to one where a gestational mother

57

Perry-Rogers, 276 A.D.2d at 74-75 and fn. 2.
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has arguably the same rights to claim parentage as the
genetic mother.58
The apparent simplicity of this analogy to switched-babies cases is
convoluted when one questions "when" the bond was wrongly formed. The
court leaves us guessing on that score. Did the court criticize the Fasanos
for forming a bond after the child's birth (during the time Joseph/Akeil lived
with the Fasanos before he was transferred to the Rogerses) or for
forming a bond during the remainder of the pregnancy (after the Fasanos
were informed about the embryo mix-up and the possibility that one or both
of their twins might be the genetic child of another)? This court never tells
us what its understandings about parent-child bond formation are. At this
point in the opinion, we do not know whether the court acknowledges
intrauterine bonding or believes that all mother-child bonding occurs after
birth.
Instead of explaining how it perceives parent-child bonding to
work, the court concludes without explanation that the boy should have
been turned over to the Rogerses immediately at birth. This mandated
result is not obvious to me even now, and certainly it would not have been
obvious to me as a parent at the time of the child's birth. I am perplexed
about why this court is so sure that the baby should have gone to the
Rogerses and that switched baby analogies are persuasive. The only way I
have been able to make sense of the court’s approach is to attribute it to an
unspoken (and perhaps even unconscious) ideology of genetic essentialism
that incorporates inequitable biases about gender, science and technology
or to an unspoken (and perhaps even unconscious) ideology of racematching that is linked to biological racism. These arguments must be
taken up later, though, because they interfere with the remainder of this
critique of the 'switched-babies' analogy.
Assuming arguendo that the switched babies cases are correctly
decided,59 this analogy still fails. Switched babies cases involve at least

58

Id. at 74-5 (footnote omitted).
The legal inspiration for the switched baby cases may itself be misguided. Turning over
the mistakenly given baby, even in the switched baby cases, seems like a property-based or
commodification argument. The baby becomes “property wrongly acquired.” Yet, courts
are loath to say that children are property or quasi-property, ownership of whom is to be
59
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two parents (often two sets of parents) each of whose baby is wrongfully
taken and given to another. In this case, there is no mutuality of exchange
based on the mix-up. It is not as though the Rogerses have the Fasanos'
baby and the Fasanos have the Rogerses' baby. The hospital mix-up
cases may come out the way they do, because once the mix-up is rectified,
both sets of parents end up with the babies at the same time. In cases
where there are not two children to be returned to their "rightful" parents
when the switch is ameliorated (like this one) or where sufficient time has
elapsed to allow the non-genetic parent(s) to form a familial bond, courts
acknowledge, as the Perry-Rogers v. Fasano court does in footnote 2,
that other courses of action may be followed. In those cases, the genetic
parents may only get visitation rights, rather than legal custody, while the
nurturing parents are entitled to continued custody. 60 Because of the

determined by property law. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 109 N.J. 396 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1988). See also Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L .REV. 1849
(1987) and Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
60
Pope v. Moore, 261 Ga. 253, 403 S.E.2d 205 (Ga. 1991); Twigg v. Mays, 542 So.2d 241,
1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 1512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Ilana Hurwitz notes another
recent case of switched babies in her article, Collaborative Reproduction: Finding the Child
in the Maze of Legal Motherhood, 33 CONN . L. REV. 127, 154-5 (2000), footnotes omitted:
Recently, in Virginia, Paula Johnson, who sought child
support from her estranged boyfriend, discovered through blood tests
that neither she nor her former boyfriend was the biological parent of
Callie Johnson, the three-year-old little girl Paula had reared. After
investigation, Paula Johnson discovered that a baby girl born to Kevin
Chittum and Whitney Rogers, in the same hospital on the same day as
she had given birth to a baby girl, actually was the child she was given
to take home. Her biological daughter was mistakenly given by hospital
personnel to Chittum and Rogers and raised by them as Rebecca
Chittum. On the weekend after Paula Johnson's discovery, as fate
would have it, Kevin Chittum and Whitney Rogers were killed in a car
accident, leaving Rebecca Chittum orphaned of social parents and Callie
Johnson orphaned of biological parents.
Paula Johnson faced a
dilemma. On the one hand she had an ineradicable biological connection
to Rebecca Chittum. On the other hand, she had developed a mutual
loving relationship with Callie Johnson, the child she nurtured and
emotionally nourished for three years, the child for whom Paula had
been "mother." Holding a large color photograph of Callie Johnson,
Paula said about Callie at a news conference: "I love her wholeheartedly,
with all my heart. . . . There isn't anything I wouldn't do for her."
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passage of time and bond that was formed, courts generally realize that
there are interests more powerful than genetics that must govern the
ultimate determination of parentage. Apparently the court in this case did
not consider the bond formed during the more than seven months of
pregnancy after the mix-up was discovered or the four and a half months
after the child's birth as moving the Fasano claim into the latter category of
analysis.

A second way the switched-babies analogy fails is that a baby
and an embryo are not similar enough to be analogized. In the instant
case, an embryo is what was mistakenly switched or misappropriated;
there were no babies in existence at the time of the mix-up. To apply this
mix-up analogy properly, Donna Fasano would have had to turn over the
mixed-up embryo upon notification of the mistake. Could this really be
what the court intends? Surely the court did not conclude that the
embryo should have been removed from Fasano's womb and placed in
Ms. Perry-Rogers', even if that were technologically possible without risk
to both fetuses and both mothers. It is doubtful that the Rogerses would
have even wanted that relief when they were notified of the clinic’s
mistake, particularly since Ms. Perry-Rogers’ body had just endured the
unsuccessful procedure from the month before. Besides, so far as the
Rogerses' genetic embryo was concerned, it was already too late to do
any transfer when the mix-up was discovered, because the embryo had
become a fetus attached to Fasano by a placenta.
Realistically, the Rogerses can not be arguing that they wanted the
embryo back at the time the error was discovered. That embryo no longer
existed even then. Once the embryo implanted itself in Fasano's womb and
grew to be a fetus, it was not the same being as the embryo mistakenly
transferred, or even the same as the embryo would have been, had it been
transferred into Perry-Rogers' womb in the first instance. The fetal
environment powerfully affects the growth and development of the fetus.
Government-sponsored warnings about pregnant women’s cigarette
smoking, drug use, and alcohol intake attest to the influence the fetal

When asked ni a television interview if she had any intention of
switching the two children, Paula answered unequivocally, "No."
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environment has on fetal development, as do government programs, like
WIC, designed to supplement pregnant women’s dietary needs. Actions of
pregnant women affect the health and growth of their babies. By the time
the embryo is gestated into a baby in another woman's womb, it is
transformed from what was mixed-up in the first place.61 The gestating
woman’s contribution to what the embryo becomes is not excisable from
the baby that is born. The switched-babies analogy just doesn't work.
b. Same-sex couples' and stepparent custody disputes
The court's second analogy is to custody and visitation disputes
between same-sex parents or between stepparent and biological parent. In
same-sex parents' custody disputes, the nurturing parent who is a
"biological stranger" can be denied all rights to the child in New York. 62
Likewise, the stepparent who has not legally adopted his or her stepchild,
can be denied visitation based on being a "biological stranger."63 Using this
analogy, the court follows what it calls the "strong policy considerations"64
applied in those "biological stranger" parent cases to find that the Fasanos
have no rights to the child. Seeming to find this analogy superior to
gestational surrogacy as well,65 the court relies on two New York cases,
Alison D.66 and Ronald FF.,67 that hold that "where a child is properly in
the custody of parents, … those parents are accorded a [sic] extremely
broad rights to exclude any visitation, even by a person who raised and
nurtured the child as his or her own."68 Though I believe those cases

61

Hopefully, we will never go down the path of understanding the fetus/baby as an embryo
with value-added.
62
Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586, 572 N.E.2d 27
(N.Y. 1991).
63
Matter of Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 70 N.Y.2d 141, 517 N.Y.S.2d 932, 511 N.E.2d 75
(N.Y. 1987).
64
The court discusses "strong policy considerations," but does not even explain what they
are. Perry-Rogers, 276 A.D.2d at 75.
65
Id.
66
Matter of Alison D., supra note 60.
67
Matter of Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., supra note 61.
68
Perry-Rogers, 276 A.D.2d at 75. See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct.
2054 (2000). But see V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200 (2000), cert den.(N.J. Supreme Court
granted visitation to the same sex partner who was a child’s “psychological parent” using a
best interests of the child standard.)
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are badly reasoned and wrongly decided, even assuming their legitimacy,
their application to this situation is untenable.
Cases about stepparents or same-sex couples and their children's
custody after the parenting couple splits up, i.e., cases in which one of the
parenting adults is not biologically related to the children he or she nurtured,
are inapposite to this case of a woman who has a clear biological
connection to the child she carried in her womb for nine months. If
biological-relatedness is the sine qua non of natural parenthood according
to New York law, a gestational mother, such as Donna Fasano, necessarily
meets that test.69 Her blood and nutrients course through the fetus. Her
womb envelops and stretches to accommodate the fetus. The fetus is with
the gestational mother every minute of every day, whatever she is doing,
for nine months. These are basic physical, biological connections. Fasano
has consistently asserted rights to the child based on her biological
(gestational) motherhood. Fasano is the child's mother. So too may be
Perry-Rogers, but that doesn't take away from Fasano's maternity and right
to make claims for visitation. The court offers no explanation or reason
that the "strong policy considerations" in the "biological stranger" cases
should apply to this case, where the court acknowledges that it is
inaccurate to call a gestational mother a "biological stranger."70 If nothing
else, Fasano is clearly one of the child's mothers, the gestational mother,
the woman who gestated the embryo to bring it to life. Without a
"biological stranger" claim, application of the same-sex couples or
stepparent analogy completely loses its force.
c. Gestational surrogacy

69

We must distinguish between a gestational surrogate mother, one who for commercial or
altruistic reasons agrees to bear a child for another woman, and a gestational mother, a
woman who becomes pregnant and "gestates" a child, whether from her own genetic
material or not, intending to be the child’s mother. Surrogacy arguably adds another layer
to the analysis of maternity that is not present in this case. See McDonald v. McDonald,
196 A.D.2d 7, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), at 12. But see Arrendondo v.
Nodelman, 163 Misc.2d 757, 622 N.Y.S. 2d 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
70
Perry-Rogers, 276 A.D.2d at 75.
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The third erroneous analogy is to a gestational surrogacy case.
This court makes a flawed assumption about maternity that is internally
inconsistent within the opinion and just plain wrong. The court likens this
case to gestational surrogacy. While Fasano may be the "gestational
mother,"71 she is not a "surrogate mother" or "gestational surrogate" in any
of the ways that that term has been used. A gestational surrogate
contracts or agrees to become impregnated with an embryo that is
genetically unrelated to her. Regardless of whether courts decide
gestational surrogate mother cases appropriately,72 their reasoning turns on
the intention of the parties, as the Perry-Rogers v. Fasano court
attests.73 Based on intentions, this court finds that in a fictional custody
dispute between the Rogerses and the Fasanos, the Rogerses would win:
Parenthetically, it is worth noting that even if the Fasanos
had claimed the right to custody of the child, application of
the "intent" analysis …would—in our view—require that
custody be awarded to the Rogerses. It was they who
purposefully arranged for their genetic material to be taken
and used in order to attempt to create their own child,
whom they intended to rear.74
Frankly, I cannot understand how the court reached such an
unexamined conclusion. Yes, the Rogerses "arranged for their genetic
material to be taken and used in order to attempt to create their own child,
whom they intended to rear." So did the Fasanos. Both couples engaged
in the identical processes with identical intentions. Their intentions are not
altered by the clinic's mistake. Each woman intended to bear a child of her
own. Neither woman intended to bear a child for another woman or to
have another woman bear her child, a fact that courts use to justify taking a
child from its gestational mother in surrogacy cases. Were the intent-

71

The court clearly identifies her as such in its opening paragraph, “This appeal concerns a
tragic mix-up at a fertility clinic through which a woman became a “gestational mother” to
another couple’s embryo, when the embryo was mistakenly implanted into the wrong
woman’s uterus.” Id. at 69.
72
I would also argue that courts often err in their decisions and analysis in gestational
surrogacy cases.
73
Id. at 72-73 (citing Johnson v. Calvert, supra note 26 and McDonald v. McDonald, supra
note 67).
74
Id. at 73.
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based reasoning of the gestational surrogacy cases applicable at all, it
would not lead to a preference of one set of parents over the other on
these unique facts. For this reason alone, a gestational surrogacy analogy
does not work.
Even more curious is why the court did not use an "embryo
donation" analogy instead of a "gestational surrogacy" one.
Embryo
donation, which is akin to sperm or ova donation, may be the more
appropriate theoretical approach, if we are to assume that something was
"donated" (either a womb or a gamete/embryo) in this mix-up.75 The law
has concretely addressed cases of sperm and ova donation. In those
cases, the anonymous donor, though the genetic parent, is declared by law
not to be the parent.76 The Perry-Rogers v. Fasano opinion contains no
explanation for the court's preference of a gestational surrogacy analogy
to an embryo donation one. The court's selection of a gestational
surrogacy, rather than embryo donation, analogy reinforces my conclusion
that the court's decision is rooted in unconscious or conscious assumptions
of genetic essentialism. In truth, neither analogy works because neither
situation represents the parties' intentions nor the facts of the case.
But more potent than the court's failure to consider an embryo
donation analogy is the inapplicability of the gestational surrogacy analogy
in the first place. As was noted above, being a gestational mother differs
from being a gestational surrogate. The New York courts recognized how
the different statuses require different results in McDonald v.
McDonald.77 In McDonald, the gestational mother and her husband, both
physicians, had used donated eggs from another woman (ostensibly the
genetic mother), which they had fertilized with the husband's sperm. The
resulting embryos were then transferred to the wife/gestational mother's
womb, resulting in the birth of twins to the couple. When the couple later

75

See e.g., Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the
Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REV. 265 (1995).
76
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702, 9B U.L.A. 354 (2000); UNIF STATUS OF CHILDREN OF
ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4(a), 9B U.L.A. ___ (2000); and N.Y. DOM REL LAW § 73.
John C. Sheldon, a Maine judge, has recently proposed adaptations to these statutes.
Surrogate Mothers, Gestational Carriers, and a Pragmatic Adaptation of the Uniform
Parentage Act of 2000, 53 M AINE L REV. 523 (2001).
77
196 A.D.2d 7, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
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divorced, the husband sought sole legal custody of the twins, claiming to be
the "only genetic and natural parent." In this "egg donation" case where the
wife was the gestational mother, the court found that she was the natural
mother and entitled to temporary custody, with permanent custody to be
decided at a later hearing. Dr. Benita McDonald never intended to be a
surrogate for another mother. The couple had intended to rear the children
as their own. Likewise, Ms. Fasano had no intention of being a surrogate
for another mother, and the Fasanos intended to rear the child as their own.
A gestational surrogate is always a gestational mother, but a
gestational mother need not be a gestational surrogate. She may be
gestating the embryo or ovum in order to call the child her own, as Dr.
McDonald did. Applying the "intent" standard from McDonald, which the
Perry-Rogers court discusses, would result in understanding this as an
'embryo donation' case. Following the reasoning of the McDonald
precedent, Fasano would have standing to make a claim for visitation, and
even custody, in the same way that Dr. McDonald did. The gestational
surrogacy analogy is as flawed as the switched babies, same-sex or
stepparents, and even egg donation, analogies. None of these analogies
reflects the biological relationship present in the Fasano case.
The Appellate Division's decision is undercut by its use of faulty
analogies to support Donna Fasano's lack of standing. If all the arguments
by analogy are fatally flawed, then why were they convincing to the judges,
and why did the court unanimously resolve the dispute the way it did.? I
believe that the court was swayed by a subconscious, or conscious but
unspoken, ideology that privileges genetics over all other forms of
relationships. This genetic essentialism is especially pernicious because it
reproduces gender biases, as I explain in Part IV.

3. Inconsistent Rhetoric About Maternity and Bonding
The key error, the one that logically and scientifically undermines
the opinion, is the court’s conflicting rhetoric about the bonds between a
pregnant woman and her desired fetus. Judge Saxe uses blatantly
inconsistent and contradictory reasoning in his analysis. Yet, the entire
court unanimously agrees.
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A pregnant woman's maternal bonds with her child in utero are
powerful. 78 This bonding continues to increase during the pregnancy. 79 As
Ilana Hurwitz explains about the prenantal, mother-to-fetus bond, based on
her extensive research:
Researchers have attempted to document particular
incidents during pregnancy or behaviors of a pregnant
woman that foster a bond between mother and fetus.
Theorists have identified accelerated maternal attachment
after sensory stimulation such as quickening, the mother's
experience of fetal movement, maternal counting of fetal
movements, and maternal viewing of early fetus by means
of ultrasound imaging. Some researchers have pointed out
associative behaviors with the unborn child that assist
mothers to begin the attachment process, such as verbal
communication, stomach rubbing, and visualizing what the
baby will look like. Researchers have also identified
factors that negatively impact maternal-fetal attachment
including depression and anxiety of the gestational mother,
low levels of social support and high levels of control,
domination and criticism from the mother's partner.

78

Ilana Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction: Finding the Child in the Maze of Legal
Motherhood, 33 CONN . L. REV. 127, 157-167 (2000); Scott B. Rae, Parental Rights and the
Definition of Motherhood in Surrogate Motherhood, 3 S. CAL . REV. L. & WOMEN 'S STUD.
219, 245-246 (1994); R. Brian Oxman, Maternal-Fetal Relationships and Nongenetic
Surrogates, 33 JURIMETRICS J. 387, 424 (1993); ROBIN FOX, REPRODUCTION AND
SUCCESSION: STUDIES IN ANTHROPOLOGY , LAW AND SOCIETY 71-79 (1993); John Lawrence
Hill, What Does It Mean To Be A Parent? The Claims of Biology as a Basis for Parental
Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 397 (1991); PHYLLIS CHESSLER, SACRED BOND : THE
LEGACY OF BABY M (1988).
79
The process of bonding between a gestational mother and her fetus is called attachment.
Carolyn Lerum, et al. The Relationship of Maternal Age, Quickening, and Physical
Symptoms of Pregnancy to the Development of Maternal Fetal Attachment, 16 BIRTH 1, 13
(1989). Scientific and psychological evidence suggests that attachment begins early in
pregnancy as a result of physiological and psychological changes to the gestating mother.
Mecca A. Cranley, Development of a Tool for the Measurement of Maternal Attachment
During Pregnancy, 30 NURSING RESEARCH 5, 281 (1981).
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One can draw evidence of prenatal bonding from the
fact that women who suffer loss of pregnancy through
miscarriage or elective termination of pregnancy for
genetic reasons experience the grief of bereavement.
Studies show that 71% to 75% of women who miscarry
perceive the miscarriage as loss of a baby. Researchers
have identified typical grief characteristics experienced by
the mother after prenatal loss, including despair, anger,
hostility, guilt, loss of control, rumination, depersonalization,
somatic symptoms, and death anxiety. One can extrapolate
from this evidence that pregnant women can, and many do,
form bonds with their fetuses during pregnancy. 80
The Perry-Rogers v. Fasano court acknowledges "that a bond
may well develop between a gestational mother and the infant she carried,
before, during and immediately after the birth."81 In addition, the signed
agreement between both sets of parents acknowledged that bond and was
recognized by the lower court.82 But when the opinion's rhetoric is
analyzed, those declarations become mere lip service to the scholarship on
point.83 The court immediately concludes that "the suggested existence of
a bond is not enough under the present circumstances"84 to afford the

80

Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction, supra note 78, at 159-160 (footnotes omitted).
Perry-Rogers, 276 A.D.2d at 76.
82
Id.
83
The court cites Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Switched at the Fertility Clinic: Determining
Maternal Rights When a Child is Born from Stolen or Misdelivered Genetic Material, 64
M O . L. REV. 517 (1999). For more scholarship on the maternal bond with fetuses/children
in utero, see also Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thought on
'Reproduction' and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355 (1989); Marie Ashe, Law-Language of
Maternity: Discourse Holding Nature in Contempt, 22 NEW ENG . L. REV. 521 (1988); Vicki
C. Jackson, Baby M and the Question of Parenthood, 76 GEO . L.J. 1811, 1820 (1988);
BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING M OTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND T ECHNOLOGY IN A
PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (Norton 1989); Rebecca S. Snyder, Reproductive Technology and
Stolen Ova: Who is the Mother?, 16 L. & INEQ . J. 289 (1998); Note, Rethinking
(M)otherhood: Feminist theory and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325
(1990); FEMINISM & BIOETHICS: BEYOND REPRODUCTION (Susan M. Wolf, ed. Oxford U.
Press 1996); EMBODYING BIOETHICS: RECENT FEMINIST ADVANCES (Laura M. Purdy and
Anne Donchin, eds., Rowman & Littlefield 1999).
84
Perry-Rogers, 276 A.D.2d at 76.
81
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Fasanos standing as parents. Yet Alice Noble-Allgire, cited by the court,
tells us:
[A] woman who mistakenly gestates someone else's
embryo is likely to experience the same prenatal bonding
as a surrogate mother and, therefore, suffer from the same
psychological impact of relinquishing the child after birth.
In fact, the impact may be even greater in the case of
switched genetic material than in the voluntary surrogacy
context because in the latter scenario, the surrogate
mother entered into the arrangement with knowledge that
she was carrying the child for someone else, [whereas in
the case of switched embryos, the gestating mother
believes she is gestating her own child.]85
Despite referring to Noble -Allgire’s scholarship, the court asserts that "any
bonding on the part of Akeil to his gestational mother and her family was a
direct result of the Fasanos' failure to take timely action upon being
informed of the clinic's admitted error."86 The blatant contradictions in the
rhetoric are unacknowledged.
Furthermore, the court suddenly ignores the mutuality of bond
between pregnant woman and her fetus 87 and how Donna Fasano became

85

Noble-Allgire, supra note 79, at 566 (bracketed material added to clarify the meaning of
the quotation).
86
Perry-Fasano, 276 A.D.2d at 76.
87
The in utero bond is mutual in that the fetus bonds with the mother as the mother bonds
with the fetus. A fetus feels the pregnant woman's every move; her every emotion releases
hormones that affect the fetus. Fetuses hear their mother's voices and react to what their
mothers eat and imbibe. Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction, supra n. 78, at 162-163 and
notes, reports:
It is documented that a fetus is able to hear, sense, and learn prior
to birth. It is also documented that children synchronize their biologic
rhythms to the gestational mother. In addition, a mother's emotions and
psychological experiences during pregnancy can affect a fetus in utero
and after birth. Research results indicate that a mother's negative
attitude toward pregnancy and her developing fetus can lead to
emotional disturbance in her child. Researchers also assert that initial
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pregnant in the first place. Like the Rogerses, the Fasanos desperately
desired to become parents. Like all couples engaged in assisted
reproductive technologies, the Fasanos, no doubt, waited with bated breath
to learn whether the pregnancy "took." Like other women who have
achieved pregnancy after a difficult struggle, the excitement of the
pregnancy promotes bonding with the fetuses immediately, even though the
pregnant woman may realize she faces the dangers of loss from
miscarriage.
We can only speculate that Donna Fasano reacted to her
pregnancy in same ways that many other pregnant women do. First of all,
Fasano was aware of her pregnancy before she was informed of the clinic
error. She lived with the joy of having achieved this hard-won pregnancy
day and night. Pregnancy is a twenty-four hour a day, seven days a week
(24/7) condition. 88 She also probably lived with the fear of having a
miscarriage. Second, although early in her pregnancy the clinic informed
her that they made a mistake, all through her pregnancy she did not know
for certain whether or not both babies were her genetic children. Of the
embryos transferred to her womb, the other couple's embryo could have
been one that didn't implant. Since more than one of her and her husband's

infant-mother attachment is at risk when a mother is prejudiced by her
prenatal experiences of stress and by negative feelings about pregnancy
and the developing child. (footnotes omitted).
Some of the scientific literature supports the idea that a fetus bonds with its mother in utero
includes Madgy S. Mikhail, et al., The Effect of Fetal Movement Counting on Maternal
Attachment to Fetus, 165 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 988 (1991); and Byron
England and Ellen A. Farber, Infant-Mother Attachment: Factors Related to its Development
and Changes over Time, 55 CHILD DEV. 753 (1984).
88
Hurwitz put it well when she described the physical contributions of a gestational
mother:
[A gestational mother is] the one who may have to undergo the
discomfort of nausea, exhaustion, water retention, varicose veins,
bladder pressure, sleepless nights, physical distortion as the stomach
swells, repeated medical check-ups and, ultimately, the pain of
contractions and labor. Pregnancy is a constant state. There is no relief
from the physical demands from the moment of conception until well
after childbirth, when the body has had an opportunity to recover. The
gestational mother's contribution in the procreative process is
monumental.
Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction, supra note 78, at 158 (footnote omitted).
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embryos had been transplanted in addition to the Rogerses', she could have
been carrying two of her own genetic children.
Third, surely the court did not mean that Fasano was obligated to
avoid the in utero bond by identifying89 and selectively aborting90 the
Rogerses' genetic embryo/fetus, with the consequent risk of miscarrying
her own genetic fetus. (I imagine that the Rogerses would not have
preferred that option, for that really is the Solomonic decision of killing the
baby so the parents don't fight over it.) Finally, this pregnancy was
something Fasano longed for. She had made physical and financial
sacrifices in order to become pregnant. We ought not fault her for
concluding that she was not going to "waste" the joy of the pregnancy by
worrying about whether both fetuses were her genetic progeny and by
consciously trying not to bond with them. I imagine that Donna Fasano

89

Although she could have had amniocentesis, the record contains no evidence that she
chose to do that. Amniocentesis creates a risk of miscarriage and/or damage to the fetus, so
many mothers, even mothers with pregnancies that are "risky," choose not to undergo the
procedure. In addition, in American jurisprudence, we now respect the autonomy of
mothers to refuse to consent to intrusive procedures, even for the alleged benefit of the
fetus they carry. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) ). ROSAMUND SCOTT, RIGHTS,
DUTIES AND THE BODY : LAW AND ETHICS OF THE M ATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICT (Portland,
OR: Hart Publishing 2002). Amniocentesis in this case would not have been for the benefit
of the fetus or the mother, but only for the benefit of third parties because a fourth or fifth
party made an error. Here, the court seems to have wanted Fasano to do something, maybe
something like amniocentesis during her pregnancy, for the benefit of another couple who
are complete strangers. Courts generally will not override one party's autonomy for
another's medical (or in this case, psychological) need, even in life-threatening situations and
when they are relatives. See e.g., McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D & C.3d 90, 1978 Pa. D & C.
LEXIS 489 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1978). But see Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 1969 Ky.
LEXIS 151 (Ky. 1969) (where a court approved a mother's decision that her mentally
disabled son, who was incapable of consent, donate one of his kidneys to his brother). No
cases have ever required this kind of an intrusion for the benefit of a stranger.
90
In cases of multiple simultaneous gestations, sometimes doctors recommend that women
undergo a process of selective or elective reduction. Mary V. Rorty, Feminism and Elective
Fetal Reduction, in EMBODYING BIOETHICS: RECENT FEMINIST ADVANCES (Donchin &
Purdy, eds., Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), at 159. Rorty reports that many doctors refuse
to reduce multifetal pregnancies when there are only twins, as in this case, but some doctors
will reduce a twin pregnancy. She also cites studies that show a risk of loss of the entire
gestation from the procedure.
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knew the fetuses were "hers" because she could feel them growing inside
of her (regardless of genetics).91 When the growing babies moved or
kicked in her belly, there was no way she could know which "one," if any,
she was supposed to bond with and which one a court would punish her for
bonding with. She had no clues about which baby’s feet were getting
under ribs or which baby made her uncomfortable every time she tried to
lie on her side. It would be nearly impossible for a mother to chose to bond
with one of two twins in utero but not with the other.
The court's understanding of Fasano's experience is terribly
misguided. To ask Fasano, a woman who sought out assisted reproductive
technologies and was willing to endure the consequent risk of a multiple
birth resulting from use of the technologies, to decide not to form a bond
with her fetuses because they may not be hers is unrealistic, unnatural and
practically unthinkable (except that the appeals court thought it). And then,
after having carried both babies for nine months, having bonded with them,
and having gone through the labor and birth of both children, processes that
further increase the bond, the court seems to conclude that Fasano should
have given up one of her children after his birth.
Either there is an in utero bond that forms between mother and
child, that the Fasanos cannot be "blamed" for acting badly in developing, or
the in utero bond does not count at all. If an in utero bond between a
pregnant woman and her desired fetus is a fact of nature in most cases, as
the court recognizes that it is in its rhetoric and citations, Donna Fasano
ought not be punished for forming it with her fetuses. The court
contradicts the findings about the in utero bond it had just acknowledged in
its text and footnotes, when it denies the Fasanos standing because they
wrongly formed a bond with the child in utero.92
If the court respects and recognizes the in utero bond, then it still
undermines its importance when the court implies that this maternal-child
bond ought to evaporate at the child's birth, that is, when the child is ex
utero. In order to "punish” Donna Fasano (by denying her any rights to
visit with Joseph/Akeil) for establishing the ex utero bond, the court must
have concluded that regardless of the in utero bond, she should have

91

Had she miscarried during the pregnancy, she would have grieved the loss of her two
"babies," not one.
92
"Defendants cannot be permitted to purposefully act in such a[] way as to create a bond,
and then rely upon it for their assertion of rights to which they would not otherwise be
entitled." Perry-Rogers, 276 A.D.2d at 76.
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refused to continue a bond with the child she bore after its birth. This very
unusual conclusion, especially in the absence of a prior contractual
surrogacy agreement by a gestational mother to relinquish the child,
requires further excavation of the court’s probable underlying, sub silentio
assumptions. The only way I can understand the court’s reaching this
conclusion is that there must have been something in the child’s physical
appearance that the court thought signaled to Fasano that she had to sever
her relationship with this baby.
My logical conclusion is that the court faults Fasano for being a
white woman who bonds with her dark-skinned child. Once she saw that
the child she bore was African-American, according to the court, she was
supposed to deny any natural bonds with it and give it away. One cannot
help but wonder whether if Joseph/Akeil’s racial physiognomy were
“white” Fasano would have been required to give him away. The court
made no such requirements about Vincent, even though he, too, could have
been the product of an ART mistake.
In essence, the court is requiring Fasano to choose not to form
bonds based on race. Donna Fasano’s refusal to let race be a barrier to
her bonding with the baby after his birth affected the court’s determination
that she has no standing to seek visitation. This seems terribly wrong on
many levels and violates our core notions of fairness and justice. No doubt
the court would say that it was not about color or race, but the fact that she
knew one or more of her babies might be the genetic children of another
couple. Yet the court does not speak of a legal duty of parents in all cases
of ARTs (because such a mistake could always happen) to have their
children genetically tested to determine parentage before ex utero bonds
are formed. We do not require other mothers to get their children
genetically tested before they bond with them. We have serious reasons to
challenge this court’s approach if, indeed, it is premised on the assumption
that a white mother ought not bond with a child who appears to be AfricanAmerican.
The inconsistent rhetoric about maternal bonding in this opinion
accentuates the flaws already noted in the Perry-Rogers v. Fasano
appellate court decision. The sex-based and gender issues within this ART
case blindside the court. Without openly addressing the gender issues
which are so formidable in this case, the court is bound to get tongue-tied.
It is essential to understand the science and culture of maternal bonding to
reach a fair result in this complex dilemma. It is also essential to analyze
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the role that race plays in assessing the appropriateness of the ex utero
bond between mother and child. I will take up more of the gender- and
race-based issues that arise if the court defaults to a genetics-based
analysis in the next section, but first I will comple te my critique of the
Appellate Division’s decision in this case.

4. In Utero 'Twin' as 'Genetic Stranger'
Last, but not least, the Perry-Rogers court finds that Vincent, the
Fasanos' genetic child, does not have standing as a sibling to claim visitation
rights with Joseph/Akeil, because the statute defines a sibling as "related by
whole or half-blood"93 and Vincent is neither. Although the court does not
use this language, here the court is reprising the "genetic stranger"
argument that it rejected in the case of the mother. Here, the genetic
strangers are children who grew up together in the same womb at the
same time. The court argues against the application of the "genetic
stranger" category to Donna Fasano, but then applies it to Vincent's
relationship to Joseph/Akeil. Fraternal twins are genetically different, but
not considered less twins than identical twins who are genetically alike.
They are twins because they grew together in the womb. They are not
twins solely because they have the same parents. If having the same
parents makes two children twins, then we would call brothers and sisters
(all siblings) twins. We don't do that. In truth, there has never before been
any doubt in the law that twins are siblings, even if the statute does not so
define the term. The absence of this statutory definition may be due to the
fact that the legislature assumed that it goes without saying that twins are
siblings.
In addition, the statute speaks of “whole or half-blood,” rather than
of genetic relationships. Anthropologically and legally, prior to genetic
testing, biological relationships or kinship relationships were defined through
"blood lines." The legislature, referring to "blood" relations in the statute,
was probably referring to these biological kinship relationships. But the
concept and use of the term blood to represent biological kinship relations is
especially interesting as applied to this case. A more complex meaning of
blood as a metaphor or trope for kinship arises upon deeper examination.
If being of the same "blood" is what constitutes kinship (rather than being
of the same genes), Vincent and Joseph/Akeil are "blood brothers." The

93

N.Y. DOM. REL . LAW § 71.
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biology in this case is that both children were nurtured entirely by the same
"blood" from Donna Fasano for nine months. They were wholly nurtured by
her blood and it was her whole blood. Arguably this makes them of
"whole blood" within the clear language of the statute. Nothing in the
language “by whole or half blood” refers to genetics rather than nine
months in one womb using the same blood for nourishment and oxygen.
Surely this blood relationship should be enough to give Vincent standing to
claim visitation. Instead, in the court's interpretation of the statute, it
unwittingly falls back on assumptions that blood means genetics and
genetics are the essence of a person. By applying these genetic
essentialist assumptions, the court finds that the twins are strangers and not
entitled to visit one another as brothers.

IV. The Deeper Substantive Issues in Perry-Rogers v. Fasano
A. Unanswered Questions
What really is at issue in the Perry-Rogers v. Fasano case is the
degree to which genetics ought to define parenthood in our era of assisted
reproductive technologies. The Court makes false stabs at the issue, but
ultimately only grazes it, instead, resting its decision on a shaky finding of
no standing. Had it granted the Fasanos standing as parents (at a
minimum, had it granted Donna Fasano standing as a mother), the court
would have been required to decide the contested visitation claim based on
a "best interests of the child" analysis, according to New York law.94
Since the parties reached an agreement about visitation that included a
specific paragraph clearly acknowledging the importance of the child's
continued relationship with the Fasanos,95 the court had a mutually agreed

94
95

N.Y. DOM. REL . LAW §70.
The agreement stated:
All parties acknowledge that continued liberal visitation and contact
between Joseph and Vincent and the Fasanos is in the best interests of
Joseph. Deborah Perry-Rogers and Robert Rogers agree that they shall
exert every reasonable effort to maintain reasonable access and contact
between Joseph, Vincent and the Fasanos. All parties agree that they
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upon basis for determining Joseph/Akeil’s best interests. This case was
easier than it could have been if the parties had not already worked out the
transfer of custody or visitation agreement.
The end result imposed by the court, with each set of parents ending up
with one twin, suggests a Solomonic 'split-the-baby' decision,96 but unlike
Solomon's story, in this case the 'split' ostensibly helps the parents, rather
than kills the baby (although it “kills the twins”). But to look at this case as
one about two children who are equally divided among two sets of parents
distorts the analysis. This case is about one of the children only, about
Joseph/Akeil. The parents had worked out a more Solomon-like decision
than the court. In their visitation agreement, each set of parents got a
piece of the child's time and affection, and the child got the benefit of both
couples' love, time, and attention. In the court's resolution, the child is no
longer "split" between the couples, but the child is also no longer the
beneficiary of both families' attention and love. The child loses all
connection to his birth parent and twin sibling, despite their ardent desire for
further contact. The child’s interests seem to have been subordinated to
some grander principle, though that principle is not articulated.
Paradoxically, Joseph/Akeil was deprived of his birth family and sibling in
the easier case where the court only had to decide about visitation, not
primary physical and legal custody, and the parties had negotiated a plan in
advance.
The much more difficult case would have been a dispute over legal
custody rather than just visitation. In that case the court would have had to
face squarely whether it is in the best interests of a child to be placed with
its genetic parents or its biological/social parents, when neither set of
parents has been shown to be unfit. Since the appeals court did not see fit
to order a "best interests" hearing in this case, I will proceed from the
premise that each set of parents' home and home-lives were equivalent.

shall foster a feeling of affection between the children and each other.
Deborah Perry-Rogers and Robert Rogers agree that they shall do
nothing which may estrange Joseph from the Fasanos.
Reply Brief for Defendants-Respondents-Appellants (Fasanos) at 4, PerryRogers v. Fasano, 276 A.D.2d 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (No. 601218/99) (citing
Record on Appeal, at 91-92).
96
The Solomonic aspect of the case is that there were twins and the court splits the twins
in two giving each couple one of the boys. While this may seem the most equitable solution
at first blush, it raises very complicated issues about multiple births, ART mistakes, and
infertility generally.
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The Appellate Division decision touches on some of the deeper
issues and implications of the case in its standing analysis. In a footnote it
acknowledges that in some cases both the gestational and genetic mothers
may be parents for "certain purposes."97 In the text the Court indicates
that it will not let genetics be its sole guide.98 It also refuses to estop the
Fasanos from making claims based on their parenthood, merely because
they acknowledged the Rogerses' as their child's genetic progenitors:
[The Fasanos’ lack of standing was] not because we
necessarily accept the broad premise that in any situation
where a parent, possessed of that status by virtue of
having borne and given birth to a child, acknowledges
another couple's entitlement to the status of parent by
virtue of their having provided the genetic materials that
created the child, the birth parent automatically gives up all
parental rights.99
One could easily be deceived into thinking that the court was about to make
a just decision after carefully incorporating all the relevant concerns into its
analysis. But that would, indeed, have been a deception.
The court's subconscious or silent preference for genetics over
gestation prevails, regardless of any rhetoric it uses to the contrary.
Finding no standing in the Fasanos was the same as finding that the
Rogerses were the sole and appropriate parents. The genetic parents win
completely. No other parents could even come before the court to argue
for the legitimacy of their claims. Certainly the Court realized that its
resolution foreclosed the Fasanos from visitation, and therefore foreclosed
them from having any relationship with their child. As I suggested earlier,
the injustice of this decision is compounded because the court makes this
decision based on a procedural analysis rather than a substantive one.

97

"It is certainly conceivable that under some other circumstances, we would have to treat
both genetic and gestational mothers as parents, at least for certain purposes." PerryRogers v. Fasano, supra note 1, at fn. 1.
98
"[I]t is simply inappropriate to render any determination solely as a consequence of
genetics." Id. at 73.
99
Id. at 74.
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We need reasoned opinions on the substantive issues of this case.
These issues include genetic essentialism, a gendered analysis of
motherhood, and even more submerged issues of the role of race and class
in family disputes arising from the use of ARTs. General issues about the
reconceptualization of le gal parenthood in a post-ART age lurk large in this
case. The court has an obligation to discuss what it means to have two
legally recognized mothers, since it acknowledges the possibility, and why it
completely forecloses that result in this case. The court has an obligation to
explain why even though it acknowledges the bonds between a pregnant
woman and her fetus, it ignores those bonds entirely in reaching its
decision. If the court denies its reliance on biological determinism, or
"genetic essentialism," but reaches a result only explainable by genetic ties,
it needs to be explicit about its reasoning. 100 In a complicated case like this
one, the court shirks its responsibility when there is no serious analysis of
the relationship between genetics and parenthood. At a minimum the
court must explain why it preferred genetic evidence of family status over
biological (gestational), cultural notions of family and kinship. This ‘no
standing’ decision fails miserably in explaining its rationale and the result of
completely cutting off the child from his birth family.
Additionally, there are open questions on ARTs and the relatively
frequent multiple births that result from them. There is no more than a
cursory discussion of the role ARTs play in creating new legal analyses,
particularly with their risks of serious errors and the risks of multiple births
in such delicate matters of creation and reproduction. Furthermore, the
court misses the opportunity to discuss the appropriateness of applying the
New York Domestic Relations law about standing to parties whose familial
relationships were never conceived of 101 by the legislatures that drafted
the laws.102 Perhaps the court should assess whether reproduction has

100

For a discussion labeling the primacy of genetics in family relations as "genetic
essentialism," see Dorothy Nelkin & M. Susan Lindee, Genetic Essentialism Applied, in T HE
DNA M YSTIQUE: T HE GENE AS A CULTURAL ICON (W.H. Freeman & Co., 1995).
101
All puns intended.
102
See note 37, supra, for N.J. Superior Court Judge Stanton's assessment of this very issue
in In re Estate of Kolacy, 332 N.J. Super. 593, 753 A.2d 1257, 2000 N.J. Super LEXIS
275,* (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 2000) at *12. Accord, Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Security,
2002 WL 4289, ____ (MA 2002):
For the second time this term, we have been confronted with
novel questions involving the rights of children born from assistive
reproductive technologies. See Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med.
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become so commodified and market-based that contract or property law
serve as better models for analysis than family law. Though family law
makes the most sense because we are discussing parenting and familial
relationships, ARTs inject such unusual dimensions into the relational
dynamics of families that much of family law’s reasoning fails to resolve
these new dilemmas. Sometimes we suffer more from shoving these
square pegs into round holes than from creating an entirely new receptacle
that fits all the pieces.
Finally, courts need to determine how to proceed and who should
bear the loss of a child when the tortious conduct of an ART provider
harms two disparate, but equally innocent, parties. We need reasoned
decisions from courts about whether tort law or family law or some new
approach should inform us in these cases. Resolution of these issues is
essential. A court’s failure to look into these complex matters leaves
future victims of ART mistakes doubly harmed. New victims, and we
know it is inevitable that there will be new victims, will have to suffer the
physical, emotional and life-altering consequences of the mistake, and then
they will suffer by having to slog through this legal morass without any
advice or guidance. The court was not justified in denuding this legal

Ctr., ante 285, 482 N.Y.S.2d 660 (2001). As these technologies
advance, the number of children they produce will continue to multiply.
So, too, will the complex moral, legal, social, and ethical questions that
surround their birth. The questions present in this case cry out for
lengthy, careful examination outside the adversary process, which can
only address the specific circumstances of each controversy that
presents itself. They demand a comprehensive response reflecting the
considered will of the people.
In the absence of statutory directives, we have answered the
certified question by identifying and harmonizing the important State
interests implicated therein in a manner that advances the Legislature's
over-all purposes. In so doing, we conclude that limited circumstances
may exist, consistent with the mandates of our Legislature, in which
posthumously conceived children may enjoy the inheritance rights of
"issue" under our intestacy law. These limited circumstances exist
where, as a threshold matter, the surviving parent or the child's other
legal representative demonstrates a genetic relationship between the
child and the decedent.
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dispute of all its underlying, substantive issues and only addressing formal
procedural matters almost without regard to the peculiarities of the context.
In the rest of this essay, I offer a challenge to the Perry-Rogers
v. Fasano court’s and our culture's new bias in favor of genetics as a
determinant of natural and legal motherhood. Recent cases, like Johnson v.
Calvert,103 Belsito v. Clark,104 Soos v. Superior Ct.,105 In the Interest of
O.G.M.,106 In the Marriage of Litowitz,107 Arrendondo by Arrendondo v.
Nodelman,108 Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center,109 and this
Perry-Rogers v. Fasano case, seem to favor a genetics-based analysis of
parenthood, despite at least one party’s reasonable claim for a different
approach. In this essay I urge courts to reject such an exclusive, geneticsbased analysis. In the next subsections, I will examine some of these
issues that the court in Perry-Rogers v. Fasano ignored. First, I will
discuss how a genetics-based definition of parenthood promotes an
ideology of "genetic essentialism," and then assess how genetic essentialism
masks the underlying issues of sex bias in this case.110 Alternatively, if the

103

Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal.4th 84, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc.2d 54, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio C.P. 1994)
105
Soos v. Superior Ct., 182 Ariz. 470, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)
106
In the Interest of O.G.M., 988 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999), review dismissed (Jun
15, 2000).Do we need a parenthetical here?
107
Litowitz v. Litowitz, 102 Wash. App. 934, 10 P.3d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000),
reversed, 146 Wash.2d 514, 48 P.3d 261 (WA 2002), amended, 2002 WL 31015235
(Wash.Sep 10, 2002)(No. 70413-9).[Parenthetical? Does the way I use this case change in
the later reversal or amendment?]
108
Arrendondo by Arrendondo v. Nodelman, 163 Misc.2d 757, 622 N.Y.S.2d 181 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Queens 1994) (In action to amend children's birth certificate, the Supreme Court
found that the woman who provided the egg, and hence the genes, in a gestational surrogacy
case, was the mother, rather than the gestational surrogate).
109
435 Mass. 285, 756 N.E.2d 1133 (2001)(Ordering that the genetics parents’ names go on
the birth certificate, rather than the surrogate mother’s name, where “the gestational carrier
agrees with the orders sought.” Id. at 1138)
110
Socio-economic class also plays a powerful role in an genertics-based analysis of
motherhood growing out of the use of ARTs. When conception and childbirth occur
naturally, a genetics-based analysis of motherhood does not reflect class biases. Fertile
couples, no matter what their economic status, can create pregnancies in which the genetic
mother is the same person as the gestating mother, so that legal biological motherhood is not
in dispute. However, where ARTs are utilized, a genetics-based analysis reveals deep classbased biases. Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson & Elaine J. Hall, Reproductive Technology:
Perspectives and Implications for Low-Income Women and Women of Color, in HEALING
104
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court is not relying on genetic essentialism, then I argue that it necessarily
was engaging in an unconscious, sub silentio race-based assessment of
parenthood. The court’s race-based assumptions may have skewed its
decision and caused the unjust result in the case. The other matters raised
in this subsection must be saved for another day.

B. A Genetics-Based Analysis (or Genetic Essentialism)
The court in Perry-Rogers v. Fasano clearly states that genetic ties
are not the deciding factor in this case, and then, without even giving the

T ECHNOLOGY : FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 93 (Kathryn Strother Ratcliff, et. al., eds, Ann
Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1989); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK
BODY : RACE , REPRODUCTION, AND THE M EANING OF LIBERTY (Pantheon Books, 1997).
Whereas fertile women of any class can be gestating mothers, only infertile women with
significant wealth can engage in the assisted reproductive technologies that allow one
woman's ova or embryo to be transferred to another woman's womb. “In Massachusetts,
where infertility care is mandated, the costs, with [ARTs] for a successful pregnancy is
$39,375, … other estimates range from $ 60,000-$ 800,000, per successful pregnancy."
Hazel Glenn Beh, Sex, Sexual Pleasure, and Reproduction: Health Insurers Don't Want You
to do Those Nasty Things, 13 WIS. WOMEN 'S L.J. 119, 173 n.362 (1998) (citations omitted),
cited in Sherri A. Jason, Comment, “Loving Infertile Couple Seeks Woman Age 18-31 to
Help Have Baby. $6,500 Plus Expenses and a Gift”: Should We Regulate the Use of Assisted
Reproductive Technologies by Older Women?”, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & T ECH . 287 (2001).
Even employed women with health insurance, clearly wealthier women than
women without full-time jobs providing health insurance, may not be able to afford these
technologies. Most health insurance plans exclude coverage for infertility treatment and
assisted reproductive technologies. See e.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey, Co., 117 F.Supp.2d
318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Thomas D. Flanigan, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and
Insurance under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 777 (2000);
Shorge Sato, A Little Bit Disabled: Infertility and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 5
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL 'Y 189 (2001/2002). But see, Witcraft v. Sunstrand Health and
Disability Group Benefit Plan, 420 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1988) (where Iowa Supreme
Court found that infertility was an illness covered by a health care plan). Only a few states
mandate coverage for infertility treatments. See American Society for Reproductive
Medicine, State Infertility Insurance Laws, http://www.asrm.org/Patients/insur.html
(visited, Sept. 2002). At best, a small proportion of infertile women have adequate
resources to purchase the assisted reproductive technologies that would allow them to have
genetically related children by using other women's bodies. Despite the importance of classbased issues in ARTs, they are not the focus of this essay.
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Fasanos a chance to make their argument about gestational or biological
motherhood, decides in favor of the genetic parents. The court is
apparently so sure that the genetic mother should win that it is willing to
reach that conclusion circuitously through a dubious-at-best "standing"
analysis. Furthermore, the court precludes even visitation with the
gestational mother without feeling the need to tackle the more complicated
substantive issues raised above. The court’s decision evidences its
commitment to a simplistic, genetics-based analysis of legal and biological
motherhood.
I argue that the better test of biological motherhood, if we must
privilege one of a child's biological mothers in a contest between them, is to
presume biological motherhood, and hence legal motherhood, based on the
gestating and birthing of a child. 111 The court finds differently by default.
The court implicitly concludes that genetics is the better basis for biological
and legal parenthood. Perhaps, in reaching this result, our culture's
relatively recent addiction to science and technology overwhelmed our
fundamental cultural understandings of motherhood that long preceded this
addiction.
While science- and techno-philia clearly motivate part of the turn to
genetics, there are more subtle motivations for this increasing reliance on
genetics in law and culture, particularly in the realm of reproduction.
Dorothy Nelkin and M. Susan Lindee analyze the way 'the gene' has
become the new "sacred essence" of human beings in our culture.112 In
their study of the cultural significance of the gene, they assert that the gene
has become the equivalent of the "soul, assum[ing] a nearly spiritual
importance as a powerful and sacred object through which human life and
fate can be explained and understood."113 They illustrate how our cultural
image of the gene has caused us to move from a primarily socialenvironmental analysis of human behavior to an individualized, geneticsbased analysis in many areas of our lives. We use DNA fingerprinting to

111

Of course, biological motherhood ought to be only one factor in determining legal
motherhood. The best approach is to recognize multiple biological and legal mothers when
multiple mothers create and care for the children.
112
NELKIN & LINDEE , supra note 13, at Chapter 3.
113
Id. at 57. The gene is "an almost supernatural entity that has the power to define
identity, determine human affairs, dictate human relationships, and explain social
problems." Id. at 193.
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identify criminals or the remains of servicemen,114 and genetic testing to
anticipate health problems in children and adults, to assess fitness for work,
for risk assessment in insurance, to identify parents for purposes of support,
custody and visitation, and to explain alcoholism, violent behavior and even
extra marital affairs. Genetic analysis now expands to include behaviors
and personality traits115 as well as physical states.116 This trend has more
insidious effects than just limiting the opportunities of individuals. Nelkin
and Lindee worry that "[g]enetic explanations of behavior and disease
appear to locate social problems in the individual rather than in
society….They are thus a convenient way to address troubling social
issues."117 In some ways, the Perry-Rogers v. Fasano case follows suit
by ultimately using genetics as a convenient way to address the troubling
social issue of ARTs, identity, and human relations.
Biologica determinism,118 or “genetic essentialism,” as Nelkin and
Lindee call it, is the belief that the essence of a human being is his or her

114

Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp. 300 (D. Haw. 1995).
See e.g., JUDITH RICH HARRIS, THE NURTURE ASSUMPTION: WHY CHILDREN T URN OUT
THE WAY T HEY D O (Free Press 1998). A special thanks goes to Professor Sarah Ramsey
for connecting this book to my research.
116
NELKIN & LINDEE , supra note 13, at Chapter 5.
117
Id. at 194.
118
Biological determinism is also called genetic determinism by some scholars. For some
descriptions of these concepts, see RUTH HUBBARD & ELIJAH WALD , EXPLODING THE GENE
M YTH (Beacon Press 1993); RICHARD C. LEWONTIN, STEVEN ROSE & LEON J. KAMIN, NOT
IN O UR G ENES: BIOLOGY , IDEOLOGY , AND H UMAN N ATURE (Pantheon Books 1984)
(arguing against biological determinism). Biological determinists conclude:
that human lives and actions are inevitable consequences of the
biochemical properties of the cells that make up the individual; and
these characteristics are uniquely determined by the constituents of the
genes possessed by each individual. Ultimately, all human behavior –
hence all human society – is governed by a chain of determinants that
runs from the gene to the individual to the sum of the behaviors of all
individuals. The determinists would have it, then, that human nature is
fixed by our genes…
What is more, biology, or "genetic inheritance," is always
invoked as an expression of inevitability. What is biological is given by
nature and proved by science. There can be no argument with biology,
for it is unchangeable." Id. at 6.
115
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genetic code, the DNA.119 It is a belief that most of who we are is preprogrammed by our genetic codes, despite our environments or
relationships or learning. Genetics, in this ideological approach, defines our
family and our history and predicts our futures. Though not so named,
genetic essentialism is what Aldous Huxley was satirizing and warning
against in Brave New World.120 More recently, the film Gattica was
designed to challenge genetic essentialism. 121 Despite these poignant
critiques, genetic essentialism continues to take hold as a dominant cultural
ideology in society, according to Nelkin and Lindee.
Genetic information can assist us in treating illnesses and
identifying bodies. Its usefulness in these areas, though, does not translate

In arguing against genetic determinism, Glenn McGee explains that, "Genetic determinism is
the view which holds that everything . . .about human identity is determined at the moment
of conception and encoded in DNA." GLENN M CGEE , T HE PERFECT BABY : A PRAGMATIC
APPROACH TO GENETICS 59 (Rowman & Littlefield 1997). I will use the term genetic
essentialism instead of biological determinism, but they represent the same ideology.
119
This ideology is called "gene-mania" by Allen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels
and Daniel Winkler in FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE 13 (Cambridge U. Press, 2000);
“geneticization” by Mary Anne Bobinski, Genetics and Reproductive Decision Making, in
T HE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE 79 (Murray, Rothstein
& Murray, eds., Indiana U. Press, 1996) at 107; and “genism” by George Annas, Genism,
Racism , and the Prospect of Genetic Genocide, UNESCO 21st Century Talks: The New
Aspects of Racism in the Age of Globalization and the Gene Revolution at the World
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance,
Durban,
South
Africa,
September
3,2001,
http://www.bumc.bu.edu/
www/sph/lw/pvl/genism.htm.
Alta Charo discusses how reductionist it is to use a
biological determinism or genetics approach. R. Alta Charo, Biological Determinism in
Legal Decision Making: The Parent Trap, 3 T EXAS J. WOMEN & LAW 265, 269 (1994). ).
Janet Dolgin examines how this ideology “reduces personhood to DNA molecules.” Janet
Dolgin, Personhood, Discrimination, and the New Genetics, 66 BROOKLYN L.REV. 755, 769
(2000-2001). Discrimination against people based on an ideology of genetic essentialism
has been called “geneticism” by Abby Lippman, The Human Genome Initiative and the
Impact of Genetic Testing and Screening Technologies: Article: Prenatal Genetic Testing
and Screening: Constructing Needs and Reinforcing Inequities, 17 AM. J. L. & MED . 15
(1991), at fn.16; Susan M. Wolf, Beyond "Genetic Discrimination:" Toward the Broader
Harm of Geneticism, 23 J.L. MED . & ETH . 345 (1995); and R. Alta Charo and Karen H.
Rothenberg, “The Good Mother”: The Limits of Reproductive Accountability and Genetic
Choice, in WOMEN AND PRENATAL T ESTING: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC
T ECHNOLOGY (Ohio State U. Press 1994).
120
ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Doubleday, 1932).
121
GATTICA (Columbia Pictures 1997).
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into usefulness in determining legal parenthood. The use of genetics as the
sole determinant of parenthood elides the biological with the social, cultural,
legal and political. How families are constituted by law is not a scientific
inquiry at all. Even if genetics tells us something about the science of
human kinship relationships through the contents of individual cells, it
certainly does not tell us all. On a purely scientific basis, it does not
address the organism as an organized system or collection of systems, the
organism’s physiology, its interactions with the environment, its
developmental growth, or its interrelationships with other organisms or
beings. 122 In terms of parenthood, genetics does not address the roles of
pregnancy, labor, birth, and nurturance. And these are just the scientific or
biological components that are absent from genetic essentialism. One of
the gravest problems with genetic essentialism or genetic determinism is its
reductionism. Genetic analysis cannot tell us anything about the social
world, culture, politics, spirit or mind.
I am not arguing that genes are irrelevant to who we are, nor that
the link between our genetic make-ups and some of our physical traits is
not scientifically supportable, nor that our genetic constitution is
independent of the characteristics we display. That there is a correlation
between genes and some physical attributes or traits seems indisputable.
The mapping of the human genome will certainly help fill in the gaps in our
knowledge about the extent to which genes affect, influence and define
us.123 But genetic essentialism claims more than correlations and addresses
more than physical attributes. To genetic essentialists, genes cause and
control us; they define who we are. ‘Genes ‘R Us.’ Genetic essentialists
argue that although some of the natural facts about genes are not optimistic
ones, it is foolish to rail against them. Genetic diagnoses, genetic screening
results, genetic definitions must be accepted. Science will not stop. If
nothing else, it is pragmatic to join the bandwagon. Genetic therapies and
enhancements are inevitable, so they say, as is human cloning, which may
turn out to be the most extreme form of genetic essentialism.

122

LENNY M OSS, WHAT GENES CAN ’T DO (Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book, MIT Press,
2003) (advocating a developmental, interactive, organizational theory of biology, rather than
a monadic cellular, gene-based understanding).
123
See articles cited supra note 29.
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Nelkin and Lindee explain that genetic essentialism runs some
serious risks. People may feel trapped by their genes, in ways that do not
fairly represent their true potentials. Risks exist that genes will be seen as
causes rather than correlations, as probabilities rather than as possibilities,
as truths, rather than as predispositions.
The scientific concept of genetic predisposition
assumes the existence of a biological condition signaling
that an individual may suffer a future disease or behavioral
aberration. But predisposition in the clinical sense is a
statistical risk calculation, not a prediction. A person
"predisposed" to cancer, for example, may have biological
qualities that heighten the odds that he or she will develop
cancer, in the same way that driving many miles each day
heightens one's odds of involvement in an automobile
accident. But many variables influence whether a person
will actually suffer from cancer.
Terms such as
"predisposed" or "at risk" are understood by scientists to
mean that the individual is vulnerable to a disease that may
or may not be expressed in the future. In the quest to
identify genetic predispositions, however, the statistically
driven concept of correlation is often reduced to "cause."
And possible future states, calculated by statistical
methods, are often defined as equivalent to current status.
...[A]n individual "at risk" may be regarded as deserving
differential treatment long before it is known whether or
not the risk will materialize.124
There are risks that people will try to control the genetic codes of
their children through preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)125 and

124

NELKIN & LINDEE , supra note 13, at 165-6.
See Rich Weiss, Test-Tube Baby Born to Save Ill Sister, WASH . POST, October 3, 2000, at
A01 for the story of Jack and Lisa Nash and the birth of their son, Adam, discussed supra
note 19. See also James Meek, Sons created to beat blood disease, GUARDIAN (London),
October 17, 2000, at 6 (Spanish couple where man has hemophilia used PGD to bear only
sons who do not have the disease. Male children are the only ones subject to hemophilia;
female children may be carriers, but are asymptomatic. This couple discarded all female
embryos that may be carriers, even though the daughters would have been perfectly healthy
themselves).
125
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genetic enhancement,126 thinking they can "design" their children. 127 As
with all technologies and sciences, we risk human error in reading genetic
tests, in manipulating genes, and in understanding the interrelationships
between one gene and another. There are also many other legitimate
concerns about genetic essentialism: privacy, employment discrimination,
health insurance, excuses or justifications for criminal conduct, and excuses
or justifications for social and economic stratification, to name a few. In
this essay, I am most concerned with what genetic essentialism does to our
legal understandings of reproduction and families, and what it might say
about sex and race. I save the other issues for another day.

C. Gender-Bias Issues in a Genetics-Based Approach of
Parenthood
A genetics-based approach to legal familial rights will inevitably
privilege men over women. In the first instance a genetic trump card to
use in disputes over the custody of children created through ARTs does not
seem sex-biased at all. Both women and men contribute equally when it
comes to the genetic heritage of children. 128 A man's genetic contribution
to an embryo (one gamete called a sperm) is equal to a woman's genetic

126

See e.g. Symposium, Genetic Technology: Social Values and Personal Autonomy in the
21st Century, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 561 (1999).
127
See e.g., GLENN M CGEE , T HE PERFECT BABY , supra note 116, at Chapter 7 (arguing that
genetic enhancement and "designed" babies are "not-so-deadly sins", but more akin to
educational policies or other things parents do to help their children).
128
At least this is true now. Speculation about children born of single-sex couples, either
two mothers or two fathers and a surrogate mother, or asexual reproduction through cloning,
abound. In these cases, the genetic contribution to the child can come from two women or
two men, and the union can be manipulated by technicians in vitro. See e.g., LEE M.
SILVER, REMAKING EDEN , supra note 27, at Chapter 15. A less technologically complicated
means for two lesbians to have a biological child together is for one to donate the ova and
for the other to gestate the embryo. But in these cases a donor sperm is required. See, e.g.,
Kyle C. Velte, Egging on Lesbian Maternity: The Legal Implications of Tri-Gametic In Vitro
Fertilization, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL 'Y & L. 431 (1999); Anne Reichman Schiff,
Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity,
80 IOWA L. REV. 265 (1995) (arguing that in those cases, both women should be legally
recognized as mothers).
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contribution (one gamete called an ovum), so males would not be favored in
a genetic contest between ovum and sperm gamete contributors. The
dispute in the Perry-Rogers v. Fasano case was not about whether men
should prevail over women in genetics-based parenthood controversies, so
how could a genetics-based approach in that case reveal sex-bias?
Deborah Perry-Rogers, the genetic mother, prevailed over Donna Fasano,
the gestational mother, both of whom are women. If one woman can
defeat another woman’s claims when using a genetics-based approach to
legal parenthood, how can a genetics-based analysis be male -biased?
The key to my argument is that whether conscious or unconscious,
a genetics-based analysis of parenthood reinforces and replicates an
understanding of reproduction rooted in a male experience. Because a
male’s only biological contribution to reproduction is his gene-carrying
sperm, and because fathers are increasingly being identified by DNA
genetic tests, courts may believe that parity requires that mothers be
identified in the same way. 129 If something like this reasoning is dictating
results in these cases, even if it is below the surface rather than articulated,
this false equality between male and female roles in reproduction exhibits a
male-biased perspective. Women who are genetic parents benefit from
this approach, but they only benefit, if they are "like men" with respect to
their biological contributions in these ART cases130 – if they are genetic
contributors to the embryo. 131 Women who are gestational mothers, that is,
women whose contributions to reproduction include gestation, labor and
birth, are not valued in a genetics-based analysis of parenthood. Geneticbased approaches to parenthood necessarily ignore one of the two ways

129

See e.g., Soos v. Superior Court, 182 Ariz. 470, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)
(Court finds that, in a contest between genetic and gestational mothers, it violates equal
protection not to let genetic mother prove her legal parenthood by DNA testing in the same
way that men prove their legal parenthood).
130
In fact, women are never really “like men” when it comes to biological reproduction.
Although a genetic mother and a genetic father can be compared in their equal contributions
of a single cell to the embryo, the biological intrusion necessary to take that single cell
differs markedly. Even the genetic contributor woman has a stronger biological connection
to the embryo than a genetic contributor man because of the intrusiveness of the process of
gamete retrieval on the woman’s body.
131
Courts sometimes require that men and women participating in assisted reproductive
technologies be both genetic contributors and intending parents. See e.g. Johnson v.
Calvert, supra note 26; Litowitz v. Litowitz, supra note 102. The additional requirement
of intention is not sex-biased and can be equally achieved by men and women.
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women can contribute to reproduction. Genetic definitions of parenthood
value what only men can contribute to reproduction (gametic contribution)
and do not value what only women can contribute (gestatational and birth
contribution).
Therefore, relying on genetics as the definition of
parenthood, particularly of legal motherhood, is fundamentally sex-biased.
The privileging-of-genetics problem only becomes an issue
between women when biological motherhood is bifurcated. 132 Until the last
few decades, a woman who bore a child was always also the woman who
contributed half the genetic complement to that child. When an analysis of
parenthood occurred, the law named the male party as a parent by his
genetic contribution, i.e., his sperm causing the pregnancy,133 and the

132

Since this discussion focuses on biological motherhood, it does not address arguments
concerning other forms of mothering: social motherhood, step-motherhood, foster
motherhood, adoptive motherhood, etc. The absence of these other forms of mothering in
no way implies their lack of significance. The rights and interests of these social mothers
are already recognized in law, even if not adequately, whereas the simultaneous or
prioritized rights of more than one biological mother is an open question. The theory of
genetic essentialism, which I challenge here, would devalue these social mothers if it were
applied in their custody disputes over infants, just as it devalues non-genetic, gestating
mothers.
A biological essentialism, as opposed to genetic essentialism, could also undermine
social mothers, if misunderstood. If properly understood, however, there are significant
analogies between a biological essentialist notion of motherhood and a social mothering
notion of motherhood. Both biological and social mothering are about dependencies and
relationships.
A biological essentialism based on pregnancy, labor and giving birth,
recognizes that women’s biological contributions to their fetuses/children are relational.
Pregnancy is an active relationship between a pregnant woman and her fetus, JANICE G.
RAYMOND , WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE T ECHNOLOGIES AND THE BATTLE OVER
WOMEN ’S FREEDOM 36-39 (HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), just as social mothering is an active
relationship between mother and child. Genetic contributions, on the other hand, are about
DNA and cells, at best about potential relationships, but not about active current
relationships.
133
For the moment, this excludes the legal presumption that the husband of a pregnant
woman is the father. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); In re Raphael
P., 118 Cal. Rptr.2d 610 (Cal. App., 1 Dist. 2002). See also full discussion of legal
presumption and its implications for legal parenthood in Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene:
Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637 (1993). But see Rafferty
v. Perkins, 757 So.2d 992 (Miss. 2000) (S.Ct. of Mississippi rejected the presumption that
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female party as a parent by her giving birth (which also coincided with her
ovum creating the child). 'Bearing a child' was a synonym for 'being the
child's genetic mother.'134 The new reproductive technologies have
changed that. Now, it is possible for the biological female contribution to
procreation to be made by at least two women, one who contributes the
genetic material (the ovum or gamete donor) and one who gestates and
gives birth to the child. 135 We have been forced to recognize that giving
birth is no longer the only way to be a mother or female biological parent.
With an understanding of the separation of the genetic and gestational
aspects of biological maternity, we can begin to analyze whether the
genetic component or the gestating and birth component of the female
contribution ought to be privileged in custody or visitation disputes.
Once maternity has been disassembled by assisted reproductive
technologies, courts' unstated assumptions about parenthood are exposed.
The unstated assumption courts use more and more frequently in disputes
arising from assisted reproductive technologies is that genetics is the core
identity of the child, and therefore genetic contributors ought to be seen as
the legal parents.136 This argument, based in genetic essentialism, is rooted

husband is father of child when faced with genetic evidence that another man was the
father); and Witso v. Overby, 609 N.W.2d 613 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) ("A positive genetic
test thus creates a presumption of paternity that would, in this action, compete with the
presumption of paternity applicable to the mother's husband"). This is an important
adaptation in the law, but not relevant to this case or argument, so I am bracketing it for
now.
134
Johnson v. Calvert, supra note __.
135
There also may be a third woman included in the analysis of maternity--the intending,
social, or adoptive mother--who may or may not be a biological mother. As technologies
dip deeper into the well of interventions into human reproduction, we may be adding more
biological roles. One of the cloning techniques used involves taking an enucleated cell from
one person (who could be one of the biological mothers) and inserting the genetic or DNA
material from another person (biological mother or father) and then having another woman
gestate the embryo (another biological mother). This could result in three biological
mothers.
136
I see this trend in Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), Culliton v. Beth Israel
Deaconness Medical Center, 435 Mass. 285, 756 N.E.2d 1133 (2001); Soos v. Superior Ct.,
897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); In re O.G.M., 988 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999),
Litowitz v.Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) ("Here, Becky did not contribute
any gametes to the preembryos. Thus, under a Davis analysis, she does not have a
constitutional right to procreate. But David is a progenitor and, therefore, he has a
constitutional right not to procreate") Id. at 1092, reversed, In Marriage of Litowitz, 146
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in a male-biased perspective on reproduction. 137 Were a non-sex-based or
"neutral" perspective used, genetics alone, or even genetics and intention at
conception, would not be the defining element of legal parenthood.
Fairness requires that we remove this male-bias from courts' analyses of
parenthood in ART cases and apply a more equitable analysis that respects
the biological realities of reproduction for both sexes. Principles of justice
urge us to expose the male -bias in the ways courts subtly or overtly use
genetics as the primary descriptor of parenthood138 and even motherhood.
In evaluating the contributions of males and females to
reproduction, we can measure many things: their intent to procreate, their
genetic contributions, other biological contributions (including bonding and
pre-birth nurturance), the relationship between parent and fetus/child, and
post-birth social nurturance. My argument in this essay is based solely on
prenatal biological contributions, since postnatal social and physical
contributions—except for lactation (for which bottle -feeding can be

Wash.2d 514, 48 P.3d 261 (2002); Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc.2d 54, 644 N.E.2d 760
(Ohio C.P. 1994), In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), and Perry-Rogers, despite the
courts' rhetoric in each of these cases that decisions were based on intentions. In all of
those cases, the court found the genetic contributors to be the parents, in some cases even
when the intentions at the time of conception were arguably different. But see Doe v. Doe,
710 A.2d 1297 (CT 1998); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 280 (Cal.App. 4
Dist., 1998); R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (MA 1998).
137
Accord, Barbara Katz Rothman, Daddy Plants A Seed: Personhood Under Patriarchy,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1241 (1996). Janice Raymond calls this “ejaculatory fatherhood.”
RAYMOND , WOME N AS WOMBS, supra note 127, at Chapter 2.
138
In contrast to my argument that the law is moving toward relying more on genetics to
define parenthood, Janet Dolgin powerfully argues that in law, women have been
denominated mothers based on their biological connections to a child, but men have needed
more than biology, or their genetic connection, to be entitled to paternity. Dolgin, supra
note 128. She argues that courts favor men who have formed a familial relationship with the
child's mother when determining paternal rights, rather than looking solely to their genetic
connection to the child. This seems borne out in recent paternity cases, where conduct and
relationships trumped the need for genetic testing as the indicia of paternity: In re Kim F.,
744 N.Y.S.2d 777 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.,2002) & People ex. Rel. J.A.U. v. R.L.C., 47 P.3d
327 (Co., 2002) and In re Raphael P., 118 Cal. Rptr.2d 610 (Cal. App., 1 Dist. 2002). But
see Walter v. Gunter, 788 A.2d 609 (Md. 2002) where putative father’s child support
obligation was vacated after genetic testing excluded him as the father.
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substituted)—can be equally contributed by males or females.139 With
regard to "intent to procreate," men and women are also in parity – they
can each intend to reproduce and each can intend to become the parents
who will rear the children. Applying an intent standard for determining
parenthood is free of sex-bias,140 because men and women have equal
opportunities to intend to be parents.141 But men and women are not
equivalent in their prenatal biological contributions to the birth of a child.
The only biological way that men contribute to reproduction is through the
genetic contribution of their gametes.142 Men contribute half the genetic

139

Linda Lacey objects to a focus on biological motherhood as too dismissive of the needs
and interests of infertile women for whom any biological motherhood is not an option or for
whom only genetic motherhood is an option. Lacey, supra note 14. If I can play out her
arguments with those I make in this essay, I believe her claim would be that my 'biological
essentialist' argument is as flawed as a 'genetic essentialist' argument, for it devalues and
ignores infertile women's interests and needs in "having children." Accord Barbara Berg,
supra note 14. Lacey does recognize, however, that incorporating the infertile woman's
perspective into the analysis still doesn't answer the question of who should have custody
when there are disputes. ("I do not contend that adding the infertile woman's voice to the
dialogue will provide easier answers to complex problems." Lacey, supra note 14, at 195.)
140
Several courts have used an "intent" standard to determine parentage in disputed
surrogacy custody cases. Johnson v. Calvert, supra note 26; Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 77
Cal.Rptr.2d 280 (Cal.Ct.App. 1998); McDonald v. McDonald, supra note 67.
141
In cases such as the dispute between the Fasanos and Rogerses, an "intent" standard
does not advance the analysis, since both parties equally intended to create a child through
in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer. Because of the intent standard's inadequacy in a
context where embryos are stolen, misappropriated, or switched, Alice Noble-Allgire
recommends that “intent” be combined with a “best-interests” standard, recognizing that
such an approach would weigh more heavily in favor of the gestating mother, all other
things being equal. Noble-Allgire, supra note 79, at 584. While I appreciate Noble-Allgire's
arguments a great deal, I would urge us to reject an intent standard, unless it is based solely
on intent to create a child. Courts have used the intent standard to analyze questions about
intent to rear the child. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, supra note 26 and McDonald v.
McDonald, supra note 67. To me, this misapplication of an intent standard transforms a
reproductive and family-based inquiry into a contract-based inquiry, reflective of market
values more than familial/relational values. For a valuable discussion of market-based versus
family-values-based versus genetics-based analyses regarding new reproductive
technologies, see Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The
Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN . L. REV. 523 (2000).
142
BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING M OTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN
A P ATRIARCHAL SOCIETY , supra note 79; JANICE RAYMOND , WOMEN AS WOMBS, supra note
127.
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material that defines the child's DNA. Women have two biological ways to
contribute to reproduction—the genetic contribution of their gametes and
the biological connections of gestation and birth which form a direct
relationship with the fetus/child. If we privilege genetics over gestation, we
are privileging the only thing that men can do as the measure of
parenthood, that is, we are using only the contribution of gametes to define
legal parenthood. 143
Women, like men, contribute half the genetic materials that define
the child's DNA, but women also contribute the physical, biological
environment and nutrients that enable the combined male and female
gametes to grow to become a baby. The latter biological role has no male
equivalent. Pregnancy/gestation is biological and relational—the crux of
the biology is the relationship between pregnant woman and child in utero.
In an analysis that prioritizes genetics as the definition of legal parenthood,
those biological functions that women additionally do during reproduction,
i.e., gestate, labor and give birth to a child, become of lesser importance, or
even no importance, in defining legal parenthood. 144 A genetics-based
analysis violates principles of sex equality, because it counts all the things
that men do in procreation, but does not count all the things that women do
in procreation. To value those aspects of procreative contribution which
track the sum total of what men do, but ignore or devalue those aspects of
procreative contribution that only women do, unjustly discriminates against
women. Therefore, measuring legal parenthood first and foremost by
what men biologically contribute (genetics) unfairly favors men, by
encoding their experiences of procreation as the dominant measure of
parenthood. 145
Both genetics-based and biological-contribution-based

143

Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Redefining Parenthood, 29 CAL . W. INT'L L. J. 313 (1999)
("Conventional dichotomy of genetic versus social construction of parenthood is more
reflective of the male experience of parenthood than the female experience"), Id. at 325-6.
Professor Halperin-Kaddari argues that Israeli law makes genetics the ultimate force and
has unintended patriarchal consequences.
144
In Johnson v. Calvert, supra note 26, the California Supreme Court named genetic
donors as the parents, completely overriding any legal parental claims by the gestational
surrogate mother. The court argued that it was persuaded by "intent," not genetics, but the
genetic essentialism of the opinion was clear.
145
The court in Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) decided the
equality issue completely differently. Finding the state's surrogate statute violative of equal
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analyses of parenthood may be criticized for their "biological essentialism,"
were that the only consideration that courts assessed in determining
parenthood.
Feminist legal scholars, feminist social scientists, and feminist
political theorists have carefully illustrated the dominant historical tendency
of law and society to privilege males over females through the conscious,
subconscious or unconscious use of unstated assumptions and male -biased
perspectives. I am arguing that the newly developing genetics-based
analysis of motherhood (and parenthood generally) continues in that
discredited tradition, and therefore must be abandoned.
An impartial and more inclusive approach would value all the
contributions to reproduction made by both sexes and determine
presumptive custody by evaluating which potential legal parent made the
most significant contribution (biologically, relationally, and psychologically)
to the child's life and well-being. This kind of analysis sounds strikingly
similar to the “primary caretaker” analysis in family law146 or even the “best

protection when it declares the surrogate the legal mother of the child born as a result of a
surrogate parentage contract, A.R.S. § 25-218(B), the court reasoned that, since Arizona law
allows a man to rebut the presumption of legal paternity in another by proving genetic
fatherhood, it should afford a woman the same right. Although the woman giving birth (the
gestational mother) is presumptively the mother, the law must afford the female genetic
progenitor an opportunity to rebut that presumption of maternity with evidence of the
genetic tie. "A woman who may be genetically related to a child has no opportunity to
prove her maternity and is thereby denied the opportunity to develop the parent-child
relationship. … The Mother has parental interests not less deserving of protection than
those of the Father." Id at 1360. The court errs in its analysis because it equates a legal
presumption based on social concerns (paternity in the husband of the mother) with a legal
presumption based on biological facts (maternity in the woman who gestates and gives birth
to the child). Men and women are not in the same situation with regard to reproduction
because of critical biological differences. This fundamental biological difference shows that
Arizona is not treating similarly situated persons differently in violation of equal protection
when it creates an irrebuttable presumption of maternity in the gestating woman.
146
See, e.g., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360-61 (W. Va. 1981) (applying primary
caretaker presumption to establish custody for young child). Accord, Mary Ann Mason,
Custody Wars: Why Children Are Losing the Legal Battle and What We Can Do about it
(Basic Books 2000) (proposing a primary parent preference). Something more akin to the
primary caretaker role has also been incorporated into the American Law Institute’s
Principles of Family Dissolution, Section 2.09, which allocates responsibility and time with
the child post-dissolution to the parents in proportion to the time they spent relating to and
nurturing the child prior to the dispute. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution:
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interests of the child” analysis.147
That gestating birth mothers would
presumptively prevail in these contests is not a function of the inequitable
application of a biased norm, as in a genetics-based analysis, but a
reasoned measure of the biological and relational facts of child in utero’s
life.148 Gestation, labor and delivery are the sine qua non of bringing
children into the world. Perhaps some day children will be "grown" entirely
in vitro, ex utero, through ectogenesis,149 but we are not there yet and will
not be for quite some time.150 Couples who use in vitro fertilization to

Analysis and Recommendations, 2.09 (Tentative Draft No. 3 Part I, March 20, 1998) By
recognizing the value of the relational, nurturing role to the well-being of the child, the ALI
principles replicate the kind of analysis proposed here. The nine months of prebirth
nurturance in utero would be valued in the same way that the pre-dissolution nurturance is
valued by the ALI Principles.
147
After this article was drafted, but before it was published, Ilana Hurwitz published her
thoughtful article on Collaborative Reproduction, supra note 76, reaching a very similar
conclusion.
148
See e.g., Marie Ashe, Law-Language of Maternity: Discourse Holding Nature in
Contempt, 22 NEW ENG . L. REV. 521 (1988). Janet Dolgin instructs us that Justice Stewart
recognized the relational bond between gestating mother and child in his dissent in Caban v.
Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) ("Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the
biological connection between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring.
The mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense, her parental relationship is clear"),
as did Justice Stevens in his dissent, id. at 405 (discussing a “symbiotic relationship
between mother and child" creating a "physical and psychological bond"). Dolgin, supra
note 128, at 659-660. My argument emphasizes that, unlike the language used by these
two Justices, the bond between gestating mother and child is a biological bond, i.e., not
solely psychological, and that the biology of pregnancy is a biology about the relationship
between mother and child. The point of quoting the Caban majority and dissent is to
illustrate that the Supreme Court is very capable of recognizing the powerful connection
between gestating mother and child as a component of parenthood.
149
Julien S. Murphy, Is Pregnancy Necessary? Feminist Concerns about Ectogenesis, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN M EDICAL ETHICS 181 (Helen Bequaert Holmes & Laura M.
Purdy, eds, Indiana U. Press, 1992). That day may be sooner than we think, see Robin
McKie, Men redundant? Now we don't need women either; Scientists have developed an
artificial womb that allows embryos to grow outside the body, T HE OBSERVER, February 10,
2002.
150
Some early feminist theorists yearned for the day when children could be gestated ex
utero, thinking that technology would liberate women. See e.g., SHULAMITH FIRESTONE,
T HE DIALECTIC OF SEX: T HE CASE FOR FEMINIST REVOLUTION (NY: William Morrow, 1970).
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create embryos still need a woman to gestate the child or their embryos die
or remain frozen in liquid nitrogen. Though both men and women equally
contribute gametes and DNA to a child,151 a woman's many months'
gestation, labor, and delivery necessarily constitute a more significant
biological and relational contribution to the child's existence than genetics.
The most troubling problem with a genetic essentialist approach is
that it ignores this post-conception, prenatal biological, relational and
psychological connection between mother and child. Biologically, the
placenta, an organ that is genetically part of the fetus, but also responsible
for maternal metabolic changes during pregnancy, physically connects the
mother and fetus.152 Maternal hormones, such as adrenaline, produced in
response to emotions such as anger, anxiety, and fear have been shown to
prompt kicking by the fetus, behaviorally linking mother and fetus.153
Psychological analyses of women’s experiences during pregnancy
demonstrate a positive attachment to the fetus that develops during the first
trimester of pregnancy and increases throughout the gestation period. 154
Specifically, attachment has been shown to dramatically increase after the
fetus shows “clear signs of life” such as movements and quickening. 155
Behavioral studies of expectant mothers have reported that women engage
in attachment behaviors, such as talking to the fetus, calling it by a pet

I am not so optimistic.
151
Though gametes are equally contributed by men and women, the process by which
women contribute gametes to in vitro fertilization is significantly riskier and more intrusive
than the process by which men contribute gametes, see infra n. 147. This physical fact
may militate in favor of female gamete providers in disputes with male gamete providers
over embryos or children. See in part, argument for Sue Davis in Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588 (TN 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993); argument for Ruti Nachmani in
Nachmani v. Nachmani, 50(4) P.D. 661 [Nachmani II; Israel]; arguments in A.Z. v. B.Z.,
supra at note 21.
152
Pedro Rosso, Nutrition and Metabolism in Pregnancy, Mother and Fetus 133 (1990).
153
T HOMAS VERNY , M.D. & JOHN KELLY , T HE SECRET LIFE OF THE UNBORN CHILD 76, 85
(1981).
154
Mecca S. Cranley, the developer of the first measurement scale of maternal-fetal
attachment, defined prenatal “attachment” as “the extent to which women engage in
behaviors that represent an affiliation and interaction with their unborn child. Mecca, supra
note 79. See also Jeanne T. Grace, Development of Maternal-Fetal Attachment During
Pregnancy, 38 NURSING RESEARCH 4, 228-232 (1989).
155
Mario Mikulincer and Victor Florian, Maternal-Fetal Bonding, Coping Strategies, and
Mental Health During Pregnancy – the Contribution of Attachment Style, 18 J. OF SOCIAL
AND CLINICAL P SYCHOLOGY 3, 256-257 (1999).

Bender –10/10/02

GENES, PARENTS & ART MISTAKES

65

name, reprimanding it for moving too often, and offering it food when they
are eating, and adopt psychological mindsets in preparation for birth. 156
A genetic essentialist analysis constructs the gestating mother as a
mechanical incubator rather than as a interactive being with the fetus. As
Justice Kennard of the California Supreme Court writes in her dissent in
Johnson v. Calvert:
A pregnant woman intending to bring a child into
the world is more than a mere container or breeding
animal; she is a conscious agent of creation no less than
the genetic mother, and her humanity is implicated on a
deep level. 157
Even if the male bias of a genetics-based analysis of parenthood were too
subtle to see in its other formulations, the dehumanizing of the fundamental
female gestational contribution to reproduction by seeing a pregnant woman
as a "womb to rent" or fetal container, confirms the hypothesis of male bias.
No part of what a male contributes to reproduction is devalued in a
genetics-based analysis; the largest part of what a female contributes to
reproduction is devalued and dehumanized in an analysis that relies on a
genetic definition of legal parenthood. In addition to the differential
qualitative contributions of men and women to reproduction, the risks of the
process of reproduction for men and women differ significantly, as do the
risks for gestating women over gamete-donating women. 158

156

Cranley’s maternal-fetal attachment scale identified and measured six subscales of
maternal behavioral-psychology. These included: 1) differentiation of self from fetus; 2)
interaction with fetus; 3) attributing characteristics and intentions to the fetus; 4) giving of
self; 5) role-taking; and 6) nesting. Cranley supra note 79 at 282. A subsequent study by
Grace determined that behaviors associated with role-taking and giving of one’s self were
most positively correlated with increased gestation. Grace supra note 154.
157
Johnson, 851 P.2d. at 797-98. See also Julien Murphy, Should Pregnancies Be
Sustained in Brain-Dead Women?: A Philosophical Discussion of Postmortem Pregnancy,
in HEALING TECHNOLOGY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 135-159 (U. Mich. 1989)
(emphasizing the need to respect a woman's autonomy through recognizing consciousness
and choice as critical elements of pregnancy and reproduction).
158
The egg donation/retrieval process for gamete donors is no simple matter. Women must
take regular hormone injections to properly time their cycles, plus other drugs to create
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The birth [gestating] mother risks sickness and
inconvenience during pregnancy. She faces the certain
prospect of painful labor. She even risks the small but
qualitatively infinite possibility of death. Throughout all of
this discomfort and uncertainty, it is her body which
remains the cradle for the growing fetus. By comparison,
the physical involvement of the sperm donor is de minimis.
While the egg donor physically risks more than the sperm
donor, her level of physical involvement pales in
comparison with the gestational host.159
An extensive feminist bioethics literature addresses these
significant sex-based differences, their implications, and how we ought to
analyze ARTs for men and women in all of their roles.160 Whether as a

controlled ovarian hyperstimulation (to ripen and produce more eggs), must be monitored at
clinics, must communicate with the clinical team, and then must undergo intrusive surgery
(laparoscopy) or transvaginal manipulation with ultrasound guidance to retrieve the eggs.
See e.g., Nancy Klein, Gretchen Sewall and Michael Soules, Donor Oocyte Program at
University of Washington Medical Center, in NEW WAYS OF M AKING BABIES 3, 10 (Cynthia
Cohen, ed., Indiana U. Press 1996). In a parallel analysis to that of genetic versus
gestational contributions, a weighing of the biological contributions between female and male
gamete donors reveals that female gamete donors make a significantly greater biological
contribution by undergoing a more difficult and time-consuming process in order to donate.
159
John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to be a "Parent"?: The Claims of Biology as the
Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 408 (1991).
160
The list of articles would be too long. Even a partial list of books is ext ensive: see, e.g.,
BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING M OTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND T ECHNOLOGY IN A
PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (W. W. Norton 1989); FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN M EDICAL ETHICS
169-300 (Helen Bequaert Holmes & Laura M. Purdy, eds. (Indiana U. Press, 1992); JANICE
G. RAYMOND , WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE T ECHNOLOGIES AND THE BATTLE OVER
WOMEN 'S FREEDOM (1993); CHRISTINE OVERALL, ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION
(Harper 1987); PATRICIA SPALLONE , BEYOND CONCEPTION: T HE NEW POLITICS OF
REPRODUCTION (Bergin & Garvey Press 1989); VALERIE HARTOUNI, CULTURAL
CONCEPTIONS: ON REPRODUCTIVE T ECHNOLOGIES + THE REMAKING OF LIFE (U. Minnesota
Press, 1997); CYBORG BABIES: FROM T ECHNO -SEX TO T ECHNO -T OTS, Part 3 (Robbie DavisFloyd & Joseph Dumit, eds., Routledge 1998); EMBODYING BIOETHICS: RECENT FEMINIST
ADVANCES, Part II (Anne Donchin & Laura M. Purdy, eds., Rowman & Littlefield, 1999);
REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW : FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (Joan C. Callahan, ed.,
Indiana U. Press, 1995); SUSAN SHERWIN, NO LONGER PATIENT: FEMINIST ETHICS & HEALTH
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matter of natural reproduction or assisted reproduction, equality requires
that gestation be fully valued for the extraordinary female contribution
(biological and relational) to reproduction that it is.
A genetics-based
analysis of parenthood fails to meet that test because of its sex-bias.
When contributions of genetic materials and contributions of gestation,
labor and birth are treated without bias and fairly compared, it becomes
clear that a gestating mother is entitled to presumptive primary legal
parenthood, with its concomitant rights to custody and visitation.
To reach the conclusion that women’s biological contributions of
gestation, labor and birth ought to be included in an analysis of biological
parenthood does not mean that a man's or woman's genetic contribution to
a child ought to be ignored and devalued instead. Nor does it imply that the
intentions and desires of infertile couples who cannot contribute genetically
or biologiocally are to be ignored. My sole argument here is that biological
contribution is one important aspect of legal understandings of parenthood,
and in any analysis where weight is given to biological contributions, a
primarily genetics-based definition of biological contribution is sex-biased
and must be abandoned.
The court in Perry-Rogers v. Fasano denies that it is applying
"solely" a genetics-based analysis of parenthood, yet it reaches a conclusion
that effectuates that end. “But for” genetics, and in the absence of legal
adoption, no other reason exists to give any legal rights, especially exclusive
legal rights with regard to Joseph/Akeil to the Rogerses.161 While he was
being nurtured in utero, born, and cared for at the beginning of his life, the
Rogerses did not even know of his existence. For the almost eight
additional months of pregnancy post-clinic notification of the mistake and
then the time after Joseph/Akeil’s birth before their genetic parenthood
was confirmed, the Rogerses were unaware of his existence. During that
same time period, Donna Fasano developed a relationship with the child
and nurtured him daily in her body and through her being. The Rogerses’
claim to him, when they discovered the fact of his birth, was genetic, not

CARE , Chapter 6 (Temple U. Press, 1992); ROSE M ARIE T ONG , FEMINIST APPROACHES TO
BIOETHICS, Chapters 7-8 (Westview Press, 1997).
161
In this case there is the signed agreement between the parties, but since the court
disregards that agreement when it comes to visitation, it would be odd to conclude that it
was enforcing other aspects of that agreement.
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relational. The Rogerses were terribly wronged by the negligence of the
IVF clinic, but the clinic's mistake with respect to the misappropriation of
their embryo does not seamlessly translate into parental rights in the child,
as the court makes it appear. They have been harmed, and harmed by
reproductive technologies, but being harmed does not make one a legal
parent.
If genetics had not been the salient feature of parenthood in its
reasoning, the court could have found that the Rogerses had a valuable
claim against the IVF clinic, but that they had no standing to seek a
declaration of exclusive legal parenthood. Ironically, the court instead
found that the Fasanos had no standing to bring a claim for visitation.
Therefore, the court's denial of reliance solely on genetics is contradicted
by the facts of the case and the resolution it reached. Somehow an
ideology of genetic essentialism, with its male -bias on issues of assisted
reproductive technologies, crept in as the court's unstated assumption. The
ensuing gender-bias undermines the possibilities of achieving a just result.

D. Race Issues and ART mistakes
The Perry-Rogers v. Fasano opinion does not acknowledge the
racial issues raised by this case,162 and yet the court seems to have used an
unconscious or unspoken ideology about race to reach its conclusion that
Donna Fasano was wrongful in bonding with Joseph/Akeil. Racial
difference is the elephant in the living room that we are not supposed to
mention. Practically every newspaper account of this extraordinary
situation mentions the racial differences between the couples and the
between the twins.163 This subsection on race issues and ART mistakes

162

Race is only mentioned in one paragraph in the facts. Perry-Rogers, 276 A.D.2d at 69.
See, e.g, Michael Grunwald, In Vitro, in Error, and Now in Court; White Mother Given
Black Couple's Embryos Will Give One 'Twin' Back, WASH . POST, March 31, 1999, at A01,
available in 1999 WL 2208496; Samuel Maull, Teaneck Parent Opposing 'Twin' Visits,
REC. N. N.J., February 4, 2000, at A06, available in 2000 WL 15796459; Bob Groves,
Lawyers Argue over Visitation in Case of Misplaced Embryo, REC. N.N.J., June 10, 2000, at
A03, available in 2000 WL 15818246; Kathleen Parker, Baby Case Ends with Multiracial
Scrambled Eggs, CHICAGO T RIB., June 21, 2000, at 17, available in 2000 WL 3677176;
Samuel Maull, White couple ask court to let them visit black baby that was born to them,
APWIRES 19:54:00, October 18, 2000; Jim McClean, Couples war over implant mix-up
baby: White parents of black child accused of trying to exploit fertility treatment fracas,
HERALD (Glasgow, Scotland), October 20, 2000, at 11, available in 2000 WL 28098709;
163
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explores the role of racial difference in the facts of the Perry-Rogers v.
Fasano case, and how race influenced the way the court resolved the
dispute about parenthood claims. The court’s strategy of “colorblindness”
or ignoring race on the surface, but using race-based assumptions to
produce the result, imposes a damaging race-bias that in this instance leads
to a renewed kind of biological racism.
Biological racism maintains that racial groups are physically distinct
species, with specific characteristics or capabilities attributable to each
racial group based on the group members’ similar genes and biology. The
racism part of biological racism separates or divides human beings into
hierarchically ranked groups with more or less power and privileges; the
biological part of biological racism makes those divisions seem scientifically
supportable and natural, as if they were based on real racially-based,
physical distinctions. One’s physiognomy, or one’s racially distinct
features, becomes the signifier of racial group membership. But biological
racism does more serious harm than signifying racial group membership; it
divides people into groups in ways that do not necessarily reflect their
agency, experiences, understandings, or even their relationships. One of the
residual effects of an assumption about ‘race as biology’ (or ‘race as
physiognomy’) is that it is carries with it social or cultural norms and
expectations. Those expectations, including understandings about the
inappropriateness of interracial intimacy,164 endure in our social and cultural
conduct and get incorporated into legal decision-making, even if they are no
longer openly sanctioned by law, as happened in Perry-Rogers v. Fasano.
An assumption about race as a biological, genetic fact, combined
with cultural norms that still discourage interracial intimacies, including
interracial parenthood, limits Joseph/Akeil’s options to have a familial
relationship with his birth mother (that is, to be with his white mother in
addition to his African-American mother). The court’s decision punishes
Joseph/Akeil for being racially different from his birth family. In this case,
it actually punishes him for being dark-skinned and appearing to be
African-American. I do not want to be understood to be saying that

Cerisse Anderson, Couple's Visitation Rights are Rejected in Case of Mixed-up In Vitro
Births, N.Y.L.J., October 27, 2000, at 1, (col. 4).
164
RACHEL M ORAN , INTERRACIAL INTIMACY : T HE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
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Joseph’s being placed with his genetic parents, the Rogerses, is
punishment. I am definitely not saying that. But, I am saying that it clearly
is punishment to completely sever a child’s connection with his birth mother
and brother, despite their strong desires to stay attached and continue the
relationship.
My argument is that the Perry-Rogers v. Fasano court defaulted
to a simplistic race-matching approach to parenthood, determined by
genetics and physiognomy. While part of that default is the result of the
genetic essentialism discussed in an earlier section of this essay, the other
part is attributable to an ideology of biological racism. In either case,
whether due to genetics alone (genetic essentialism) or race and genetics
(biological racism), Joseph/Akeil is forced to suffer the loss of his mother
and brother. The consequences for Joseph/Akeil of the court’s biologically
race-based assumptions are as painful and real as if they were carved into
his body by the execution apparatus/machine from Kafka’s The Penal
Colony.165
To illustrate the role that race played in the court’s decisionmaking,
I will give a rough overview of the multiple steps in my argument about the
race-bias of the court’s reasoning, and then develop some of its subparts
more fully. First, if the court is not relying solely on genetics as the
descriptor of legal parenthood, as it states, then we must examine why the
court reached the decision it did. That is the purpose of this subsection.
Second, the court explains that Donna Fasano was denied standing to make
a claim to maintain a relationship with her infant on the grounds that she
was wrongful in bonding with the infant. Third, since Fasano was made
aware of the clinic’s error early in her pregnancy, she should have known
that both, one, or neither of her twins might have been the genetic child of
another couple. Fourth, despite the general uncertainty about both
children’s genetic parentage during the pregnancy (because of the clinic
mistake, or for that matter, in any ART created-pregnancy, since human
error is always possible), the court never requires Fasano or any mother
made aware of an ART clinic mistake to genetically test at their birth all of
her infants born from that pregnancy. Fifth, nor does the court say that in
the absence of genetic testing, parents utilizing ARTs are wrongful in
bonding with any of their children. Sixth, the court never faults Donna
Fasano for bonding with Vincent, the other twin. Seventh, the only reason
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Franz Kafka, In the Penal Colony, in LAW IN LITERATURE : LEGAL THEMES IN
SHORT STORIES 217 (ed. Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette, ________, 1995).
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Donna Fasano could have had to know that she “shouldn’t” have bonded
with Jospeh/Akeil when he was born was his racial physiognomy that
appeared to differ from her and her husband’s. Eight, therefore, the court
uses physical features correlated with racial groups to delimit the range of
legally acceptable relationships for Joseph/Akeil and the Fasanos. These
race-based assumptions and relational limitations are throwbacks to a
flawed biological racism that has been roundly rejected by scientists and
scholars.
My biological racism critique of this case identifies the court’s
unstated assumptions in the opinion as (1) race is reducible to a visually
detectable set of characteristics (that are genetically transmitted and
physical) and (2) interracial family relations are unseemly and should be
avoided. Despite powerful articulations by courts and scholars denouncing
biological racism166 and denouncing race-based prohibitions on family
relations,167 these concepts have found subtle ways to insiunate themselves
in the Perry-Rogers v. Fasano decision.
The ideology of 'race as a biological category,' a concept that has
fueled much racist thinking, is no longer viable as a formal matter in law
and society. 168 In 1987, the United States Supreme Court in St. Francis
College v. Al-Khazraji, stated:
There is a common popular understanding that there are

166
167

See text accompanying fn 169, infra.

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,
104 S.Ct. 1879 (1984).
168
See e.g., Barbara K. Kopytoff & A. Leon Higginbotham, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex
in the Law of Colonial Antebellum Virginia, 77 Geo. L.J. 1967, 1981 (1968); IAN F. HANEY
LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW : THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (N.Y.U. Press 1996); Haney
Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication and
Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994); Richard Ford, Race As Culture? Why Not?,
47 UCLA L. REV. 1803 (2000) ("It is now almost common knowledge that the idea of raceas-biological-difference has been discredited as a matter of science") id. at 1806; Keith E.
Sealing, Blood Will Tell: Scientific Racism and the Legal Prohibitions Against Miscegenation,
5 M ICH . J. RACE & L. 559 (2000); Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1375 (1999) (“the Court has not held—indeed, could not have held—racial status to
be biological, but [sic] it has instead treated that status as the product of institutions that
were necessarily social and political”) id. at 1446.
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three major human races--Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and
Negroid. Many modern biologists and anthropologists,
however, criticize racial classifications as arbitrary and of
little use in understanding the variability of human beings. It
is said that genetically homogeneous populations do not
exist and traits are not discontinuous between populations;
therefore, a population can only be described in terms of
relative frequencies of various traits. Clear-cut categories
do not exist. The particular traits which have generally
been chosen to characterize races have been criticized as
having little biological significance. It has been found that
differences between individuals of the same race are often
greater than the differences between the "average"
individuals of different races. These observations and
others have led some, but not all, scientists to conclude that
racial classifications are for the most part sociopolitical,
rather than biological, in nature.169
That racial groupings are often correlated with certain physical features
does not make the concept of race a biological reality. 170 Racial

169

St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610, n. 4 (1987) (see generally string
cite in this footnote of works rejecting the notion of a biological category of race)
170
See, e.g., Sandra Soo-Jin, Joanna Mountain, and Barbara Koenig, The Meanings of
“Race” in the New Genomics: Implications for Health Disparities Research, 1 YALE J.
HEALTH POL ’Y L. & ETHICS 33 (2001); Ian Haney Lopez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The
Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL . L. REV. 1143,1152 (1997); Reva Siegel states
that:
Current scientific and social-scientific accounts of race do not treat race
as a group-categorical distinction but instead conceptualize race in terms
of group-salience - as arising out of the uneven incidence of genetic or
phenotypic or social traits in a population; this is the approach to race
reflected in historical-race and culture-race discourses. Further,
historical-race and culture-race discourses understand race as
aggregations of socially relevant traits - that is, they conceptualize race
as made of norms, understandings, cognitive and practical skills,
material resources, life experiences, practices, activities, memories,
concerns, commitments, fears, interests, desires, and identifications that
are distributed in a society in group-salient patterns that persist with
variable intensity over time. Some version of this approach to
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classifications may be associated with genetically transmitted, physical
characteristics like skin color, hair color and texture, eye color and shape,
nose size and shape, facial bone structure, and body size and shape, but
those correlations or associations cannot scientifically be translated into
biological definitions of race and certainly should not be understood as an
analogue of legal parenthood. The variations of each of those
characteristics within a designated "race" are as broad as the variations
between delimited "races."171
The power of race, or racial thinking, is derived
from the supposition that race is biological and hence,
immutable - inextricable from the essential character of
individuals. Historically, race has been identified through
physiological characteristics such as skull size, skin color,
facial features, and other qualities readily available for
scrutiny by the passing observer….

conceptualizing race as a social formation seems inevitable in debates
over the justice of our distributive practices, however complexly we
model the problem in institutional, dynamic, economic, or other terms.
For if we want to identify particular social practices that are
distributively just with respect to race, it would indeed seem that,
whatever our view of distributive fairness, we would have to reason
about race as it is socially instantiated, whether in historical or cultural
terms.
Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color Blindness" Discourse
Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 99-100 (2000).
171
Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race, in
"RACE ," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 21, 30-32 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., U. Chicago
Press 1985); RICHARD C. LEWONTIN ET AL., NOT IN OUR GENES: BIOLOGY , IDEOLOGY , AND
HUMAN NATURE (Pantheon Books 1984); Sandra Soo-Jin, Joanna Mountain, & Barbara
Koenig, supra note 160; Renee Bowser, Racial Bias in Medical Treatment, 105 DICKINSON
L. REV. 365 (2001). Scientists working on the human genome project continue to discover
that there are no genetic ways to differ between races. Natalie Angier, Do Races Differ? Not
Really, Genes Show, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2000, at F1. Findings from the HGP indicate
that 99.9% of the genome is the same across races and ethnicities. Nature Genome
Gateway: http://www.nature.com/genomics/human/slide-show/9.html.
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…the fields of physical or biological anthropology
and population genetics have long held that the idea that
distinct human races exist is scientifically incorrect, as well
as harmful.
The widely accepted consensus among
evolutionary biologists and genetic anthropologists is that
biologically identifiable human races do not exist; Homo
sapiens constitute a single species, and have been so since
their evolution in Africa and throughout their migration
around the world. Population genetics provides the best
evidence for this conclusion: The genetic variation within a
socially recognized human population is greater than the
genetic variation between population groups.172
How we treat people as members of racial groups based on these
physical features and perceived differences is not about biology at all.
Perceptions of which physical differences signify inclusion or exclusion in
certain racial groups (and even what constitutes a racial group) 173 have
changed over time and place and are politically and socially malleable. Ian
Haney Lopez notes, “Race, until recently, has been widely understood as
something rooted in the biology of human differentiation…. [however] all
racial identities…are intelligible only as social constructions. Race is best
understood as a process of social differentiation rooted in culturally
contingent beliefs in the biological division of humans.”174 john powell
describes race as “experiential,” as a verb, as in “being raced,” rather than
as a noun or description. 175

172

Sandra Soo-Jin, Joanna Mountain, & Barbara Koenig, supra note 162 at 37, 39.
As Martha Mahoney explains,“Race derives much of its power from seeming to be a
natural or biological phenomenon, or at the very least, a coherent social category." Martha
R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA . L. REV. 1659, 1661
(1995).
174
Ian F. Haney Lopez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory,
supra note 160 at 1152.
175
john a. powell, The "Racing" of American Society: Race Functioning as a Verb Before
Signifying as a Noun, 15 LAW & INEQ . J. 99 (1997). Accord, Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse
of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA . L. REV. 1805, 1806-07
(1993).
173
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Socially and culturally constructed ideas about race vary in
particular historical moments and locations.176 While there are a few
scientists today arguing for the persistence of racial categories, mostly for
purposes of public health benefits, most scientists and academic scholars
refute the concept of biological race.177 But, as Haney Lopez instructs:
Though a social construction, race is real. Its
reality lies in social practices, including beliefs in natural
group divisions and their significance, not in the abstract
“truth” of such beliefs. Recognizing the falsehood of
physical conceptions of race cannot serve in and of itself
to establish that race is unreal. Nor can it support without
more the conclusion that racial rhetoric is inappropriate for
discussing groups that have been racialized. The “reality”
encountered by such groups does not change in the least
with the recognition that race is not biologically real. 178
My arguments are aligned with Haney Lopez’s premises. The court is
wrong in both ways that it engages with race—in using biological racebased assumptions and in ignoring race’s socio-political impacts when
making a decision in a case like this where racial difference is a critical
element.
A fair analysis of the custody (or visitation) dispute in PerryRogers v. Fasano requires dealing openly with this issue of race, but with
an understanding of race as socio-economic, political, ideological and

176

See e.g., powell, supra note 165 (describing the different ways in which race has been
understood in American history and culture).
177
See fn. 160, supra. Some population geneticists have taken issue recently with this
position. For example, Neil Risch, of Stanford University, argues that the correlation
between race/ethnicity and disease is identifiable through genetics and must be taken into
account by biomedical researchers. Nicholas Wade, Race seen as crucial to medical
research, 8/2/02 Toronto Star F05, 2002 WL 24326698 (referring to Risch’s article in the
online journal Genome Biology). Risch identifies five racial categories through genetic
markers, classifiable based on historically isolated geographic origins that have traditionally
been denominated as races.
178
Haney Lopez, supra note __ at 1186.
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cultural practices, rather than as a biological fact.179 The court does the
exact opposite: it does not deal with race at all in the open, but applies an
assumption about race as a genetic, biological construct that requires a kind
of race-matching between parent and child. Genetic essentialism, applied in
a race-based culture, yields biological racism. Unlike sex, where biology
necessarily informs our understanding of reproduction and parenthood,
there is no relevant ‘biology of race’ to inform our reasoning about
reproduction and parenthood.
As I mentioned earlier, the court claims that it is not looking at
genetics as the defining feature of parenthood. If we take the court at its
word, the only logical inference from the court's decision that the Fasanos
were blameworthy for forming a bond with their child is that the court was
acting on highly race-conscious assumptions about race and race-matching
between parents and children. 180 In other words, my argument is that the
court is either contradicting its own assertions and using a genetics-based
approach as I argued in subsections B and C above, or the court is taking
race into account sub silentio by using an unexamined biological, racebased assumption about parenthood. 181 Either approach is seriously
flawed.

179

M ICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNTIED STATES: FROM
1960S TO THE 1980S (1986). See generally, LESLIE BENDER & DAAN BRAVEMAN,
POWER, PRIVILEGE & LAW : A CIVIL RIGHTS READER (West, 1995).
THE
180
181

See Part III, B, 3, supra.

Discussing other race-based assumptions that intersect with new reproductive
technologies, Lisa C. Ikemoto writes: “What may be most disturbing about this procreative
technology use is the imagined moment of a black woman giving birth to a white infant, or a
white woman giving birth to a black infant….The level of unease generated by interracial
birth may also indicate that the notion of race that assumes biologically-inherent difference
is still deeply embedded in the more recent notion that racial difference is culturally
constructed.” Lisa C. Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 1007, ___ (1996). Likewise, Patricia Williams assesses the role that racebased assumptions would play if the baby in the Baby M case had appeared black:
What would have happened, for example, if Mary Beth Whitehead had
turned out to have been the “passed” descendant of my “filed”
godmother Marjorie’s mother? What if the child she bore had turned
out to be recessively and visibly black?….These questions turn,
perhaps, on not-so-subtle images of which mothers should be bearing
which children. Is there not something unseemly, in our society, about
the spectacle of a white woman mothering a black child? A white
woman giving totally to a black child; a back child totally and
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One reason the court’s approach in this case is so strange is the
court never addresses the issue of the ever-present threat of ART
mistakes resutling in parent-child genetic mismatches and mix-ups. This
case ought to have been decided with attention to its important precedential
value, much like Davis v. Davis182 was, as a case of first impression about
a custody battle over frozen embryos, or In re Baby M,183 a precedential
surrogate mother contract case. The reasoning in this case could have
served as persuasive authority or guidance for courts across the nation.
Thinking about this more broadly, we realize that without
mandatory genetic testing, parents using an ART process cannot know for
certain that the children they have borne are their genetic children. It is
possible for mistakes to happen in any IVF treatment procedure.184 The
New York state legislature has not responded to this problem. For that

demandingly dependent for everything, sustenance itself, from a white
woman. The image of a white woman suckling a black child; the image
of a black child sucking for its life from the bosom of a white woman.
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, T HE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR
226 (Harvard U. Press, 1991). April Cherry, in an important article, also examine the
relationship between race, mothering and reproductive technologies, with specific attention
to gestational surrogate mothering, although her focus is more on the ways that Black
mothers of white children are not appropriately acknowledged in law, rather than the
reverse claim I am making in this section that white mothers of black children are also
discounted by courts. April Cherry, Nurturing in the Service of White Culture: Racial
Subordination, Gestational Surrogacy, and the Ideology of Motherhood
10 T EX. J. WOMEN & L. 83 (2001).
182
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.3d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
183
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
184
Recently another IVF mistake where race was an issue occurred in Britain. Sarah Lyall,
Whites Have Black Twins in In-Vitro Mix-up, N.Y. Times, July 9, 2002, at A12. One
wonders how often this occurs within a racial group rather than across races, and therefore
goes unnoticed or unreported. In Harnicher v. University of Utah Medical center, 962 P.2d
67 (1988, as corrected, March 19, 1999), a sperm mix-up was recognized because the child
had distinctly different physical features from the other children, but the difference was not
racial. There are also several notorious sperm mix-up cases where the parents were white
and the children were of different races. See generally discussion of the Skolnick and the
Higgins sperm mix-up debacles in Raizel Liebler, Are You My Parent? Are You My Child?
The Role of Genetics and Race in Defining Relationships After Reproductive Technological
Mistakes, 5 DE PAUL J. OF HEATH CARE LAW 15 (2002).
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matter, no state legislature has enacted a law requiring all parents to
genetically test their children at birth. 185 Nor has any legislature enacted a
law requiring the special subset of parents, those parents whose children
were conceived through ARTs, to genetically test their children at their
birth. Even absent legislation to that effect, the court may have concluded
that justice requires that any parents participating in ARTs have their
babies genetically tested at their birth to determine their parenthood as a
prerequisite to getting a legal birth certificate and having legal custody.
Since the court never criticized the Fasanos for failing to have
post-birth DNA tests done on both their children immediately upon their
birth, then what about Joseph/Akeil, but not Vincent, would have indicated
to the Fasanos that he was not "their child" and that bonding with him was
wrongful? The court was unequivocal in its understanding that the Fasanos
acted wrongly in permitting a bond to form with the child Joseph/Akeil,
after he was born (if not even while he was in utero), but never indicated
that they were wrongful in bonding with Vincent as well:
[A]ny bonding on the part of Akeil to his
gestational mother and her family was the direct result of
the Fasanos' failure to take timely action upon being
informed of the clinic's admitted error. Defendants cannot
be permitted to purposefully act in such a[] way as to
create a bond, and then rely upon it for their assertion of
rights to which they would not otherwise be entitled. 186
Joseph/Akeil’s only characteristics that could have revealed to the Fasanos
that they were not entitled to treat him as their son were some of his
physical features, including skin color, that are correlated with race.187 The
court implies that immediately upon Joseph/Akeil's birth, the Fasanos should
have recognized his "otherness" (racial difference) from them and severed
(or failed to establish) bonds with him. The reason the Fasanos were
wrong in their conduct, and therefore not entitled to standing as parents in

185

Not that I would want such a law enacted.
Perry-Rogers, 276 A.D.2d at 76.
187
Had his eyes been blue instead of brown, would the court have reached the same
conclusion? Had he been long and thin in a family of short, stocky parents, would the court
have decided that they were wrongful to let bonding occur? What could it have been but the
signs of “racial otherness” or racial difference that motivated the court’s conclusion?.
186
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this visitation action, was that they failed "to take timely action." They
failed to reject their son for his racial otherness when he was born. Lisa
Ikemoto speaks about the way race-based assumptions play into these
technological mistakes and reveal a kind of biological racism:
The image of a black woman claiming authority over a
white child inverts racially-based rules of status and
ownership. Second, the historical rule of race is that any
child born of a black woman is also black. The use of
transracial egg donation to change the conclusion that
blackness begets blackness challenges the assumption that
black mothers create the traits deemed inferior by white
supremacy.
What may be most disturbing about this procreative
technology use is the imagined moment of a black woman
giving birth to a white infant, or a white woman giving birth
to a black infant. Blackness has been so othered that the
intimacy, the ultimate intimacy, of the moment seems
impossible and strange and perhaps even alien. The
strangeness and seeming impossibility of the image only
shows the extent to which motherhood has been used to
maintain the color line. The level of unease generated by
interracial birth may also indicate that the notion of race
that assumes biologically-inherent difference is still deeply
embedded in the more recent notion that racial difference
is culturally constructed. 188
Patricia Williams calls our attention to the ways that race-based imagery
and assumptions in our culture animate our thinking about interracial ART
mistakes, “Is there not something unseemly, in our society, about the
spectacle of a white woman mothering a black child? A white woman
giving totally to a black child; a back child totally and demandingly
dependent for everything, sustenance itself, from a white woman.”189

188

Lisa C. Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS L.J.
1007, ___ (1996) (footnotes omitted).
189
PATRICIA WILLIAMS, supra note 174.
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Insights of scholars like Ikemoto and Williams support my conclusion that
unconscoius or subconscious race-based assumptions tainted the
decisionmaking process in Perry-Rogers v. Fasano.
In line with the argument about how the court treated Vincent
differently from Jospeh/Akeil with respect to relying on genetic tests to
define parenthood, we need to examine what the court left out about what
the Fasanos knew or could have known. The court does not take notice of
the fact that the Fasanos had no information about another specific couple
who was waiting for the birth of this child. Though they knew there had
been a mix-up at the clinic, there is no evidence that they were informed
that the Rogerses were anxiously waiting in the wings for the baby that the
Fasanos were carrying. For all they knew, the Rogerses could have had
babies through the IVF process and chosen to forget the information about
the mix-up. Or the Rogerses could have been trying to put that horrific
experience behind them.
The clinic did not breach the parties’
confidentiality by informing them about one another, so the Rogerses did
not know about the pregnancy and the Fasanos did not know about the
Rogerses. The only reason they would have had for giving up Joseph/Akeil
at that time of his birth was the divergence of their and his physical
features that correlated with notions of race.
The physical mismatch becomes the sub silentio justification for
denying the Fasanos a relationship with their son. 190 The court impliedly
tells us that when Joseph/Akeil was born and the Fasanos noticed his racial
difference, that was cause for them to give up their child, rather than
further their bond with him. Since the Fasanos were not aware that other
"parents" were prepared to take this child at the time of his birth, they
would have had to give the child up to the State or the IVF clinic.191 It
seems extremely unusual to expect a birth mother to give her child to the
State, when she wants him herself, solely because he looks different from

190

Ironically, in Harnicher, supra note 24, the Utah Supreme Court chastised the parents
who complained because their child had physical features dissimilar to theirs. The court
ridiculed the couple and indicated that they should be happy to have given birth to healthy
children through this extraordinary technological feat. Obviously, the Perry-Rogers v.
Fasano court reached the opposite conclusion.
191
Although after the fact we know that there were people desirous of rearing the child, the
Fasanos had no such knowledge at his birth when his racial difference became apparent. If
there were no parents to take this child, the Fasanos would have had to relinquish him to
the State for foster care or adoption. Considering the fact that they wanted this child, it
seems an incredible decision for the court to make.
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her. It seems blatantly racist to imply that a person "ought" not bond with a
child of a different race. Certainly that conclusion ends up "taking race into
account" in an impermissible way (whether mentioned or not).
By not discussing the race, the court is ultimately taking race into
account in this unexamined way.
No other parents of children born
through IVF have been required to test their children upon birth and then, if
their genetic make-up is different from their parents due to a clinic mistake,
to relinquish them to the State (or fail to bond with them). We have no idea
how often this has happened in the absence of racial difference. We also
may have no idea how often it happens when there is racial difference,
although the “sensational” nature of these cases tends to call them to the
media’s attention. 192
The court insists its decision does not turn solely on genetics, but if
it is not using genetics as the key, then its decision must turn on race or skin
color. No doubt the court would be loath to admit its reliance on race
rather than on genetics. Even though the court mystifies its reliance on
genetics, if we agree that the real basis for its judgment is genetics, not skin
color, then I would still argue that genetic essentialism necessarily ends up
taking race into account in an impermissible way. The dividing lines along
the circle of genetics, physical features, biological racism, and ‘race as a
social-political construction’ become blurred and the danger of reproducing
a racist understanding looms large.
Genetic essentialism creates troubling racial issues, in addition to
the troubling sex-based issues discussed in the previous subsection. The
application of a genetic essentialist ideological framework in a case like this
one proves even more disturbing than in many other ARTs debacles. Most
race-based critiques of assisted reproductive technologies argue (1) that
these technologies are not adequately available to people of color, (2) that
use of these technologies reproduces the racist ideology in our society that
values white babies and their physical features over children of color and
their physical characteristics, and (3) that people of color will be "victims"
of this technology as an underclass of breeders or in ways that will cause
them to lose custody of their children. 193 These powerful critiques of

192

Michael Seamark & Beezy Marsh, After White Couple Have Black Twins in Test Tube
Mix-up, Daily Mail (London), July 9, 2002, ____ LEXIS ____,
193
DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY : RACE , REPRODUCTION, AND THE
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racism in society and racism in the uses of ARTs advise extreme caution.
They challenge infertility treatment providers and bioethicists to intervene in
societal racism and prevent ARTs from reproducing systemic racism while
trying to "reproduce" individual persons. Despite the ringing truths and
poignant concerns in those critiques, ironically in the Perry-Rogers v.
Fasano case, each of those claims is inapposite. This case may be the
exception to the rule in terms of how the racial dynamics play out, but it is a
real case, nonetheless.
First, the Rogerses, the couple who had their embryo mistakenly
implanted in another woman, are an African-American couple who clearly
had access to ARTs. There is no doubt that ARTs are prohibitively
expensive for most couples.194 Their expense alone makes them
unavailable to many African-American families who are impoverished or of
only moderate means because of systemic racism. 195 The "lack of access

M EANING OF LIBERTY , Chapter 6 (Pantheon Books, 1997); April Cherry, Nurturing in the
Service of White Culture, supra note 181; Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI.
L REV. 209 (1995); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, T HE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A
LAW P ROFESSOR (Harvard U. Press, 1991); Patricia J. Williams, Spare Parts, Family
Values, Old Children, Cheap, 28 NEW ENG . L. REV. 913 (1994); Anita L. Allen, The Black
Surrogate Mother, 8 HARV. BLACK LETTER J. 17 (1991); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Destabilizing
Thoughts on Surrogacy Legislation, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 633 (1994); Barbara Omolade,
Looking Toward the Future: Feminism and Reproductive Technologies, 37 BUFFALO L.
REV. 203 (1988/89); Beverly Hornsburgh, Jewish Women, Black Women: Guarding Against
the Oppression of Surrogacy, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN 'S L.J. 29 (1993).
194
“In Massachusetts, where infertility care is mandated, the costs, with [ARTs] for a
successful pregnancy is $ 39,375, … other estimates range from $ 60,000-$ 800,000, per
successful pregnancy." Hazel Glenn Beh, Sex, Sexual Pleasure, and Reproduction: Health
Insurers Don't Want You to do Those Nasty Things, 13 WIS. WOMEN ’S L.J. 119, 173, n.362
(1998), cited in, Sherri A. Jason, Comment, “Loving Infertile Couple Seeks Woman Age 1831 to Help Have Baby. $6,500 Plus Expenses and a Gift”: Should We Regulate the Use of
Assisted Reproductive Technologies by Older Women?”, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH . 287
(2001). The cost of infertility treatments ranges from $ 1,500 to $ 10,000 per cycle. James
B. Roche, After Bragdon v. Abbott: Why Legislation is Still Needed to Mandate Infertility
Insurance, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 215 (2002) (fn. 95, citing Peter J. Neumann, Should
Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Options, 22 J. HEALTH POL ., POL 'Y & L. 1215,
12168-9 (1997).
195

Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson & Elaine J. Hall, Reproductive Technology: Perspectives and
Implications for Low-Income Women and Women of Color, in HEALING T ECHNOLOGY :
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 93 (Kathryn Strother Ratcliff, et. al., eds, Ann Arbor, University of
Michigan Press, 1989); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY , supra note 105, at
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for people of color" critique, while true in most situations for AfricanAmericans who might want to utilize ARTs, particularly given higher
infertility rates for African-Americans,196 fails to explain the way this case
reproduces an underlying societal racism.
Second, the technology was used, in part, because the Rogerses
wanted to reproduce themselves as African-Americans. Nothing about
their participation in this ART process indicates that they preferred a white
or European-American baby to their own. They engaged in the technology
in order to create an African-American child, in the instant case countering
the otherwise valid critique that this technology is being used primarily to
create white babies in a world where African-American babies are
considered less desirable. In addition, while it is clearly arguable that the
European-American family may have participated in IVF because they
wanted white children rather than children of color, their conduct after the
birth belies that conclusion. The Fasanos did not seem to value only white
babies, for they were content to claim the African-American child as their
own.
Moreover, in response to the third critique mentioned above, the
woman treated as a "breeder" in this case was Donna Fasano, a EuropeanAmerican woman, not Deborah Perry-Rogers, an African-American
woman. But let there be no mistake that in this case, there was never a
design to use one woman for the benefit of another or to pay one woman
for her gestating services for the benefit of another. Yet if we are to make
any sense of the court's decision denying Donna Fasano visitation rights in
the child she bore, we must conclude that the court viewed her solely as a

253-256. For general analyses of the disproportionate lack of wealth among AfricanAmericans, see DALTON CONLEY , BEING BLACK , LIVING IN THE RED : RACE , WEALTH , AND
SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA (U. Cal. Press, 1999); MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS SHAPIRO ,
BLACK WEALTH /WHITE WEALTH : A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (NY:
Routledge, 1995).
196
Raizel Liebler, supra note 184, reports that Blacks have an infertility rate 1.5 times
greater than whites. Id. at fn. 67 and accompanying text (citing a Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment report on Infertility from 1988, located at http://www.wws.
princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk2/1988/8822/8822.PDF (visited October 10,
2002)), See also, NEW YORK STATE T ASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW , ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE T ECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 11
(1998).
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"breeder" or "incubator." This conclusion reinforces the sex-based or
gender-based critique made earlier, but at least for this case, cuts against
the usual race-based critique of ARTs.
Last, but not least, the usual race-based critiques of ARTs seem to
fail because this is a case where the law permits a couple from a
traditionally oppressed racial group to prevail. The Rogerses sought sole
custody of "their" African-American child without visitation rights in the
white parents, and they won. 197 Under the particular facts of the PerryRogers v. Fasano case, genetic essentialism yields the unwavering
conclusion that the African-American child is the child of the AfricanAmerican parents and should be exclusively in their custody.
As an antiracist strategy in a white supremacist society, if
application of a genetics-based analysis works to privilege parents who
belong to a subordinated or oppressed race,198 shouldn’t we argue for its
continuation, rather than seeking its rejection? My conclusion is that we
should not. The fact that African-American parents won in this case may
be an anomaly. Other situations applying a genetic essentialist approach
may disadvantage more African-American families or families of color
than not. The reasons for choosing or rejecting a genetic essentialist
approach cannot be purely situational.

197

This seemingly antiracist result may in fact reflect a more deep-seated, white
supremacist view that abhors visions of white women giving birth to black children. As
Professor Patricia Williams observed:
Is there not something unseemly, in our society, about the spectacle of
a white woman mothering a black child? A white woman giving totally
to a black child; a black child totally and demandingly dependent for
everything, sustenance itself, from a white woman. The image of a
white woman suckling a black child; the image of a black child sucking
for its life from the bosom of a white woman.
PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW
PROFESSOR 226 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. Press, 1991).
198
Though the narrative and argument in this essay specifically address Black/White,
African-American/European-American racial dynamics, these same concerns arise with
Latinos/as, when understood as a racial category, and Asians. See generally, RICHARD
DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, eds., LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER (NY: N.Y.U.
Press, 1998); ROBERT S. CHANG , DISORIENTED: ASIAN-AMERICANS, LAW AND THE NATION
STATE (NY: NYU Press, 1999); FRANK WU , YELLOW : RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK
AND WHITE (Basic Books, 2001). For a discussion of Latinos/as identity as race-based, see
Ian F. Haney Lopez, Race Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85
CALIF. L. REV. 1143 (1997).
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To reject a genetic essentialist approach because it tends to
reproduce a biological racism does not mean, however, that race should not
be taken into account in deciding the custody and visitation issues in PerryRogers v. Fasano. In America, in the 21st century, it is still irresponsible
and racist to say "regardless of race."199 Race in the United States is
about power and politics, about social castes and economic classes, about
shared histories and cultural practices, about externally imposed
stereotypes and exclusions. One cannot ignore these inequalities and
injustices in the name of colorblindness. Just as a genetics-based approach
tends to produce a biological racism in a race-based society, colorblindness
(or ignoring race entirely) tends to reproduce cultural and political racial
dominance in a race-based society. In a society borne in racism with
slavery as its primary means of production; a society whose founding
documents and principles speak of liberty and equality but simultaneously
accommodated the persistence of slavery;200 a society that fought a bloody
civil war in part to attempt to ameliorate the injustices and harms of slavery
and then within twenty years sold out its equality aspirations again with the
Hayes-Tilden compromise;201 a society that required decades of civil rights
struggle to guarantee these same citizens and their progeny the rights they
should have had from the country's founding and certainly after the Civil
War and emancipation;202 a society where to this day all the statistical data

199

Martin Luther King, Jr.'s dream that people will be judged by the content of their
characters rather than the color of their skin is still merely an aspiration for our society.
Martin Luther King, Jr., I HAVE A DREAM (August 28, 1963). I recognize that if we ever
(dare I say, "when we"?) achieve that day when the physiological features of racial identity
are as "insignificant as eye color" to one's economic well-being, success, opportunities, and
power, then my arguments will need to be changed. I continue to participate in the struggle
that would make that so. I anxiously await a time when the arguments in this section are no
longer salient and would gladly refine them at that point.
200
DERRICK BELL , AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ILLUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
(Basic Books, 1987); DERRICK BELL , RACE , RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW , 4th ed. (Aspen
Law, 2000); Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States
Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987).
201
See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA 'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at
575-601 (Harper & Row 1988).
202
HOWARD BALL , A DEFIANT LIFE : T HURGOOD M ARSHALL & THE PERSISTENCE OF RACISM
IN A MERICA (Crown Publishers, 1998); T AYLOR BRANCH , PILLAR OF F IRE : AMERICA IN THE
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confirm that people of color, and particularly African-Americans, are
second class citizens suffering more poverty, unemployment and
underemployment and hunger, more of whom live in desperate, unsafe and
frequently uninhabitable conditions in inner cities and or rural
environments;203 in a society where African-Americans are subject to
excessive violence, disproportionate imprisonment, police brutality,204 and
racial profiling;205 where African-Americans are significantly

KING YEARS 1963-65 (Simon & Schuster, 1998); T AYLOR BRANCH , PARTING THE WATERS:
AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 (Simon & Schuster, 1988); JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON
THE PRIZE : AMERICA ’S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965: A Companion Volume to the PBS
Television Series (Viking, 1987); T HE EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER (Clayborne
Carson, David J. Garrow, Gerald Gill, Vincent Harding, & Darlene Clark Hine, eds, Penguin
Books, Blackside, 1991); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (Vintage Books, 1975);
HOWARD Z INN, A PEOPLE ’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1492-PRESENT: TWENTIETH
ANNIVERSARY EDITION (Harper Collins, 1999).
203
DALTON CONLEY , BEING BLACK , LIVING IN THE RED , supra note151; OLIVER &
SHAPIRO , supra note 151; ANDREW HACKER, T WO NATIONS (NY: Ballantine Books, 1995);
M ARTIN CARNOY , FADED DREAMS: THE POLITICS OF ECONOMICS AND RACE IN AMERICA
(NY: Cambridge U. Press, 1994); NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE , THE STATE OF BLACK
AMERICA (Washington, DC: National Urban League, January 1992); DOROTHY NEWMAN ,
ET. AL , PROTEST, POLITICS, AND P ROSPERITY : BLACK A MERICANS AND WHITE INSTITUTIONS,
1940-1975 (NY: Pantheon Books, 1978); M ANNING M ARABLE, HOW CAPITALISM
UNDERDEVELOPED BLACK AMERICA : PROBLEMS IN RACE , POLITICAL ECONOMY & SOCIETY
(South End Press, 1983); ); See generally, INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY ,
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/irp/ (and links therein).
204
DAVID COLE , NO EQUAL JUSTICE : RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (NY: The New Press, 1999); SAMUEL WALKER, CASSIA SPOHN , & MIRIAM
DE LONE , THE COLOR OF JUSTICE : RACE , ETHNICITY AND CRIME IN AMERICA (Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1996); RONALD H. WELCH & CARLOS T. ANGULO , JUSTICE ON
T RIAL: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Washington, DC:
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights / Leadership Conference Education Fund, May
2000); ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. H ARRISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS
IN 2000 (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, August 2001); Federal Bureau of Prisons,
Quick Facts, May 2002, http://www.bop.gov/fact0598.html; Angela Y. Davis, Masked
Racism: Reflections on the Prison Industrial Complex, COLORLINES (Fall 1998), also
published at http://home.ican.net/~edtoth/lawprisonrace.html; Angela Y. Davis, Women in
Prison: African-American Women have fastest rising incarceration rate in U.S, ESSENCE
(Sept. 2000).
205
DAVID A. HARRIS, DRIVING WHITE BLACK : RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S
HIGHWAYS, AN ACLU SPECIAL REPORT, June 1999, http://www.aclu.org/profiling/
report/index.html.
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underrepresented as leaders in business, professions and politics;206 where
most African-American children experience underfunded, inadequate
educational opportunities and are tracked into school classes with low
expectations of success that lead to dead ends; 207 a society where
African-Americans suffer from inadequate health care and high infant
mortality rates;208 and where African-Americans are too-frequently
portrayed negatively in the media as criminals, thugs and ne'er-do-wells;209
in such a society, in this society, we cannot say that race doesn't matter210
or issues of race can be ignored. To be colorblind in this situation is to be
blind to the realities of the ways racism continues to affect the lives and

206

LANI GUINIER, THE T YRANNY OF THE M AJORITY (NY: Free Press, 1994); T HOMAS DYE ,
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STUDIES,
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OFFICIALS,
A
STATISTICAL
SUMMARY 2000,
http://www.jointcenter.org/whatsnew/beo-2002/ (formerly Black Elected Officials: A
National Roster)
207
GARY ORFIELD, SUSAN B. EATON & THE HARVARD PROJECT ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION,
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: T HE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (
NY: The New Press, 1996); JONATHAN KOZOL, AMAZING GRACE : T HE LIVES OF CHILDREN
AND THE CONSCIENCE OF A N ATION (NY: Crown, 1995 ); JONATHAN K OZOL, SAVAGE
INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA ’S SCHOOLS (Crown, 1991); JONATHAN KOZOL,
DEATH AT AN EARLY AGE : THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HEARTS AND M INDS OF NEGRO
CHILDREN IN THE BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1967);
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Vernellia R. Randall, Racist Health Care: Reforming a Racist Health Care System to Meet
the Needs of African-Americans, 3 HEALTH M ATRIX 127 (1993); Sidney D. Watson, Race,
Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives, 27 AM. J. L. & M ED . 203 (2001);
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http://academic.udayton.edu/health/.; UNEQUAL T REATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND
ETHNIC BARRIERS IN HEALTH CARE (National Academy Press, 2002), available online at
http://www.nap.edu/books/030908265X/html/; HHS Initiative to Eliminate Racial and
Ethnic Disparities in Health Care, National Vital Statistics System, Linked Birth and Infant
Death Data, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/linked.htm; Infant Mortality Rates by Race and
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http://raceandhealth.hhs.gov/
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Health,
Data/Statistics,
at
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ROBERT ENTMAN AND ANDREW ROJECKI, T HE BLACK IMAGE IN TH E WHITE M IND: M EDIA
AND RACE IN A MERICA (U. Chi. Press, 2000); HYPE: Managing the Black Image in the
Media, online at http://www.ayaed.com/hype/index.htm.
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opportunities of most African-Americans.211 Race is not a biological
category, but in America, it is a political, socio-economic and cultural one.
Until we have eradicated racism from our core, we cannot in good faith
allow the law to ignore race, even in the name of the laudable -sounding
goal of colorblindness. At this historical juncture an anti-racist strategy
must take race into account.
The law has a responsibility to do all it can to make sure that a
child whose destiny is in its hand is not reared by racist parents. A passive
assumption that there are no relevant race-based factors in deciding issues
of child custody and parentage is completely inadequate. No child should
be taught that he or she is inferior (or superior) based on racially correlated
physical attributes or cultural norms. Children who are likely to be
subjected to societal and political racism need parents who can understand
and identify this dynamic, and who can teach them their history. Parents of
a child subjected to racial prejudices and discrimination must be able to
prepare the child to deal with this aspect of life, to nurture the child's selfimage and capacities for success, to offer the child a sense of cultural and
racial pride, and to guide the child to live an ethical, responsible life.212
While courts cannot intervene in every child's life to assure that the child
will not bear a socially-imposed and psychologically-internalized mark of
inferiority,213 courts can and must act in cases where issues of children's
parentage and well-being are before them. Courts are obliged by their

211

PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLORBLIND FUTURE : T HE PARADOX OF RACE
(Noonday Press 1998).
212
Dorothy Roberts discusses the role that Black parents must play in rearing Black
children:
A Black parent’s essential contribution to his or her children is not
passing down genetic information but sharing lessons needed to survive
in a racist society. Black parents transmit to their children their own
cultural identity and teach them to defy racist stereotypes and
practices, training their children to live in two cultures, both Black and
white. Some feel they must cultivate in their children what W.E.B. Du
Bois described as a double consciousness; others see their task as
preparing their children “to live among white people without becoming
white people.” Some Black sociologists have opposed transracial
adoption on the ground that only Black parents are capable of teaching
Black children these necessary “survival skills.” (footnotes omitted).
DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY , supra note 105 at 262.
213
Charles Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
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commitments to justice to take the political, social, cultural and ideological
implications of race into account in their decision-making.
The debates about transracial adoption may prove informative
here. The National Association of Black Social Workers has argued that
placing African-American children in European-American families for
adoption is a form of racial and cultural imperialism. 214 They specifically
recommend that African-American children be adopted by AfricanAmericans whenever possible. Likewise, in response to a history of U.S.
government-backed removal of Native American children from their tribal
communities and their placement in European-American families or
institutions, the Indian Child Welfare Act requires that decisions about
placement of Native American children for adoption be made first and
foremost by their tribe with a strong preference for tribal parentage, rather
than by state or federal courts with their usual preferences for EuropeanAmerican (or even African-American) families.215 Both these approaches
respond to the perceived dangers to children of isolating them in families
who undermine or sever their cultural identity and racial roots. In response
to these concerns, Congress passed the Metzenbaum Multiethnic
Placement Act in 1994, allowing race as a permissible consideration in
adoption placement.216 A strong countermovement in support of transracial
adoption and foster care developed, and that provision of the Multiethnic

214

Roberts, The Genetic Tie, supra note 160, at fn. 98 (citing Position Paper developed at
the National Association of Black Social Workers' Conference in Nashville, Tenn., Apr 4-9
1972, reprinted IN RITA JAMES SIMON & HOWARD ALSTEIN, T RANSRACIAL ADOPTION (John
Wiley, 1977), at 50). See also Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An
Analysis of Discourse and Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 33 (1993-4).
215
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1964 (1994). The Act, at § 1911(a) and (b), states that a tribe shall
have exclusive jurisdiction "over child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who
resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe" and prefers in cases involving
Indian children off the reservation that the state transfer jurisdiction to the tribe. See
Barbara Atwood, Identity and Assimilation: Changing Definitions of Tribal Power over
Children, 4 M INN. L. REV. 927 (1999). Whether this statutory preference for tribal
determinations of child custody is understood to be about sovereignty instead of race, race
is still a formidable guiding force in this adoption law.
216
Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, §§
551-554, 108 Stat. 4056, (codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. 1996(b) and 42 U.S.C. 5115a
(1994)).
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Placement Act was repealed in 1996, clearly prohibiting states and adoption
placement agencies from using race, color or national origin as a criteria for
foster or adoptive placements.217 Some theorists argue that despite the
change in the law, race-matching continues to be promoted in the guise of a
preference for kinship care.218 An extensive debate exists in the literature
about whether race-matching in adoption is a good thing. 219
Those who advocate race-matching would no doubt reject the
approach I am promoting in this section. Nonetheless, I believe an
approach that assures as much as possible that a child is put into a family
environment sensitive to the racial dynamics the child will encounter during
his/her life and that the family is determined to nurture the child’s cultural

217

Adoption Promotion and Stability Act of 1996, in the Small Business Job Protection
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 1808(c), 110 Stat. 1755, 1904 (codified as 42 U.S.C.
1996(b) (also referred to as section 1808 of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,
entitled "Removal of Barriers to Interethnic Adoption"). This is now a final rule of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services. Administration on Children, Youth and
Families (ACYF), Administration for Children and Families (ACF), and Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS), Final Rule, 65 FED . REG . 4020 (March 2000). See
also Suzanne Brannen Campbell, Taking Race Out of the Equation: Transracial Adoption in
2000, 53 SMU L. REV. 1599 (2000) for a discussion of the legislative history and
considerations.
218
See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Correspondence, Private Race Preferences in Family
Formation, 107 YALE L. J. 2351 (1998) (responding to R. Richard Banks, The Color of
Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State
Action, 108 YALE L. J. 875 (1998)).
219
See Christine M. Metteer, A Law Unto Itself: The Indian Child Welfare Act as
Inapplicable and Inappropriate to the Transracial/Race-Matching Adoption Controversy, 38
BRANDEIS L.J. 47 (1999) (outlining the debate and distinguishing race-matching from what
occurs under the Indian Child Welfare Act). See generally Symposium on Transracial
Adoption, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 381 (1997). For examples of writings supporting racematching, see Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, The Indian Child Welfare Act and the African
American Tribe: Facing the Adoption Crisis, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 201 (1997-98); and R.
Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial Preference Through
Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998). For critiques of race-matching, see
Katharine Bartlett, Comparing Race and Sex Discrimination in Custody Cases, 28 HOFSTRA
L.REV. 877 (2000); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best
Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 M ICH . L. REV. 925, 959-62 (1994); ELIZABETH
BARTHOLET, NOBODY 'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE
ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 135-40 (1999) ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION
AND THE P OLITICS OF P ARENTING (1993); and Randall Kennedy, Orphans of Separatism: The
Painful Politics of Transracial Adoption, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1994, at 38, 38-42.
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and social connections, goes a long way towards satisfying some of the
opposition’s concerns.
While some aspects of this adoption debate seem analogous to the
issues the court must resolve in Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, there is a critical
difference. This is not a case where the state or courts are removing a
child from his natural parents to place him in the home of a differently
raced couple/parent. In this case, Joseph/Akeil was born into the home of
differently raced natural parents, but is subsequently claimed by a samerace genetic parent-couple. The court is challenged to determine the
custody or visitation rights of the differently-raced natural parent. This is
much closer to a traditional custody battle between genetic parents of
different races than to transracial adoption. 220
In a case directly addressing the issue of race in a custody dispute
between natural parents, the U.S. Supreme Court in Palmore v. Sidoti in
1984 determined that the state may not take race and race-based societal
prejudices into consideration in custody cases.221 The European-American
ex-husband in Palmore argued for a "race-matching" approach that would
award custody of his European-American children to him. He claimed that
the reality of social, racist prejudices would negatively impact his children's
lives, if they were placed with his European-American ex-wife and her
new African-American husband. The Court clearly rejects the exhusband/father's approach. 222 The Palmore court mandates that the law
take a "colorblind" view, despite its recognition that, in fact, race plays a

220

See Katharine Bartlett, Comparing Race and Sex Discrimination in Custody Cases,
supra note 191, for an extensive discussion of custody battles between differently raced
parents (particularly fn. 61) and differently raced adoptive parents and children
(particularly fn. 62).
221
466 U.S. 429 (1984) (“Public officials sworn to uphold the Constitution may not avoid a
constitutional duty by bowing to the hypothetical effects of private racial prejudice that
they assume to be both widely and deeply held”), id, at 433. See also J.H.H. v. O’Hara,
878 F.2d 240, 244 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Palmore v. Sidoti for the proposition that "the
consideration of race plays no role whatsoever in the regulation of family and domestic
relationships").
222
In Palmore, the genetic parents were both European-American, but after the couple
separated, the mother co-habited with and then married an African-American man. The
genetic father argued that he should be given custody of the child, in part, because the child
would suffer living in a home with parents of different races.
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powerful role in the children's lives. Arguably, the Court does not act from
colorblindness, but with a vivid recognition of the racial context. The Court
acknowledges the societal prejudices and articulates a powerful
commitment to overcoming their pernicious effects. The Court concludes
that those effects could be overcome better by refusing to succumb to the
racial prejudices of the day rather than acceding to them. Despite its
rhetoric of color-blindness, the court manifests a profound color
consciousness and antiracist sentiment. Palmore makes clear that the
court will not tolerate the use of race-based assumptions to interfere with
relationships between parents and their children. Unfortunately, this lesson
was lost on the Perry-Rogers v. Fasano court.
Perhaps the Fasano court missed the message of Palmore,
because the U.S. Supreme Court in that case articulated its reasoning in
terms of colorblindness.
The Court declares that equality and
nondiscrimination, which the Court recognizes as its primary long-term
goals, require colorblindness.
The law's ideological mating of
"colorblindness" with equality and non-discrimination is problematic at this
historical moment.223 At the dawn of this century, it continues to be

223

For a fascinating symposium in which several articles deal with issues of colorblindness,
see Symposium on Law in the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL . L. REV. (2000). E.g., in that
volume, Angela Harris writes, "The equation of race law with equality law tends to obscure
the law's participation in creating and maintaining racial distinctions, and thus subtly
perpetuates the notion that races just naturally are and that equality law simply provides a
neutral forum for conflict among them." Angela Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and
Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL . L. REV. 1923, 1927 (2000). Harris
argues that whether we are in a century that views "equality as sameness" (colorblindness)
or "equality as difference" (color hierarchy), both formulations of equality have been able to
coexist in the United States with relations of domination and exclusion. By applying a
‘MacKinnonesque’ feminist analysis of equality to race law, Harris shows the necessity for
a power or dominance analysis of equality, because neither a sameness nor a difference
approach to equality has been capable of adequately remedying racial domination and
power imbalances. For a sample of MacKinnon's dominance analysis, see CATHARINE A.
M ACKINNON , Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (Harvard U. Press 1987). See also Reva B.
Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color Blindness" Discourse Disrupts
and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77 (2000) (arguing that race-neutral
equality jurisprudence fosters principles of "group-blind distribution without
disestablishing group stratification,” id., at 84, and that “color blindness discourse both
constrains and legitimates practices that maintain racial stratification," id., at 87. She further
suggests that "one needs a concept of social stratification – of status inequality among
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particularly inappropriate to omit reflection on the consequences of race
stratification and power imbalances on the lives of children when making
determinations about their custody and parentage. The law must find
ways of taking the reality of race relations into account, while refusing to
reinforce disadvantages and harms flowing from racist subordination. That
is actually what the Supreme Court did in the Palmore case.
Parents or potential parents in cases of racial differences can be
treated equally and non-discriminatorily, even when race is openly
considered and even with an understanding that racial factors cut
differently for different racial identities. The answer is neither heedless
race-matching nor colorblindness, but a careful examination of whether
particular parents understand the history and political dynamics of racial
groupings in this country and in their communities. If a child is from a
subordinated racial group, the parents must evidence a commitment to
protect the child from racial domination, while nurturing the child's racial
and cultural identity.
If a child is a member of the dominant racial
grouping, an analysis of parenting abilities should examine the parent's
capacity to bring up the child with racial awareness and nonracist values.
At a minimum, this inquiry must be included in a "best interests of the child"
analysis for custody disputes between differently raced parents or between
parents where at least one parent is differently raced from the child. 224

groups arising out of the interaction of social structure and social meaning – in order to make
sense of the blindness trope at the heart of antidiscrimination law" id. at 77-78).
224
Dean Katharine Bartlett has been a strong critic of the "best interests of the child"
standard for custody determinations, because she argues that it is currently too
indeterminate and leaves too much to the individual judge's predilections and prejudices.
Bartlett, supra note 191, at 894. She prefers the proposed more determinant ALI standard
allocating custody based on pre-divorce proportion of caretaking. Though she concludes
that discrimination on the basis of either sex or race should be "categorically prohibited,"
she also recognizes that an appropriate analysis of the child's best interests may include
race-related inquiries such as the one I suggested in the text:
It means no race-matching or sex-matching. It does not mean that a
child's need for a healthy self-image, whether it relates to sex or race,
cannot be considered. A parent's ability to meet a child's needs for a
positive self-image should be relevant to the same extent as other
parental abilities. However, nothing should be presumed about a
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Ultimately, a parent's ability to give a child what he or she needs is not
based on the parent's genetic contribution to the child's physiognomy, but on
the parent's race-consciousness and openness to continued learning in
multiracial environments.
A genetic essentialist approach results in unthinking race-matching.
Genetic essentialism reinstates a discredited biologic al notion of race that
completely ignores social stratification and power imbalances regarding
racial classifications.225 A genetics-based analysis of legal parenthood,
especially when it considers itself race-neutral because it does not take
race into account, is a step backwards in our evolving jurisprudence of
race. So too is an analysis of parenthood that aggressively refuses to
discuss race in a racially charged situation, yet unconsciously applies racebased assumptions about the inappropriateness of interracial intimacy and
the biology of race.
If our goal is a nonracist jurisprudence, racial
dynamics must be carefully examined to make sure that legal decisions are
not continuing a pattern of racial domination or stratification. Such an
approach that directs courts to investigate the racial awareness and
sensitivity of parents denies the Rogerses automatic entitlement to the
African-American child because of their racial similarities or genetic link;
likewise it would permit the Fasanos custody and visitation despite their
racial differences. Both families are on relatively equal footing before a
judge who is determining the child's best interests, although the Fasanos
admittedly have a greater burden to prove their racial awareness,
sensitivity, and cultural consciousness to the child's potential struggles as an
African-American in a racially stratified society than do the Rogerses. It is
then incumbent upon the court to instruct whichever set of parents prevails
under the best interest inquiry about their continuing obligation to deal with
racial awareness and sensitivity issues during the child’s life.
In most cases involving custody disputes between parties engaged
in assisted reproductive technologies, these issues of racial awareness and

parent's ability based on his or her race or sex.
Id., at 893. I would argue further that same race, dominant race, or differently raced parents
should all be subjected to the same analysis in determining the appropriate placement for a
child whose custody is being decided by a court.
225
“[T]he law can become rather muddled when it unthinkingly adopts biological
definitions to suit the needs of social distinctions…The result is that biology distorts law
and law, in turn, distorts biology.” R. Alta Charo, Biological Determinism in Legal Decision
Making: The Parent Trap, 3 T EX. J. OF WOMEN & LAW 265, 266 (1994).
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cultural consciousness will not arise.226 When race or ethnicity does
become an issue in these cases, however, courts cannot turn a blind eye to
the realities of societal racism. Those issues do not disappear through nonacknowledgment. Individual judges may not be particularly well-equipped
by experience or their own awareness to evaluate this aspect of a child's
best interests or of parental fitness. Courts will necessarily have to rely on
the advice of experts in matters of racial dynamics and child-rearing to
gather adequate information to make informed judgments about these
qualities in the same ways they make informed judgments about other
intangible aspects of familial relationships. So long as courts are
empowered to make best interests determinations for children when
potential adult caregivers are disputing their custody, questions about racial
awareness and nonracist values ought to be included in that judgment.
Defaulting to solely genetics-based definitions of parenthood or a simplified
race-matching approach risks perpetuating patterns of racial inequality and
domination.

V. Conclusion
ART mistakes force the legal system to examine its underlying
assumptions about genes, sex, race, and legal parenthood. While questions
about race, sex and genes have always existed in families, as the PerryRogers v. Fasano case illustrates, those questions may be writ large in
disputes arising from ART fiascos. Cases about embryo mix-ups,
particularly cases involving couples and children of different races, are
valuable heuristic models to test our juridical conceptions of legal
parenthood. The complicated issues arising from ART mistakes force us to
work even harder to discover the underlying assumptions in our legal

226

A compelling argument can be made that issues of racial sensitivity and awareness
should be addressed in all ART mix-up cases where courts are deciding the “best interests”
of a child or the appropriateness of particular parents having custody, whether all the
parties, including the children, are European-American or not. I realize that the likelihood of
persuading a court to utilize this analysis in an ART mix-up case where all parents and
children are identified as being of the same race is negligible, so I will not pursue this
argument in the text right now. I am persuaded, however, that the argument is sound and
should be developed.
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notions of kinship and to ask ourselves about the values we want reflected
in our applications of law in the future. The turn of the new millennium
combined with the increasing use of complex reproductive technologies
present a perfect opportunity for us to discard the biases that have tainted
our understandings of reproduction and law in the past. As our science and
technologies grow more sophisticated, so should our insights about equality
and human relationships. When we think about how the law ought to deal
with these previously unimagined reproductive consequences of ART
mistakes, we need to think about how racism and sexism continue to distort
our legal understandings in the present and how we must prevent that from
happening in the future.
An increasing number of courts today believe that the science of
genetics provides the solution to the legal problems that the science of
ARTs has wrought. In Perry-Rogers v. Fasano the court ultimately relied
on genetics, despite its claims to the contrary, to determine who the rightful
parents were of the child born from the mixed-up embryo. When courts
define parenthood genetically, they revive harmful sex-bias. A geneticsbased approach to determining legal parenthood reincorporates a male -bias
in law by valuing all of men’s biological contributions to reproduction
(gametes), but valuing only a small part of women’s biological contributions
to reproduction (gametes, but not gestation, labor or birth). When courts
make a genetic -based judgment about parenthood in the context of
differently raced couples, their biases are compounded. When courts
assume that similar physical traits of racial group membership describe
legal and biological parent-child relationships, they risk reinstating a
biological racism, with its imprudent biological race-matching and damaging
assumptions about the illegitimacy of interracial intimacies/families. Finally,
courts perpetuate race-based injustices and prejudices by pretending to
ignore issues of race while our society and cultures are still steeped in
racial inequalities and oppression. Race as social, political, cultural and
ideological practices, not as biological fact, must be considered relevant
when ART mistakes involve people with racial differences. As the court’s
inadequate decision in Perry-Rogers v. Fasano reveals, failure to examine
these underlying race and gender assumptions and biases ends up making
the devastation of ART mistakes worse, not better.
Society cannot expect to use technologies, including ARTs, without
mistakes. Whether negligent, reckless or intentional, mistakes with their
unplanned consequences are inevitable. We are only human, and humans
are fallible, no matter how sophisticated our technologies become. In the
realm of bioethics, the law consistently finds itself in the awkward position
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of having to resolve the contests caused by the consequences of these alltoo-human mistakes with the technologies. Although traditional tort
monetary damages actions against the profit-making marketers of these
technologies may serve important societal justice goals, they do not resolve
who will be the legal parents of the child. Mistakes with assisted
reproductive technologies involve the creation of new life and disputes that
go to the heart of questions of identity and family. As citizens and
members of our communities we must urge our legislative bodies to engage
in constant study of the ever-changing implications of these new
reproductive technologies on family relationships and to make appropriate
revisions to out-dated statutes and regulations. Unfortunately, courts often
need to resolve these cases without much legislative guidance, while the
public policy, ethical, and legal debates are still raging. None of these are
easy questions with simple right answers. Courts are bound to get the
analysis wrong in some cases. They are more likely than ever to get it
wrong when they try to find quick technical or scientific answers to
complex human, familial, cultural and social problems. As lawyers and
bioethicists we must help courts resolve these dilemmas properly by
challenging their faulty analogies, offering more appropriate analogies,
situating the bioethical debates within the larger political and social critiques
of systemic gender, race and class biases, steering courts away from
solutions rooted solely in our current sciences, and reminding courts that we
can only move forward with open, well-reasoned discussions of the issues
and our values.

